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CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON, 1937-1957: PART Ill
WARREN L SHATTUCK*
CONDITIONS; AND BREACH OF PROMISE AS AN EXCUSE FOR FAILURE TO
PERFORM A RETURN PROMISE-
Express Conditions. Express conditions continue to be the draft-
man's principle reliance, in his endeavor to delineate precisely the
scope of the obligation undertaken by a promisor. The later cases
contain many interesting illustrations of this drafting technic, but are
otherwise notable only for the continued absence of a sound approach
to the classification of conditions as precedent or subsequent.
A good statement of fundamentals appeared in Partlow v. Matk-
ews:
4
6
5
A condition precedent is such as must happen or be performed before
a right can accrue to enforce an obligation dependent upon the happen-
ing or performance thereof against another in favor of one claiming
such right .... Conditions precedent to a recovery under'a contract
are usually created by such phrases as 'on condition' or 'provided that',
or 'so that', and the like. But such expressions are not necessary if the
contract is of such a nature as to show that the parties intended to
provide for a condition precedent... Whether the doing of an act is
a condition precedent depends, not on any hard and fast rule, but on
the intention of the parties as deduced from the whole instrument.
It will be observed that an express condition is a contract term
qualifying a promise. It is a term because the offeror stated the con-
dition (either as a limitation on his own promise or on one he requested
the offeree to make) and the offeree acquiesced when he accepted. The
offer and acceptance phase of many a transaction is obscured in the
execution of a formal document, but this does not vary the analysis.
Nor is it material whether the contract is bilateral or unilateral.
The qualification created by a condition most often consists of a
restriction (other than the passage of time) on the expressed purpose
of a promisor to do what he promised. As an integral part of his under-
taking he has said that he will perform only if an indicated event
occurs or does not occur before, or an indicated state of affairs exists
or does not exist when, the time for performance arrives. He may adopt
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
16543 Wn.2d 398, 261 P.2d 394 (1953). See also In re Lewis' Estate, 2 Wn.2d 458,
98 P2d 654 (1940) (provision in a note, for extinguishment of liability on the payee's
death, analyzed as a condition and part of the contract).
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the negative phrasing, saying he will not perform if a stated event
occurs or does not occur. He may even say the contract "shall be void"
or "terminated" if a stated event occurs or does not occur. These
variant ways of expressing a qualification all fit within the formula
stated in the Partlow case; the condition regulates performance of a
contract duty and is precedent."' Confusion was however evidenced
in other opinions which seem to indicate that negative or "null and
void" phrasing of the condition makes it subsequent."T The term
"condition subsequent" is by the better usage reserved for a qualifica-
tion which takes quite a different direction, operating on the enforce-
ability of a cause of action produced by a breach rather than on the
existence of a duty to perform."68 The only common instances are
found in clauses which set a period within which suit for a breach
must be brought. Since some important procedural propositions are
governed by the distinction between a condition precedent and a con-
dition subsequent,6 ' proper analysis and classification of a particular
contract provision can be more than a terminological problem. This
is a detail which badly needs clarification by the court.
As was inferred in the Partlow case, disputes about the existence or
46 This is the classification endorsed by RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 250(a), 259
(1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 666-667A (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS§ 628, 739 et seq. (1950).
48? See, e.g., Fleming v. August, 48 Wn2d 131, 291 P.2d 369 (1955), and Ravenholt
v. Hallowell, 48 Wn.2d 136, 291 P.2d 653 (1955). These cases involved a parol evi-
dence rule issue, and are discussed in Note, 31 WASH. L. Rrv. 105 (1956). Concerning
the parol evidence rule problem, see the discussion at note 443 et seq., above. See also
In re Lewis' Estate, cited in note 465 above; of the condition there in issue the court
said that the payee's death "marked the termination of the obligation under the con-
tract." Actually, was not the payee's survival a condition precedent to the maker's
duty to pay?468 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250(b) (1932) and the text material cited in
note 466 above.
469 The burden of proving satisfaction or excuse of a condition precedent is usually
said to rest on the promisee; the burden is on the promisor if the condition is subse-
quent. See 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 741 (1950). Although there is no logical basis on
which negative or "null and void" phrasing of the condition can be made to govern the
burden of proof, there are cases which make the phrasing govern. See Port Blakely
Mill Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 50 Wash. 657, 97 Pac. 781 (1908) ; 3 WILLISTON,
CoNTR.ACTS § 674 (rev. ed. 1936) ; REsTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 259 comment b (1932).
The reason is often obscure; one reason may be erroneous analysis of the condition as
subsequent. The Washington situation was further complicated by Towey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 27 Wn.2d 829, 180 P2d 815 (1947), in which the burden of allega-
tion and proof was put on the promisor because the policy did not recite that "no suit
or action on the policy could be maintained until after full compliance by the insured
with all of the requirements of the policy." The condition in question was proof of loss
(dearly a condition precedent) and the decision seems unsupportable on any theory.
On the other hand the promisor is obliged to identify in his answer the specific condi-
tion he contends was not met, the promisee remaining under the burden of persuasion
but able to frame a good complaint by alleging generally that he has met all conditions
precedent. See 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 749 (1950); RCW 4.36.080; WASH. RuLEs,
PLEADING, PRACTICE. PaocnuRaE 9(c), 153 Wash. Dec. v (1958).
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scope of an express condition will be resolved by the familiar inter-
pretation7 ° and implication47' principles. The canon under which
ambiguity is resolved against the person who used the unclear language
is often controlling and will usually operate against the promisor.' 2
Since an express condition is a contract term and part of the bar-
gain, literal operation of the condition is normally to be anticipated47
The promisee bought a qualified right. He can expect excuse of the
condition and relief from his bargain only if the promisor wrongfully
interferes with satisfaction of the condition, 74 or waives it,' or if the
condition is not of material importance to the promisor and denial of
relief for the promisee would occasion him a serious forfeiture."'
Constructive Conditions. The basic constructive condition prin-
470 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 253, 258 (1932) ; 3 CoPBIN, CONTRACTS § 639
(1950) ; 3 W.LISTON, CoNTRAcTs §§ 672, 673 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Gregory v. Morrow,
4 Wn.2d 144, 102 P.2d 699 (1940) ; Georgian House of Interiors, Inc. v. Glens Falls
Ins. Co., 21 Wn.2d 470, 151 P.2d 598 (1944) ; Garrett v. Nespelem Consol. Mines, Inc.,
23 Wn.2d 824, 162 P.2d 591 (1945) ; Superior Portland Cement, Inc. v. Pacific Coast
Cement Co., 33 Wn.2d 169, 205 P.2d 597 (1949); Michigan Chem. Corp. v. Frady,
47 Wn.2d 677, 289 P.2d 363 (1955).
471 Gregory v. Morrow, 4 Wn2d 144, 102 P.2d 699 (1940), citing RESTATEMENT,
CONTACrS § 262 (1932). See also 3 CoaRiN, CONTRACTS §§ 631, 640 (1950) ; 3 Wi.-
LISTON, CONTRACTS § 887A et seq. (rev. ed. 1936). The key argument for implication
of a condition is inability of the promisor to perform unless the condition-event occurs.
Tube-Art Display, Inc. v. Berg, 37 Vn.2d 1, 221 P.2d 510 (1950), is instructive in its
holding against the promisor; although the defense was primarily impossibility, the
court's discussion is also applicable to an implied-condition issue.
477 See Dowell, Inc. v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Wash. 666, 72 P.2d 296(1937) ; McKillips v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 10 Wn.2d 122, 116 P2d 330 (1941) ; State
Bank of Wilbur v. Phillips, 11 Wn.2d 483, 119 P.2d 664 (1941). See also the dis-
cussion at note 401 above.
47 3 Richardson v. Superior Fire Ins. Co., 192 Wash. 553, 74 P.2d 192 (1937);
Hilliard v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 195 Wash. 478, 81 P.2d 513 (1938) ; Draper v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1 Wn.2d 17, 95 P.2d 28 (1939) ; Post v. Maryland Cas. Co., 2
Wn.2d 21, 97 P.2d 173 (1939) ; Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Willrich, 13 Wn2d 263,
124 P.2d 950 (1942) ; Department of Labor & Indus. v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n,
13 Wn.2d 288, 124 P.2d 944 (1942); Jones v. Allen, 14 Wn.2d 111, 127 P.2d 265
(1942) ; Rushlight & Co. v. Johnson, 18 Wn.2d 383, 139 P.2d 280 (1943) ; Georgian
House of Interiors, Inc. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 21 Wn.2d 470, 151 P.2d 598 (1944) ;
Garrett v. Nespelem Consol. Mines, Inc., 23 Wn.2d 824, 162 P.2d 591 (1945) ; Kraft
v. Spencer Tucker Sales, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 943, 239 P.2d 563 (1952); Partlow v.
Mathews, 43 Wn.2d 398, 261 P.2d 394 (1953) ; Winslow v. Mell, 48 Wn.2d 581, 295
P.2d 319 (1956). See also 3 WLisToN, CoNTRACTS § 675 (rev. ed. 1936).
47 See the discussion below at note 496.
475 See the discussion below at note 502.
476 Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wn.2d 509, 110 P.2d 182 (1941), citing
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 302 (1932). Said the court: "This court has not hesitated
to grant relief from express conditions in contracts, where great injustice and undue
hardship would result from strict enforcement . . .," citing earlier Washington cases.
See also WASHINGTON ANNOTATiONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 302 (1935); 3 CoR-
BIN, CONTRACTS § 748 (1950) ; 3 WIILIST N, CONTRACTS §§ 769 et seq., 805 (rev. ed.
1936). "Forfeiture" is often alleged by a plaintiff who has performed his side of the
bargain, wholly or substantially, but has not satisfied an express condition qualifying
the defendant's duty. If for such a plaintiff there is available a remedy in quasi-con-
tract, it may be doubted that there exists any forfeiture risk of the kind which justifies
a court in ignoring a condition.
19591
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ciples were well established in early Washington casesP77 and relatively
few disputes about the existence of such conditions or about their
operation have reached the court since 1937. The later cases disclose
no departures from the propositions previously adopted.
Constructive conditions implement a simple and obvious analysis
of a non-aleatory bilateral contract. Back of the exchange of promises
which creates the legal relation of contract are some expectations
about the promised performances which constitute the real exchange
or bargain. The parties could (but rarely do) protect those expecta-
tions by express conditions. Courts have accordingly felt obliged to
create substantive law principles which provide the needed protection.
The development has followed two main themes. One is concerned
with the credit risks taken or not taken by the parties, as indicated
by the agreed timing of their performances. The other is concerned
with the parties' exchange-purpose where the contract calls for multiple
performances on one or both sides.
If the contract requires X to deliver goods on February 1 and Y to
pay on March 1, the rendition or tender of his performance by X is a
condition to any duty in Y to perform immediately. So also if X and
Y are both to perform on March 1. In the latter instance a like burden
rests on Y."' Several of the later Washington cases are illustrative;
some were concerned with the particular problem raised by an install-
ment payment real estate contract where the final installment falls due
while earlier installments are unpaid, and reached the usual result
holding payment and conveyance to be concurrent conditions.479 Cor-
47 See WAsHiiNGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRA=T § 266 at seq. (1935).
47 8 See RE-STATmmENT, CoNTPAcTS §§ 267, 272, 273 (1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 829 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORBIN, CoNRngcTs §§ 656, 657 (1950).
479 Mayflower Realty Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Soc'y, 192 Wash. 129, 72 P.2d
1038, 75 P.2d 579 (1937) (tender by vendee matured a cause of action against the
vendor) ; Parchen v. Rowley, 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938) ; Lasher v. Wheeler,
198 Wash. 205, 87 P.2d 982 (1939) ; Rushlight & Co. v. Johnson, 18 Wn.2d 383, 139
P.2d 280 (1943) ; Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838
(1945) ; Kolosoff v. Turri, 27 Wn.2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947) ; Cascade Timber Co. v.
Northern Pac. Ry., 28 Wn.2d 684, 184 P.2d 90 (1947) ; Gilimore v. Green, 39 Wn2d
431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951); Kirby v. Woolbert, 48 Wn.2d 141, 291 P.2d 666 (1955)
(citing several prior cases and holding, "after the final payment is due upon a time
contract for the sale of land, neither party can put the other in default without a tender
of performance."). Although conditions usually operate defensively, a promisor being
insulated from successful suit if the condition is not met, they have on occasion im-
portant side effects. Thus in the Kirby case, supra, a contract purchaser who failed to
pay when the contract required was not "in defaule' after the final payment matured,
because the seller did not tender conveyance; therefore the seller could not exact a
bonus for conveying. (That a bonus was exacted is surmised; she received an over-
payment and in this suit by the purchaser was required to return it.) In Crim v.
Watson, 196 Wash. 99, 82 P.2d 172 (1938), (cited in the Kirby opinion) the court
held a declaration of forfeiture not preceded by a tender of conveyance, after the final
installment fell due and was not paid, to be legally ineffective as a forfeiture. It was
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relatively, where X is to perform first, his duty is not conditioned on a
proffer of payment. The court so held in other of the later cases."'
If X undertakes to deliver a horse and a cow on March 1, for which
Y is to pay then (or on a later day), is Y's duty of immediate per-
formance conditioned on delivery or tender of both animals? The
answer must be found in interpretation. If for one of X's performances
the contract allocates a counter-performance by Y, the reciprocal part-
performances are an exchange and constructive conditions can operate
accordingly."" A significant interrelation between X's two perform-
ances, the utility of one being materially diminished if the other is not
rendered, is strong evidence against such segmentation of the exchange.
So is lump-sum pricing. Separate pricing is evidence the other way."2
Several of the later Washington cases illustrate the operation of these
ideas.""
also held to be neither a repudiation nor an offer mutually to rescind; the purchaser in
this action to recover the payments he had made was unsuccessful, he not having
tendered the contract balance. In re Berry's Estate, 196 Wash. 252, 82 P.2d 549 (1938)
followed the Crim case. In the Foster case, supra, failure of a buyer to give promised
shipping instructions excused delivery or tender by the seller, as a constructive condi-
tion to the buyer's duty to pay. In the Rushlight case, supra, failure of a contractor to
meet a constructive condition to the subcontractor's duty to provide a bond meant that
the subcontractor was not in default and an attempted cancellation of the contract by
the contractor was not legally justified. See also cases cited in note 488 below. Moeller
v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) is also of interest. It
involved an unusual application of the concurrent constructive condition principle to an
installment real estate contract forfeited for default, the court's decree being conditioned
on the vendee's failure to pay the remaining part of the contract price within a stated
time; this part of the price was by the terms of the contract unaccrued. The court held
that the vendee had not lost the redemption interest afforded him by the decree,
although he neither paid nor tendered payment, because the vendor had not tendered a
deed and conveyance and payment were now concurrent conditions. The decision must
be questioned; the vendee was already in total default and the conditional decree merely
gave him an opportunity to preserve his interest by producing the money.480 Klein v. Zeeve, 199 Wash. 644, 92 P.2d 877 (1939) (suit for interim installments
under a real estate contract; failure of the plaintiff to tender his performance was held
to be no defense; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 269 (1932) was cited; see §§ 270, 271
also) ; Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) (de-
fendant undertook to buy and to give shipping instructions; upon failure to give the
instructions it became liable; no tender of the goods by plaintiff was needed) ; Kolosoff
v. Turri, 27 Wn.2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947) (seller who undertook to furnish title
insurance, the date for his performance preceding the date set for the buyer's next
performance, was in default upon failure to perform; the buyer in this action recovered
his down payment). See also 3 WLiSTox, CONTRACTS § 829 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CoR-
BrN, CONTRACTS § 657 (1950).
481 Even here, if the transaction is of the installment variety which requires re-
ciprocal performances at successive intervals, an earlier performance on one side will
be a condition both to the performance which is the immediate exchange for it and
to a subsequent performance on the other. E.g., where X is to deliver a horse and ac w on March 1 for payment then, and another hors  and cow on April 1 for payment
then. X's March 1 performances will be conditions to Y's April 1 duty, as well as his
farch 1 duty. This will be so without regard to the "divisibility" of X's March 1
performance.
482 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 266(3), 268 (1932); 3 CoRBiN, CONTRACTS § 687
et seq.; 3 W.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 860A et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).
433 Darst v. Meduna, 15 Wn.2d 293, 130 P.2d 361 (1942) (gross pricing) ; Rush-
1959]
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Determining the existence of a constructive condition is a relatively
easy operation. Determining how one works in a given transaction
can be extremely difficult, made so by the principles summed up in
the phrase "substantial performance." A promisor may receive484 or
be tendered a performance which nearly enough approaches perfection
to persuade a court that justice requires him to render his own per-
formance and find his relief for the defects485 in a cross-claim for
damages." A performance which has this effect, although defective
in terms of quantity, quality or time, is said to be "substantial per-
formance" and to satisfy the constructive condition. The key to the
analysis and argument of issues about substantial performance is in
light & Co. v. Johnson, 18 Wn.2d 383, 139 P.2d 280 (1943) (promise of subcontractor
to furnish a bond and promise of contractor to pay half the premium were held to be
"mutual and dependent covenants"); Cascade Timber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 28
Wn.2d 684, 184 P2d 90 (1947) (gross pricing, in effect) ; Kraft v. Spencer Tucker
Sales, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 943, 239 P.2d 563 (1952) (contract for the sale of a car and
certain accessories; the dealer was able to deliver the accessories only) ; Mell v.
Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738, 306 P2d 751 (1957) (gross pricing); see also Reid Co. v.
M-B Contracting Co., 46 Wn.2d 784, 285 P.2d 121 (1955) (gross pricing formula
stated; the issue was the scope of a rescission agreement which in language referred
only to part of the gross performance) ; Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569(1954) (two contracts found; the court discussed Darst v. Meduna, supra, and the
effect of separate pricing, which was unnecessary and confusing; the issue was rescis-
sion for fraud) ; Anstine v. McWilliams, 24 Wn.2d 230, 163 P.2d 816 (1945) (plaintiff
bought a used car, promising to pay a sum which included a "time price differential"
and giving a mortgage to secure the debt; the mortgagee converted the property; in
this conversion action the court in applying the damages rule which requires deduction
of the debt from the market value of the property excluded the "time price differential"
in computing the debt balance, saying consideration for it failed when the conversion
occurred; this analysis evidently means that performance of the mortgagee's promise
to receive payment in installments was a condition to the mortgagor's promise to pay
the part of the price which was allocated to "time.") Concerning the meaning of the
term "failure of consideration" see the discussion at note 492 below. Cf. Marshall v.
Campbell, 19 Wn.2d 497, 143 P.2d 449 (1943) (real estate contract required the vendee
to make certain installment payments and to buy gasoline from the vendor; upon de-
fault by the vendee on his promise to buy gasoline the vendor sought to forfeit the
contract; he was unsuccessful because in the court's view this promise was "inde-
pendent!' and breach of it would not relieve the vendor from his duty to convey; the
coures analysis and terminology cannot be supported; the issue was the materiality of
the vendee's breach and the result could be justified only by a finding it was immaterial;
the vendee's duty was "independent," being performable at least in part before the date
for conveyance; the court used the term here in a most confusing way to mean that the
vendee's performance was not a constructive condition to the vendor's duty).
484 See RESTAT.aXENT, CONTRACTS §§ 275, 276 (1932); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS§ 841 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 ComIN, CONTRACTS § 700 et seq. (1950).
485 If a defective performance is received with knowledge of the defects and under
circumstances such as would have made its refusal practicable, or retained after knowl-
edge of its defects, where return is practicable, the recipient loses the protection of
the constructive condition without regard to substantial performance. The theory is
waiver. See RESTATEMMNT, CONTRACTS § 298 (1932). He no doubt has a cause of
action for the defects, in the usual transaction. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 699
et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).
486 It will be recalled that any deviation from full and precise performance by a
contract promisor whose duty of immediate performance has matured is a breach by
him. The substantial performance doctrine is strictly limited to satisfaction-of-
condition issues.
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the standards courts use in their effort to strike a fair balance between
the conflicting interests of the parties. Yet these standards are un-
commonly hard to synthesize from the opinions, which tend to be more
diffuse than otherwise in discussing the factors which impressed the
court.8 7 Some of the later Washington cases are illustrative.-" Notable
48 7 The most helpful summary of the standards courts use in resolving substantial
performance (and material breach) controversies is contained in the RESTATEmENT,
CONTRAcTS §§ 275, 276 (1932).
4'8 sMarrazzo v. Orino, 194 Wash. 364, 78 P.2d 181 (1938) ; Barfknecht v. Shepard
S. S. Co., 1 Wn.2d 643, 99 P.2d 387 (1939) (employment contract; employee in total
default); Hegeberg v. New England Fish Co., 7 Wn.2d 509, 110 P.2d 182 (1941)
(although the issue was the effect of delay in meeting what the court evidently re-
garded as an express condition, the opinion contains a discussion of delay which also
has meaning in a constructive condition context); Beaulaurier v. Washington State
Hop Producers, Inc., 8 Wn.2d 79, 111 P.2d 559 (1941) (court indicated that the release
of some co-op members from their marketing contracts might be such a breach by the
co-op of its contracts with other members as to discharge the latter; there was how-
ever no discharge here because the releases were consented to or ratified by the other
members); Patrick v. Bonthius, 13 Wn.2d 210, 124 P.2d 550 (1942) (building con-
tract; substantial performance by the builder found); Central Life Assur. Soc'y v.
Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P2d 757 (1942) (failure of seller of land to own a
small part of it held not such prospective failure of consideration as would justify
rescission by the buyer); Sherman v. Western Constr. Co., 14 Wn.2d 252, 127 P.2d
673 (1942) ; Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938 (1943) (building contract;
substantial performance found) ; Marshall v. Campbell, 19 Wn.2d 497, 143 P.2d 449
(1943) (the issue was materiality of breach rather than substantial performance; the
opinion is nevertheless of interest here; see the discussion of the case in note 483
above) ; Hesselgrave v. Mott, 23 Wn2d 270, 160 P.2d 521 (1945) (material breach of
a life-support contract was in issue and not found); In re Donaldson's Estate, 26
Wn.2d 72, 173 P.2d 159 (1946) (life-support contract; substantial performance found) ;
Kolosoff v. Turri, 27 Wn.2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947) (failure of vendor to furnish title
insurance on time held to be a material breach) ; Hopper v. Williams, 27 Wn.2d 579,
179 P.2d 283 (1947) (material breach found) ; Knatvold v. Rydman, 28 Wn.2d 178,
182 P.2d 9 (1947) (material breach found) ; Crook v. Tudor, 28 Wn.2d 289, 182 P.2d
740 (1947) (material breach found); Bryant v. Stablein, 28 Wn.2d 739, 184 P.2d 45
(1947) (real estate contract; vendee's delay in performance found not fatal) ; Haag v.
Revell, 28 Wn.2d 883, 184 P.2d 442 (1947) (employment contract; employee's mis-
conduct found to have justified his discharge) ; Bruckart v. Cook, 30 Wn2d 4, 190 P.2d
725 (1948) (material breach found) ; State ex rel. Piper v. Pratt, 31 Wn.2d 725, 198
P.2d 814 (1948) (architect who submitted plans for a building which would cost in
excess of the authorized cost held unable to recover) ; Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wn.2d 159,
201 P.2d 156 (1948) (real estate contract; tender of warranty deed conveying an in-
surable title held insufficient, the vendor's duty being to convey a marketable title) ;
Carey v. Powell, 32 Wn.2d 761, 204 P.2d 193 (1949) (life-support contract; sufficient
performance found) ; Litel v. Marsh, 33 Wn2d 441, 206 P2d 300 (1949) (real estate
contract; vendee found to be in total default) ; Peplinski v. Campbell, 37 Wn.2d 857,
226 P.2d 211 (1951) (real estate contract; vendor's delay in clearing defects in his
title held to have been excessive); Gillmore v. Green, 39 Wn2d 431, 235 P.2d 998
(1951) (an unusually interesting example of the "who is in material default" problem
often encountered when both parties default; a vendor defaulted by failure to deliver a
title report but the materiality of the default was waived by the vendee, who continued
to make payments for a time and then quit) ; Yeager v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, 39 Wn.2d 807, 239 P.2d 318 (1951) (union's failure to follow the prescribed
procedure in passing on an application for membership held to be an immaterial
breach) ; Kraft v. Spencer Tucker Sales, Inc., 39 Wn.2d 943, 239 P.2d 563 (1952)
(buyer who contracted for a car and certain accessories was not in default upon re-
fusing to take the accessories where the seller could not deliver the car) ; Bean v.
Hallett, 40 Wn.2d 70, 240 P.2d 931 (1952) (wrongful repossession by a conditional
sale vendor of land held a total breach); Lacey Plywood Co. v. Wienker, 42 Wn2d
719, 258 P.2d 477 (1953) (defects in machine which was the subject matter of the
1959]
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exceptions are Jacks v. Blazer,"' in which a delay problem was re-
solved by reference to a proposition set out in the Restatement of Con-
tracts, section 276,90 and Bayley v. Lewis,' in which the controlling
fact was the rendition of a performance which though not complete
gave the recipients "the major portion of the benefits they bargained
for under the contract."
Prospective Failure of Consideration. "Failure of consideration"
is a confusing term. Once a bilateral contract is formed by an exchange
of promises, consideration exists in fact and cannot very well "fail."
The term is used to describe a failure to render or to tender substantial
performance in a situation where such performance is a constructive
condition. One result of such a failure is discharge of the conditioned
duty,492 a matter which will be discussed later. Of immediate concern
however is "prospective failure of consideration," i.e., the existence of
a state of affairs, before the time for satisfying a constructive condition
has arrived, which indicates that it will not be satisfied when the time
does arrive. The basic exchange-of-performances analysis of a bilateral
contract not only justifies the creation of constructive conditions, but
also justifies protecting a promisor who encounters an unanticipated,
unassumed, and abnormal risk of not receiving the counter-perform-
ance. The appropriate protection varies with the circumstances and
ranges from discharge of the promisor on a change of position by him,
to a legal excuse for refusal of his performance, though due first in
contract held to constitute material breach) ; Angeles Gravel & Supply Co. v. Clallam
County Hospital Dist. No. 2, 42 Wn2d 827, 259 P.2d 366 (1953) (seller recovered
despite alleged shortages in quantity of concrete delivered; waiver, or estoppel to assert
the shortage, was the stated ground for the decision) ; Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48 Wn.2d
395, 293 P.2d 935 (1956) (life support contract; total breach) ; Radach v. Prior, 48
Wn.2d 901, 297 P.2d 605 (1956) (time can be made of the essence as to a defaulted
installment under a real estate contract, by notice to the vendee demanding payment
within a stated reasonable period); Mell v. Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738, 306 P.2d 751
(1957) (total failure of promisee to perform held "failure of consideration"). It will
be observed that some of the cases cited above put in issue the materiality of a de-
faulting party's breach rather than satisfaction of a constructive condition. These were
included because the same tests are used by courts in resolving both types of issue.
489 39 W n.2d 277, 235 P2d 187 (1951).
490 I.e., "In mercantile contracts performance at the time agreed upon is important,
and if the delay of one party is considerable having reference to the nature of the
transaction and the seriousness of the consequences, and is not justified by the conduct
of the other party, the duty of the latter is discharged." The issue was discharge, not
satisfaction of the condition. See note 486 above. The same criteria determine
"materiality" and "substantiality."
49139 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951). Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans,
13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942), is also of more than average interest; inability of
a seller to convey a marketable title to all of the property was said not to be prospec-
tive failure of consideration, because the part as to which his title was defective was
small and for it damages were an adequate substitute.
4 92 ESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 274 (1932) ; 3 Co~anN, CONTRACTS § 658 (1950);
6 CoRBiN, op. cit. § 1252 et seq. See the discussion at notes 670-676.
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time, save on contemporaneous rendition of the exchange perform-
ance." Apparently but one of the later Washington cases involved
the assertion of prospective failure of consideration as a defense.4"
Other cases in which a contract vendee sought to rescind and recover
his payments, because of defects in the vendor's title, are of interest
insofar as they shed light on the court's thinking about the evidence
requisite to establish prospective failure of consideration."'
When Conditions Precedent are Excused-Prevention. A con-
dition, whether express or constructive, ceases to be operative if the
promisor whose duty it qualifies wrongfully interferes with its satis-
faction."' Several of the later cases required routine applications of
this principle." 7 In Kingston v. Anderson9 s the court encountered an
43 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 280 et seq. (1932) ; 3 W.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 875
et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 6 CoRBi, CONTRACTS § 1255 et seq. (1950). For the earlier
cases see WASHINGToN ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 280 et seq. Con-
ditional sales contracts for land or a chattel typically contain a risk of loss clause
under which the vendee assumes the risk as to events which might otherwise be pros-
pective failure of consideration. Teply v. Sumerlin, 46 Wn.2d 504, 282 P.2d 827 (1955),
is an example.49 4 Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) (vendee who failed
to pay was in default and his interest subject to forfeiture even though the vendor's
title was defective, as the defects were curable before time for conveyance; earlier cases
were cited and followed).
49 Parchen v. Rowley, 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938) (vendee can rescind a
real estate contract upon the vendor's contracting to sell the property to another) ;
Hebb v. Severson, 32 Wn.2d 159, 201 P.2d 156 (1948) (vendee's claim of rescission
was legally justified by vendor's lack of marketable title; the defect was evidently one
which the vendor could not cure in time to render his performance). Cf. Gillmore v.
Green, 39 Wn2d 431, 436, 437, 235 P2d 998, 1001, 1002 (1951) (vendee sought without
success to rescind a real estate contract because the vendor did not have title; the court
said: "The fact that the vendor.., is not the owner of it at the time of making the
contract, is not ground for rescission of the contract in the absence of a representation
by the vendor, at the outset, as an inducement, that he, in fact, had such title," and
"the burden is upon plaintiff... to allege and prove that the vendor cannot perform
when the time for performance arrives. This, plaintiff has not done.") See also
Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 137, 204 P.2d 831, 836 (1949) ('We have
repeatedly held that the fact that a vendor in a contract for the sale of land is not the
owner thereof at the time of making the contract is not of itself ground for rescission
on the part of the purchaser, but it must appear that the vendor cannot or will not
perfect a title thereto. It is a question of conveying the title, or having it conveyed, to
a purchaser when the time of performance comes.")
496 RESTA=ENT, CONTRACTS § 295 (1932) ; 3 WIUisToN, CONTRACTS § 677 (rev.
ed. 1936) ; 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 767 (1950).
497 Vance v. Mutual Gold Corp., 6 Wn.2d 466, 108 P.2d 799 (1940) (payee of notes
payable from production proceeds sought recovery, arguing that sale of its mine was
prevention by the maker; the court found no prevention, the sale having been made
for stock in a company which undertook operation of the mine) ; Wolk v. Bonthius,
13 Wn.2d 217, 124 P.2d 553 (1942) (owner who wrongfully ordered contractor off the
site cannot assert the contractor's failure to perform as a defense) ; Bellingham Sec.
Syndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc., 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) ;
Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) (buyer who
was to designate a place for delivery, and did not, cannot assert the seller's failure to
tender the goods as a defense); Haugen v. Raupach, 43 Wn.2d 147, 260 P.2d 340(1953) (owner who wrongfully induced architect to refuse his certificate cannot assert
against the contractor a contract provision making such a certificate a condition;
RESTATFmENT, CONTRACTS § 303 (b) (1932) was cited); Aircraft Radio Indus., Inc. v.
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unusual prevention problem and disposed of it in a highly unsatisfac-
tory way. A condition the subject matter of which is an act (such as
payment or delivery of a deed or a chattel) is satisfied by a tender of
the act. 9 If the promisor prevents a tender by evasive tactics the
condition is excused. °0 Since evasion consists of absence from the
place where the tender is to occur, no progress can be made toward
solution of the problem until that place is determined. The Kingston
case probably raised this prevention issue. The case certainly dem-
onstrates the inevitable consequences of insufficient attention to the
question, where was the contract to be performed."'
M. V. Palmer, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 737, 277 P2d 737 (1954) (buyer whose duty to pay is
conditional on suitability of the goods for his purposes excuses the condition by un-
reasonable delay in determining their suitability). See also Dygert v. Hansen, 31
Wn.2d 858, 199 P.2d 596 (1948) (fishermen who were to fish on shares had a cause
of action when the vessel put out without them; although the court did not mention
prevention, it is evident that doing the work was a constructive condition, excused
by prevention). A case hard to classify and which may belong here, or may be more
allied to the waiver or estoppel cases discussed at note 508 below, is Stewart v. Moss,
30 Wn2d 535, 192 P2d 362 (1948) (buyer who paid part of the price and who
neither paid nor tendered the balance was permitted to recover the amount he had
paid; the seller had conveyed to another without having tendered the property to the
buyer, and the case might have been grounded on this circumstance; see the discussion
at note 479 above; the court however chose to take a quite different approach, finding
its reason in the seller's failure to cooperate with a buyer who it knew could not
raise the final payment save on security of the property and could not provide
security both because he bad no title and because the property was already encumbered;
this cooperation, either by offering to convey subject to its own mortgage, or by
escrowing the transaction, the court evidently deemed to have been the reasonable
and honest course although not required by the contract). It should be noted that
an obligee who asserts excuse of condition by prevention must be prepared to show
that he could and would have met the condition, save where the prevention induced
the inability. The Foster case, supra, is illustrative.
4983 Wn2d 21, 99 P.2d 630 (1940), noted in 16 WAsr. L. REv. 49 (1941).
4993 WILLISTON, CONTACTS §§ 832, 833 (1950); 3 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 663
(1950) ; 6 CoRnnx, CONTRAcTS § 1258 (1950).
500 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 836 (rev. ed. 1936).
501 It is impossible to determine from the opinion either what the precise issue was
or what the court thought it was. The court said: "The rule in the United States is
that, when a contract is made in one state for the payment of money and no place of
payment is designated, the debtor is not bound to go to another state to tender the
money to the creditor." The rule as stated is sound in instances of money debts.
6 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1812, note 6 (rev. ed. 1936). See also 5 CoRniN, CoNTRAcrs§§ 1234, 1235 (1950). The Kingston case did not involve a money debt; it involved
either acceptance of an offer or the operation of constructive conditions in a bilateral
contract. In neither situation is the rule as stated properly applicable. Upon examining
the briefs as well as the opinion, it appears that a California resident handed to a
British Columbia resident in Seattle a writing which recited an offer to sell stock in
a Washington corporation. This writing the court refers to as an "option" although
the opinion says nothing about any payment for the offer. The offeree sent a telegramfrom British Columbia to the offeror at his California address, advising him that the
option would be exercised. The offeree never tendered payment; this action was to
recover damages for the seller's failure to deliver the stock If the offer required
payment as part of the acceptance, the existence of any contract was in issue. If the
offer was not an option, absence of the offeror from the place where payment was to
be made was not wrongful, being but a type of revocation. If the offer was an
option, evasion of offeror by offeree would be wrongful and his absence from the
indicated place for acceptance would give the offeree additional time within which to
accept or might even give him a cause of action without any tender. Annot., Whens
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Waiver. A contract obligor whose undertaking is qualified by an
express condition the subject matter of which is not a material part of
the contemplated exchange will "waive the condition" if he expresses
a purpose to perform even though the condition is not satisfied. °2 The
effect of the waiver is simply to make the duty in question uncondi-
tional. Washington cases so holding were numerous before 1937.5°3
optionee's delay in exercising option excused, 157 A.L.R. 1311, 1318 (1945); 2
CORBIN, op. cit. mpra, § 275, n. 41; 1 WLLIsToN, op. cit. szpra, § 61, n. 4. This prin-
ciple cannot be applied without first determining where the payment was to be made.
The parties said nothing about this detail. Should it be found, either by interpretation
or as a matter of law, to be the place, where the option was created? This seems
unreasonable where both parties resided elsewhere. The money-debt cases which support
the proposition quoted above are grounded on the idea that the parties expect
the debtor to pay in the state in which the debtor resided when the debt was incurred.
This reasoning is not appropriate where, as in the Kingston case, both of the
parties live in another place. It is probably unsound even where an option is given
in the state of the optionee's residence. Here the bilateral contract cases (dis-
cussed below) are more analogous than the debt cases. It may be doubted that the
parties expect payment at any place other than the optionor's residence or place of
business. There seems to have been no valid reason in the Kingston case to find
Washington to be the place for payment. It is doubtful that British Columbia would
be either. If acceptance was the problem, the case is unsupportable. If the offer
permitted acceptance by a promise to buy and pay, the offeree's telegram could be
interpreted as an acceptance. If it was, a bilateral contract resulted, made, probably, in
British Columbia (see the discussion at note 90 above). Under it, payment and
delivery of the stock were concurrent constructive conditions. It is not possible to
proceed further without knowing where the contract was to be performed. If at the
buyer's residence, he may have made an effective tender by being there with the money.
If at the seller's residence (or place of business), the buyer has no cause of action. If
in Washington, failure of the seller to designate a place would be a type of prevention
and payment as a condition to the seller's duty to perform immediately was excused
(assuming the buyer could show ability and willingness to pay had the place been
designated). Where as here the parties did not expressly fix the place for performance,
the answer probably lies in interpretation, including custom. Typically, the seller's
residence or place of business is found to be the place for performance. WILLISTON,
op. cit. §§ 836, 1812. In chattel sale-contracts the same answer is dictated by the
UNiFoRm SALES ACT., RCW 63.04.440 (1); 2 WLIsToX, SALES §§ 449, 450 (rev.
ed. 1948). If the Kingston case involved a contract to buy and sell, a holding that the
seller's residence was the place for performance would have been expectable. Certainly
the opinion discloses no evidence suggesting that the parties intended to perform in
Washington. The offer did not say anything about this detail. The acceptance did
suggest Spokane as the place for closing but the court found this passage to be no
part of the acceptance; indeed, had it been, there would have been no acceptance. If a
seller moves to another state after a sale-contract is made, it can be argued that the
place for performance remains in the state where the seller resided when the contract
was made; this was not however the Kingston case. When the Kingston contract
was made the buyer resided in British Columbia and the seller in California, and the
seller remained in California. If excuse of a constructive condition by prevention
was the issue, the Kingston case is in result supportable only if Washington was the
place for performance and the principle the court stated, as quoted above, is not
supportable at all. The case will be a threat to accurate analysis of sales contracts
made in Washington between non-residents or between a Washington resident and a
non-resident, until such time as the court re-examines the proposition stated in the
Kingston opinion. It should also be noted that the case raises some disturbing ques-
tions about the way in which the seller must proceed if he is to acquire a cause of
action against the buyer. Must he tender to the buyer in the state where the contract
was made, and if so, where in that state?
r
02 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 297 (1932); 3 WLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 678
et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs §§ 752 et seq. (1950).
O3 WASHING€,x ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 297.
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The critical issues in the subsequent cases were factual: Was sufficient
evidence offered in support of the alleged waiver? '0
Application of the waiver doctrine to bilateral contracts and con-
structive conditions requires careful analysis. A performance, being
the subject of a duty in one party and a right in the other, cannot by
the better view be "waived." The right is a type of property interest;
for its surrender to the obligor the technics appropriate to discharge
or assignment must be employed."' These in turn reflect basic con-
cepts about sales and gifts. It is equally clear that an obligor can
render a constructive condition inoperative and come under a duty of
immediate performance even though the counter-performance, the sub-
ject of the constructive condition, was so defective as not to meet the
demands of the substantial performance doctrine. He will not be
discharged and will be obliged to find his relief for the defects in a
cross-claim for damages. There is demonstrated in the opinions more
than a little confusion about the theory on which these principles rest
and about the proper terminology by which to describe the obligor's
conduct."0 The extent to which reliance (on an expression of purpose
to treat as immaterial a certain deviation from the promised counter-
performance) is important, is not clear. Nor is it clear whether the
obligor's conduct should be characterized as producing waiver, estoppel
or election. Certainly, few would quarrel with the results generally
reached by courts.
That these principles appertain in Washington was made clear by
the pre-1937 cases, which also illustrate some of the significant types
504 Dowell, Inc. v. United Pac. Cas. Ins. Co., 191 Wash. 666, 72 P.2d 296 (1937)
(insurer who received a verbal accident report held "estopped" to assert a policy term
requiring written notice); Draper v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 1 Wn.2d 17, 95 P.2d 28(1939) (proof of loss; waiver not found); Morango v. Phillips, 33 Wn.2d 351, 205
P.2d 892 (1949) (construction contract; clause making a written request a condition to
the builder's right to pay for extras; condition held waived). See also Lidral Constr.
Co. v. Parker, 9 Wn2d 128, 113 P2d 1022 (1941) (the pleading burden resting on a
contract obligee, to allege satisfaction or excuse of conditions, was found to have been
met by allegations sufficient, in the court's view, to indicate waiver).50 5RESTAT1mNT, CONTmACTS § 297 comments b and c (1932); 3 WLISTON,
CoNTRAcTS §§ 678, 700 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936); 3 CoRaiN, CONTRACTS §§ 752, 766(1950). Cases like Kessinger v. Anderson, 31 Wn.2d 157, 196 P.2d 289 (1948) and
Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 269 P.2d 960 (1954), insofar as they suggest
that a property right can be extinguished by "waiver," are not supportable. A by-
product of the analytic confusion evident in these cases is doubt about the meaning of the
word "waiver." See 3 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 679. It should also be noticed thatpromissory estoppel may operate to preclude damages for failure to perform which
was consented to by the obligee. See 3 WLLIsToN, op. cit. supra § 690. Cf., 3 WiLIs-
TON, op. cit. supra § 724. See also the discussion at note 694 below.56 3 WILLsToN, CoNTRACTs §§ 683 et seq., 699 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936) ; 3 CoRPIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 754 et seq. (1950). See also RESTATEMENT, CoNXa.AcTs §§ 298, 299, 300,
304, 305, 309 (1932) ; Cf. § 297 and § 311.
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of evidence."°7 The later cases are only cumulative authority, both for
the basic rule, and for the very important collateral principle which
enables an obligor who has "waived" the importance of deviations
from the other party's promised performance to revive their im-
portance by seasonable notice."'
Repudiation. If an obligor has indicated without legal justification
that he will not or cannot perform there is no reason for requiring the
obligee to go through the useless motion of satisfying express or con-
structive conditions which would otherwise qualify the obligor's duty.
Conditions are "excused," (i.e., rendered inoperative) by such a re-
pudiation." 9 In Parchen v. Rowley ° both parties relied on this propo-
507 WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 297, 298, 299, 300,
304, 309, 311.5 08Dopps v. Alderman, 12 Wn.2d 268, 121 P.2d 388 (1942) (vendee cannot
rescind a real estate contract and vendor can specifically enforce it, where the vendor's
delay in clearing his title was consented-to by the vendee); Bulmon v. Bailey, 22
Vn.2d 372, 156 P.2d 231 (1945) (after indulging the vendee in delays in payments,
the vendor cannot summarily forfeit the contract for subsequent delays) ; Knoblauch v.
Sanstrom, 37 Wn.2d 266, 223 P.2d 462 (1950) (similar to the Bulmon case) ; Gillmore
v. Green, 39 Wn2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951) (vendee who continues to make his
payments cannot rescind for failure of the vendor to furnish a title report at the time
set in the contract; the court followed Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13
Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942), quoting from the earlier opinion a text passage
reading in part: "Any act on the part of the purchaser treating the contract as in
force, when done voluntarily and with a knowledge of facts creating a right to
rescind, amounts to a waiver of the right to rescind... ."). Some of these cases
indicate by dicta that prompt performance might, for the future, be required by
appropriate notification and a reasonable opportunity to comply; this proposition was
held to have been met in Radach v. Prior, 48 Wni2d 901, 297 Pl2d 605 (1956) (notice
of forfeiture was effective where made contingent on payment of delinquent installments
within thirty days, a period deemed sufficient) ; Hall v. Nordgren, 196 Wash. 68, 81
P.2d 857 (1938) (a similar holding) ; Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d
777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) (also a similar holding). See in this connection 3 CORBx,
CONTRACTS § 764 (1950). An employer may by permitting an employee to continue
in the employ "waive" defective performance. In Haag v. Revell 28 Wn.2d 883, 184
P.2d 442 (1947) the court declined to find that the evidence supported application of
this principle. The court also held that repudiation of the contract by the employer
was justified where the employee was in fact in total default even though the
employer gave some other reason for discharging the employee. See also Hansen v.
Columbia Breweries, Inc., 12 Wn2d 554, 122 P2d 489 (1942); Knatvold v. Rydman,
28 Wn2d 178, 182 P.2d 9 (1947). In Angeles Gravel & Supply Co. v. Clallam County
Hosp. Dist. No. 2, 42 Wn.2d 827, 259 P.2d 366 (1953) a buyer who sought to defend
an action for a balance due on a contract for the sale of cement, by showing that
various deliveries were short in quantity, was held barred from the defense by his
failure timely to ascertain and specify in his protests about shortages the amounts
thereof. It will be observed that two different but interrelated themes run through
these cases. One is an obligor's purpose to continue the transaction, manifested in
language, in continuation of his own performance, or in demands for performance by
the other party. The second is a kind of deception plus reliance, as where defective
performance is received or retained.
509 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 306 (1932) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 698A (rev.
ed. 1936) ; 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 977 (1950). It will be observed that the same conse-
quences may attend an expression by the obligor of doubt about his intentions concern-
ing performance. See also WASiNGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
306, and the cases cited in note 530 et seq. below. Here as in instances of prevention an
obligee claiming excuse of a condition must be prepared to show that he could and
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sition. The contract was for the sale of real property, with the price
payable in installments and conveyance due on full payment. When
the time came at which the vendee should have been paid out he was
far behind and said he could not pay the balance due, whereupon the
vendor, without first tendering conveyance, contracted to sell the
property to another. Subsequently, the vendee proposed to pay up
and demand conveyance but did not actually tender the contract
balance. The vendor then brought this action to quiet her title and the
vendee cross-complained for recission and restitution. The vendee
prevailed. The vendor was held to have repudiated, rather than the
vendee. Judge Steinert, in dissenting, characterized the decision as
"illogical, inequitable, and wrong." His appraisal seems to be a fair
one."1 The vendee received a remedy to which he was entitled only if
the vendor was in total default. The vendor was not in default; she
was totally discharged, both because she had materially changed her
position after the vendee expressed inability to pay,"12 and also because
the vendee was himself in total default.1
would have satisfied it had the conduct which produced the excuse not occurred.
RESTATM ENT, CONTcrS § 295 (1932); 3 WILIsToN, op cit. supra, § 677 n.7; 4CORBIN, CONTR.ACTS, op. cit. supra § 978.
510 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938), discussed in Comment, Does the Law require
a useless act? Parchen v. Rowley, 15 WASH. L. Rx. 107 (1940). The Parchen case
was apparently approved in I, re Horse Heaven Irrigation Dist., 19 Wn.2d 89, 141
P.2d 400 (1943), which, insofar as it denied all legal effect to a vendee's statement that
he could not pay, is subject to the criticism below accorded the Parchen case.
511 Of the vendee's statement that he could not pay, the court said: "He never
repudiated the contract or refused to carry it out.... Appellant cannot be deprived of
his legal rights under the contract by a casual remark of that sort." This reasoning is
contrary to that followed in Hunter v. Radford, 111 Wash. 668, 191 Pac. 794 (1920)
and by other courts. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 698A, n. 8 (rev. ed. 1936) ; 4 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS § 974, n.93, § 977, nn. 2, 3 (1950). A flat statement by a vendee, that he
cannot pay, is hardly a "casual remark." Of course, the statement must be both actually
and reasonably relied upon by the vendor to have legal effects. The main objection to
the Parchen case is that the court will never get to these details, if it is unwilling to
concede that "I cannot' is a type of repudiation statement. It should be noticed too
that "I cannot," to justify discharge of the vendor on his change of position, must
mean "I cannot during the period of time within which my tender of performance
would be substantial performance." The reliance element in the principle under dis-
cussion differentiates it from the proposition invoked in anticipatory breach cases,
which often purport to require a more positive statement of unwillingness or inability
to perform than would be appropriate where prospective failure of consideration is in
issue. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318 (1932) ; 4 CORBIN, op cit. supra, § 973; 5
WILLISToN, op cit supra § 1324. Apart from what the vendee said, if he was in fact
unable to perform, this fact plus the vendor's justified change of position should both
discharge the vendor and put the vendee in default at performance time, tender by the
vendor as a condition being excused. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 323 (1932); 6
CORBIN, op cit. supra §§ 1259, 1260; 3 WLLISTON, op cit. supra, § 877.
512 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 280 (1932); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1265, 1270
(1950). See also McCormick v. Tappendorf, 51 Wash. 312, 99 Pac. 2 (1909) and
WASHIxGT N ANNOTATiONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 280.513 The vendee was in total default, either because his statement of inability was an
anticipatory breach, if positive enough (RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318 (1932), or
because the time for his performance had arrived and there was no condition to his
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Expert's Certificate. A builder's right to payment is often expressly
conditioned on his obtaining an architect's certificate. Just what circum-
stances will operate to excuse the condition is a recurrent problem. It
is also one on which the cases are considerably confused. 1' If the
certificate be denied because of collusion between owner and architect,
or improper persuasion by the owner, there is prevention within the
principle discussed above under that subheading. The difficult issues
grow out of other evidence. Haugen v. Raupack. 5 clarified the Wash-
ington rule to a degree by adopting as an alternative ground for the
decision a proposition apparently based on Restatement of Contracts,
section 303(c): "If the architect is satisfied that there has been a
substantial performance of the contract, it then becomes his duty to
issue the certificate of completion, and if he does not do so, his conduct
is regarded as arbitrary and capricious." ' The condition was held to
be excused. The court did not mention, and may have inferentially
disapproved, an earlier case"' which ought to be overruled. That case
can be read as adopting a minority doctrine under which the condition
is excused if the builder substantially performs the work. 18 It is a
bad doctrine because it substitutes the determination of judge or jury
about conformity of the work to the contract, for the determination of
the expert. The owner is thus deprived of a protection for which he
bargained. The formula stated in the Haugen case is an improvement.
It at least makes the expert the arbiter of "substantial performance."
Whether the owner is sufficiently protected by this formula, and, in-
deed, whether the formula is workable at all, will depend on the content
duty to perform immediately. Conveyance as a constructive condition was excused by
the vendee's expression of inability. RESTATEMENT, CONTACTS § 323 (1932). The
court's holding that the vendor repudiated when she disabled herself from performing
would have been sound had its conclusion about the vendee's conduct been sound.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318 (1932).
514 3 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 794 (rev. ed. 1936); 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 650
et seq. (1950). See also WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 303.
A major source of difficulty is the use in opinions of vague terms like "fraud" or
"arbitrary" or "unreasonable!' in discussing the architect's conduct and in explaining
why the owner should or should not pay even though no certificate was forthcoming.
See, for example, the summary of prior cases in the dissenting opinion, Schuehle v.
Seattle, 199 Wash. 675, 92 P.2d 1109 (1939).
r15 43 Wn.2d 147, 260 P.2d 340 (1953)-
5116 The court cited this Restatement subsection; it proposes excuse of the condition
if the architect "refuses to give a certificate after making examination of the work and
finding it adequate." Just what the word "adequate" was intended to mean in this
context is obscure. It seems not to mean "perfect." That it was intended to mean
"substantial performance" is unlikely.
517 Washington Bridge Co. v. Land & Improvement Co., 12 Wash. 272, 40 Pac. 982
(1895).
518 3 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 797, n. 2 (rev. ed. 1936); 3 CORBIN, CoNTRACTs
§ 651 n. 23 (1950).
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given it by future decisions. Its application presents obvious difficul-
ties. What the phrase "substantial performance" means in this context
is unclear. It may be doubted that architects now make a practice of
finding "substantial performance" however defined; they refuse cer-
tificates because the builder has in their judgment departed from the
plans and specifications. The court is apparently trying to find a
balance point, to protect the builder against an overly captious archi-
tect, and to retain for the owner in fair measure the assurance which
is afforded by an expert's certificate. The endeavor is a laudable one.
It can hardly be regarded as finished. 1
BREAcH OF CONTRACT
Nature of Breach. A contract obligor who fails to do what he
promised commits a legal wrong if the time for his performance has
arrived and if all the express and constructive conditions which qualify
his undertaking have been satisfied or excused. In other words, a cause
of action for breach of contract exists only if a duty to perform im-
mediately is not fulfilled. 20 Moreover, the obligor's duty must en-
compass the particular conduct or inaction of which the obligee is
complaining. A good many disputes about breach are simply disputes
about what was promised, and must be resolved by the application of
interpretation and implication principles already discussed. These
basic propositions supplied the solution in a number of the later
Washington cases.5 2' 1
5 19 The real problem is whether the owner should have to pay if the expert has
examined the work and has in the exercise of his honest judgment, without inter-
ference from the owner, concluded that the plans and specifications have not been met.
The quarrel is typically about the technical accuracy of the expert's decision. The con-
dition is an express one and a term of the contract, relief from which can be justified
only by resort to the court's power to excuse a condition where its application would
result in extreme forfeiture. See the discussion at note 476 above; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRAcTS § 303 comment a (1932). Caution rather than liberality in excusing the
condition would appear to be in order.
520 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 312, 314 (1932); 4 CoRniN, CoNMrAcrs § 943
(1950) ; 5 Wn.IusT0o, CoTnTACTS § 1288 (rev. ed. 1936). Notice too the discussion in
the Discharge section below.
1521 Breach was a factor in many of the cases already referred to, although the con-
tested issue was contract formation, interpretation, or the operation of conditions. The
following decisions are cited here, because the existence of a breach was disputed and
the opinions contain discussion more or less relevant to the issue: Mayflower Realty
Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Soc'y, 192 Wash. 129, 72 P.2d 1038 (1937); Bullock v.
Parsons, 193 Wash. 79, 74 P.2d 892 (1937) ; Parchen v. Rowley, 196 Wash. 340, 82
P.2d 857 (1938) ; Kenney v- Abraham, 199 Wash. 167, 90 P.2d 713 (1939) ; Merager
v. Turnbull, 2 Wn.2d 711, 99 P.2d 434 (1940) ; Vance v. Mutual Gold Corp., 6 Wn.2d
466, 108 P.2d 799 (1940) ; Walker v. Herke, 20 Wn.2d 239, 147 P.2d 255 (1944) ;
Hesselgrave v. Mott, 23 Wn.2d 270, 160 P.2d 521 (1945) ; Lyle v. Haskins, 24 Wn.2d
883, 168 P.2d 797 (1946) ; White v. Mullen, 25 Wn.2d 239, 170 P.2d 322 (1946) ; Norm
Advertising, Inc. v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., 25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946) ;
Kolosoff v. Turn, 27 Wn.2d 81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947) ; Palmer Supply Co. v. Time Oi
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Prevention and Repudiation. The implication technic has further
been used to solve two problems which do not obviously lend them-
selves to the method. Unjustified prevention by one party of the
other's performance or satisfaction of a condition is a breach because
courts will imply a promise not to interfere in this way with the normal
development of the transaction.522 An obligor's unjustified anticipatory
repudiation of his duty under a bilateral contract is breach because a
promise not to repudiate will be implied. 2 Since these implied prom-
ises are unconditional and are performable immediately upon forma-
tion of the contract, they create duties which can be breached before
the time has arrived for rendition by the wrongdoer of his main per-
formance. For such a breach the injured party has at once a cause of
action. If he delays his suit, however, resort to this theory will become
unnecessary. The accepted analysis of his situation, after the time
has come for rendition of the wrongdoer's main promise (to pay or
build or whatnot) gives him a cause of action for non-performance of
it. The injured party is excused by the prevention or repudiation from
Co., 27 Wn.2d 468, 178 P.2d 737 (1947) ; Hopper v. Williams, 27 Wn.2d 579, 179 P.2d
283 (1947) ; Knatvold v. Rydman, 28 Wn.2d 178, 182 P.2d 9 (1947) ; Rathlke v. Rob-
erts, 33 Wn. 2d 858, 207 P.2d 716 (1949) ; Bean v. Hallett, 40 Wn.2d 70, 240 P.2d 931(1952); Bernbaum v. Hodges, 43 Wn2d 503, 261 P.2d 968 (1953); McFerran v.
Heroux, 44 Wn.2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954) ; Walsh Services v. Feek, 45 Wn.2d 289,
274 P.2d 117 (1954) ; Lyle v. Heidner & Co., 45 Wn.2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954) ;
Hansen v. Walker, 46 Wn.2d 499, 282 P.2d 829 (1955) ; Arnesen v. Rowe, 46 Wn.2d
718, 284 P.2d 329 (1955) ; In re Black, 47 Wn2d 42, 287 P.2d 96 (1955) ; In re Kenne-
wick School Dist., 47 Wn.2d 56, 287 P.2d 105 (1955); Carstens Packing Co. v. Cox,
47 Wn.2d 346, 287 P.2d 486 (1955) ; Gertz v. American Discount Corp., 47 Wn.2d 694,
289 P.2d 369 (1955) ; Lidral v. Sixth & Battery Corp., 47 Wn.2d 831, 290 P.2d 459
(1955) ; Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48 Wn.2d 395, 293 P.2d 935 (1956) ; Morse v. McGrady,
49 Wn.2d 505, 304 P.2d 691 (1956). Several of these cases dealt with facts of more
than ordinary interest Merager v. Turnbull and Lyle v. Haskins involved a covenant
not to compete, made by the seller of a business, and breach by the financing of a
business ostensibly operated by another person. Lyle v. Heidner & Co. was concerned
with the degree of care and skill required of a builder who takes a cost-plus contract.
In the Arnesen case, negligence in the repair of a marine engine was found to be a
breach by the repairman. In Morse v. McGrady, a builder, sued for alleged breach in
that his work was not properly done, was permitted to introduce, under his general
denial and in rebuttal, a certificate executed by the owner to the mortgagee stating the
work was accomplished satisfactorily. For the earlier cases see WASHINGTON ANNO-
TATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 312 et seq.
r22 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 315 (1932) ; 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 944 (1950);
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1293, 1293A, 1318 (rev. ed. 1936). Interference is justified
only if the contract, fairly interpreted, places the risk of it on the other party.
r23 4 CoRnIN, CONTRACTS §§ 959, 961, 971 (1950) ; 5 CORBIN, op. cit. supra, § 1053;
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1296, 1318 (rev. ed. 1936). There is some support for the
idea that anticipatory repudiation is a wrong, not because of an implied promise not to
repudiate but because nonrepudiation is a duty which exists as a matter of law. RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318 comment a (1932) ; 4 CoRBNn, op. cit. supra, § 971; 5
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra, § 1318. Whether repudiation of a unilateral contract should
have the same effect is much mooted. See 2 CoRBIN, op. cit. supra, §§ 962 et seq.; 5
WILLISTON, op. cit. supra §§ 1328 et seq.; Note, 33 WASH. L. R v. 135 (1957). The
only justification for repudiation is the existence of a legal excuse for not performing
the repudiated promise. See note 540 below.
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meeting the conditions which qualify that promise."' Wolk v. Bon-
thius525 was such a case.
Mayflower Realty Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Co.5"6 appears to be
the only 1937-1957 Washington case concerned with prevention as a
breach. A corporation sold land on an installment payment contract
under which the vendee had the option of paying in cash or by sur-
render at its par value of stock in the vendor; the corporation there-
after voluntarily dissolved. The court recognized the dissolution to be
prevention, and specifically enforced the contract in an action brought
by the vendee several years before the contract-date on which convey-
ance was due.52 The remedy granted is of major interest as there is
no reason to expect any different approach in the far more numerous
instances of breach by repudiation. Concerning the propriety of order-
ing premature performance of the promise to convey the court said
only: "Appellants cannot be heard to complain of the acceleration of
the payments on the principal since this must inevitably inure to their
advantage... ." This sketchy disposition of a very difficult problem
makes the decision of doubtful authority on the remedy issue. Although
it is generally recognized that upon an anticipatory breach a decree
5624 See notes 496 et seq., and 509 et. seq., above.
52513 Wn.2d 217, 124 P.2d 553 (1942). Noncompletion of the work was held to be
no defense to a builder's action to recover for work done where the owner withoutjustification ordered the builder off the premises. See also Norm Advertising Inc.
v. Monroe Street Lumber Co., 25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946). There is one situ-
ation in which it is difficult to determine whether the injured party's theory should be
present breach or anticipatory breach. What of a repudiation after the date set in the
contract, for the repudiator's performance, unjustified because he was not yet dis-
charged by delay in satisfying a condition to his duty to perform immediately? The
repudiation is "anticipatory" and presumably a breach. The repudiation also excuses
the condition to the main promise, which is then immediately performable. Nonper-
formance is a present breach. Parchen v. Rowley, discussed at note 530 below is an
illustrative case.
526 192 Wash. 129, 72 P.2d 1038, 75 P.2d 579 (1937). For earlier cases see WASH-
INGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 315.527 The trial court ordered conveyance by the vendor's successor on payment in cash
of the entire contract balance plus interest on deferred installments. (See the respond-
ent's brief.) The supreme court affirmed, and evidently regarded the prevention as un-
justified and a present breach. There was also repudiation by the vendor but no par-
ticular point was made of it. In form the action as brought was simply to enjoin a
threatened breach, a remedy which may be had without showing a breach has already
occurred, 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1411 (1950), but the relief given went well beyond
the injunction prayed for. The vendee's action was precipitated by a notice of for-
feiture for failure to pay the current installment in cash, served by the vendor's suc-
cessor after refusal to accept the vendee's tender of stock certificates issued by the
vendor. The decree, in permitting payment in cash, seems sound; there is technically no
such thing as "stock" in a defunct corporation and the vendee could not deliver "stock"
even though he still held certificates. Interest was properly required, as the contract
had no pre-payment option. The cash amount to be paid was computed as the difference
between the par value of the stock and its cash value when the dispute arose. Since the
vendee presumably had and retained a claim on the dissolved corporation's assets, which
was determinative of the "cash value" of what had been "stock," this too seems a sound
solution.
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can be entered which orders performance at the future date set in the
contract, it may be doubted if most courts would order performance
ahead of such date.28 The Washington court's solution may neverthe-
less be preferable where the vendee is willing to prepay.
Several of the later repudiation cases merely reiterated propositions
previously established.52 In Parchen v. Rowley 30 a vendor under a
real estate contract was held to have breached it when he subsequently
contracted to sell the property to another person. In other cases the
court declined to find a vendor to be in default just because his title
was not marketable when he entered into the contract."' McFerran v.
Heroux,32 however, raised an unusual problem. An optionee sued a
repudiating optionor, 33 for damages, before the time at which the
contemplated sale-contract would have been performable, and without
accepting. He prevailed. The holding seems to be a sensible one,
although under the more common analysis of option contracts an ex-
pression of purpose by an optionor not to perform would be only a
legally ineffective attempt to revoke."'
5 28 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 358, 360, illustration 4 (1932) ; 6 CORIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1411 (1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1432 (rev. ed. 1936).
r
29 See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318, for the
earlier cases.
530 196 Wash. 340, 82 P.2d 857 (1938). The repudiation occurred after the date for
erformance of the vendor's promise to convey, and before the vendor was under a
uty of immediate performance. See the discussion at note 525 above. Selling or con-
tracting to sell to another the specific subject matter of the contract is generally re-
garded as evidencing repudiation. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318(b) (1932); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1325 (rev. ed. 1936).
531 Central Life Assur. Soc'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942);
Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn.2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) ; Gillmore v. Green, 39
Wn.2d 431, 235 P.2d 998 (1951). Even though the vendor is not in default by reason
of such a defect, if it is one which cannot be removed in time for the vendor to perform
there is prospective inability; the vendee on a change of position is discharged and
able to recover the payments he has made. See the discussion at note 492 et seq., above.
53244 Wn2d 631, 269 P2d 815 (1954), noted as to other issues in the case, 30
WASH. L. REv. 147, 175 (1955).
53 The court so characterized the optionor, but in another passage suggested that
he was in actual breach by non-performance. Repudiation appears the correct analysis.
The optionor was a lessee who owned the building on leased land and had a right to
remove it. The lease gave the lessor an option to buy the building. The building
burned and a lease covenant obligating the lessee to rebuild became operative. He
refused to rebuild. This was a breach of the covenant but not of the option, which
only obligated him not to revoke his offer to sell. The refusal to build was also an
expression of intent not to sell what the offer called for and so was a repudiation of
his offer-promise. In a non-option offer transaction this would be a revocation.
Whether in an option it should be only an abortive attempt to revoke, or a repudiation
permitting the optionee to sue at once may be debatable. See the following note. On
no reasoning can it be a breach of the option by non-performance.
134 See the citations and discussion at note 71 above; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
47 (1932) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 61 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Kotcher v. Edelblute, 250
N.Y. 178, 164 N.E. 897 (1928). Cf. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 977 n. 7 (1950), citing
with apparent approval a case permitting specific enforcement by the optionee, without
the formality of an acceptance. The filing of the complaint, if timely, might be deemed
a sufficient substitute for an acceptance which requires only notice, and perhaps for one
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Crim v. Watson53 and In re Berry's Estate"' also merit special
mention. Each involved a wrongful notice of forfeiture, given by the
vendor under a real estate contract. Of this conduct the court said: "3'
"Such a declaration cannot be construed as a repudiation of the con-
tract by the vendor. For, of necessity, it is but an ineffectual attempt
on his part to enforce the terms of the contract" [italics by the
court]."' Granted that an expression of purpose not to perform should
be a breach only if unequivocal," 9 what stronger statement of such a
purpose can be found than a notice informing the vendee his interest
is forthwith terminated? These cases appear overly generous to the
vendor. A repudiation is not devoid of legal effect just because the
repudiator thinks he is legally justified in his course."'
In Walker v. Herke 41 apparently the first Washington case on the
point, a repudiator who retracted before the other party changed his
position was held to have nullified the effect of the repudiation. This
is the usual view. 4
requiring payment if the proceeding is in equity and the optionee has of necessity indi-
cated his willingness to pay. The obvious support for the McFerran case result is the
uselessness of accepting. It must, however, be recognized that under this approach a
vital part of the optionee's case is proof he would have accepted within the time-life of
the offer had there been no repudiation. On this detail the court might be hard to
persuade if suit is brought after the time for acceptance has run out, particularly where
changes in market values suggest that the optionee's testimony about his purpose is
unreliable. Despite the McFerran holding, the wiser course for an optionee may well
be to ignore a repudiation and accept.
535 196 Wash. 99, 82 P.2d 172 (1938).
536 196 Wash. 252, 82 P2d 549 (1938).
537 The quoted passage appears in the opinion in Crim v. Watson, note 535 above.
In re Berry's Estate reached the same result, holding no repudiation occurred.
538 The court also stressed the fact that when payment and conveyance are due, a
tender is necessary if either party is to put the other in default This is an accurate
statement of the operation of constructive conditions but totally irrelevant to the issue.
A contract obligor can repudiate and in so doing breach, even though he would not be
in default by non-performance save upon a tender by the other party. This was recog-
nized in the dissenting opinion in Davis v. C. E. Downie Inv. Co., 179 Wash. 470, 38
P2d 215 (1934). It is to be regretted that the analysis of the dissenting judges did not
prevail, in the Davis case and thereafter.
539 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 318(a) (1932) ; 4 ColmiN, CONTRACTS § 973 (1950);
5 WnLIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1324 (rev. ed. 1936). See also McGillivray v. Nielson, 30
Wn.2d 589, 192 P.2d 369 (1948), noted, 24 WAsH. L Rav. 68 (1949).
5404 CoaniN, CONTRACTS § 973 (1950) ; Note 33 WAsH. L. Rav. 135 (1957). Palmer
Supply Co. v. Time Oil Co., 27 Wn2d 468, 178 P.2d 737 (1947) is a good example.
One who had contracted to buy chattels "cancelled its order" when it thought the seller
was excessively late with delivery; the court disagreed with the buyer on the critical
detail, finding the seller was not too late. The cancellation operated as a repudiation
(although the court did not so denominate it). Another good example is McFerran v.
Heroux, discussed at notes 532 and 533 above. There the repudiator was not saved by
his having asserted, as his reason for refusing performance, that he was not legally
obliged to perform. See also Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Monroe Street Lumber Co.,25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946). ....
541 20 Wn.2d 239, 147 P.2d 255 (1944). The R.ST ATEENT, C.ONTRAcTS §§ 318, 319
were cited.
542 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 980 (1950); 5 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1335 (rev. ed.
1936).
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Total and Partial Breach Distinguished. A breach has varying
effects on the legal relations between wrongdoer and injured obligee,
depending on the circumstances. In instances of bilateral contracts, a
breach may or may not be so serious in relation to the whole of the
defaulter's obligation as at once to mature for the injured party a
cause of action in which damages for future as well as past-due per-
formances of the defaulter can be recovered, or give him the remedy
of restitution. A breach which does not have these consequences is
usually characterized as "partial." A breach which does have them is
called "total." Although the Washington court has not always used
these terms, it seems clear enough that the distinctions they represent
will be recognized." 3 Non-performance by one party to a bilateral
contract may also discharge the other, but this result is better explained
in terms of constructive conditions than in terms of "total breach."
JuDicIAL REmDms FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Damages-fundamentals. Where the failure of a contract obligor
to perform is a legal wrong, the injured obligee's basic remedy is a
money judgment. "Where a right of action for breach exists, com-
pensatory damages will be given for the net amount of the losses
caused and gains prevented by the defendant's breach, in excess of
savings made possible ... "" Although a commonly stated objective
of courts is an award so measured as to put the obligee in the economic
position he would have occupied had the contract been performed," '
this is an imperfectly achieved ideal. Damages will not include the
expenses incurred in obtaining the judgment, save where the contract
obligates the defaulting promisor to reimburse the injured party for
these losses."" Nor can recovery be had for the time expended by the
obligee in consulting counsel, appearing as a witness and the like. The
restrictive propositions discussed below under the subheadings "Fore-
seeability" and "Certainty" can operate to exclude gains or losses
which are fairly within a chain of causation originating with the
143 See for example Marshall v. Campbell, 19 Wn.2d 497, 143 P.2d 449 (1943);
Hesselgrave v. Mott, 23 Wn.2d 270, 160 P.2d 521 (1945) ; Kolosoff v. Turri, 27 Wn.2d
81, 176 P.2d 439 (1947) ; Jacks v. Blazer, 39 Wn. 2d 277, 235 P.2d 187 (1951) ; Kelly
v. Valley Constr. Co., 43 Wn.2d 679, 262 P2d 970 (1953). See also the discussion
above at notes 486, 488, and RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 275, 276, 317 (1932).5 4 4 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcrS § 329 (1932). See also §§ 335, 346.5 4 5 Rathke v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 858, 207 P.2d 716 (1949) ; Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v.
Heidner & Co., 45 Wn.2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
329(a) (1932) ; 5 CoRnIN, CONTRACTS § 1002 (1950) ; 5 WMLISTO N, CONTRACTS § 1338
(rev. ed. 1936).
5 "McCoamic , DAMAGES § 61(1935) ; Sharpe Sign Co. v. Parrish, 33 Wn.2d 883,
207 P.2d 758 (1949) (illustrates the operation of an "attorney fee clause").
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breach. In addition to these legal difficulties the injured obligee (and
the defaulter too) faces the risks of malfunctioning which are inherent
in the processes by which a trier of fact places money values on services
or things.
The most common injury suffered by an obligee is the net difference
between the market value of the performance he was to receive and
the cost to him of rendering his own performance 47 (or such of it as
has not already been rendered). Some of the later Washington cases
illustrate the recoverability of damages measured by this difference."
There are, however, transactions for which this would be an obviously
unfair and inadequate measure. For some types of performance "mar-
ket value" is an unrealistic standard. The defaulted performance may
be worth more to the obligee than its market value. Out-of-pocket
losses may be sustained, other than expenditures by the obligee in
partly performing his own undertaking. Damages will include gains
prevented or losses sustained in transactions of these types, if the
547 Concerning the difficulties encountered in determining the correct measure of re-
covery for breach of a bilateral contract by a party whose performance was to be ren-
dered first, see RCW 63.04.640(2); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1351 (rev. ed. 1936).
s8 Kingston v. Anderson, 3 Wn2d 21, 99 P.2d 630 (1940) (for seller's breach of
contract to sell stock, damages measured by difference between market value and con-
tract price); Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945)
(for buyer's breach of contract to buy apples, damages measured by full contract price
as the apples were worthless to the seller); Holton v. Hart Mill Co., 24 Wn.2d 493,
166 P.2d 186 (1946) (for employer's breach of employment contract, damages meas-
ured by full agreed wage as there was no showing the employee could have obtained
like employment in the locality); Rathke v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 858, 207 P.2d 716
(1949) (for breach by the owner of a contract for the installation of a refrigeration
system, damages measured by the difference between the contract price and the amount
it would have cost the contractor to perform) ; Dunseath v. Hallauer, 41 Wn.2d 895,
253 P.2d 408 (1953) (for breach of a contract to convey orchard land in its then con-
dition, damages measured by the difference between market value with and without the
orchard, which was substantially destroyed by cold before conveyance and after the
contract was made) ; Mathews v. Heiser, 42 Wn.2d 326, 255 P.2d 366 (1953) (for
breach of a contract to convey land, no damages can be awarded where the market
value of the land was not established) ; Frazier v. Bowmar, 42 Wn.2d 383, 255 P.2d
906 (1953) (for breach of employment contract which provided for compensation on a
commission basis, damages measured by the commissions which would have been
earned, less the expenses the employee would have incurred in earning them) ; West v.
Jarvi, 44 Wn.2d 241, 266 P.2d 1040 (1954) (for breach by the owner after partial
completion by a builder, the latter can recover the contract price less the amount the
builder would have expended in completing the job) ; Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v. Heidner
& Co., 45 Wn. 2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954) (for breach of a contract to sell lumber,
damages measured by the difference between the price paid by the buyer to obtain
lumber from other mills, and the contract price) ; Pettaway v. Commercial Automotive
Serv., Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957) (for breach of a contract to sell a car,
the proper measure is the market value less any unpaid part of the price). See also
Truck-Trailer Equip. Co. v. S. Birch & Sons Constr. Co., 38 Wn.2d 583, 231 P.2d 304
(1951) (for breach of contract promise to pay for the renovation of trucks, damages
were apparently measured by the contract price less the cost of doing the work). It
will be noted that the "market value" of a money payment is simply the amount of the
promised payment. See too the cases cited in note 586 below; notice that prima facie
the damages for an employer's breach are the agreed wage, the off-setting value of the
employee's time being handled as a mitigation problem.
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obligee successfully hurdles the obstacles raised by the foreseeability
and certainty rules. Several of the later Washington cases are illustra-
tive.54
Two of the 1937-1957 cases are of particular interest. In Kenney v.
Abraham"" and Bernbaum v. Hodges,"'l earlier authority was followed,
under which the measure of damages for breach by a builder will vary
with the circumstances. If the work was substantially done, the owner
recovers the cost of completion. If it was not substantially done, he
recovers the difference between the market value of the property as it
would have been had the builder performed and its value in its actual
"
0 Merager v. Turnbull, 2 Wn.2d 711, 99 P.2d 434 (1940) (for breach of a non-
competition covenant, damages measured by the profits lost by the obligee as a result) ;Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wn2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941) (for brach of a contract to buy petro-
leum products, damages measured by the seller's "comission," it being a distributor,
without deduction for expenses, because the seller could have handled the buyer's ac-
count without additional overhead) ; Hole v. Unity Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131
P.2d 150 (1942) (for breach of refinery's contract to sell gasoline to a wholesaler,
damages measured by the profits the buyer would have realized on resale) ; Holden v.
Schafer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160 P.2d 537 (1945) (for breach
of a contract to sell lumber, buyer recovered the profits he would have made from the
operation of his door-making business; buyer was unable to obtain lumber elsewhere) ;
Sharpe'Sign Co. v. Parrish, 33 Wn.2d 883, 207 P.2d 758 (1949) (for breach by the
owner of a contract to pay for the erection of a sign, damages can be measured by the
reasonable worth of the work done before the owner repudiated; if the transaction is
viewed as a construction contract the holding conflicts with Davis v. Thurston County,
119 Wash. 414, 205 Pac. 840 (1922), which held the proper measure to be a proportion-
ate part of the contract price; the Davis case represents what is apparently a minority
view; see RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 333, 346(2) (1932); McCoRmicK, DAMAGES §
164 (1935) ; 5 CoaniN, CONTRACTS § 1094 (1950) ; Dally v. Isaacson, 40 Wn2d 574,
245 P.2d 200 (1952) (for breach by the manufacturer, of a contract to furnish mill-
work to a contractor, the latter recovered his expenses in remedying defects in mill-
work delivered, and for extra labor costs incurred as a result of delay in delivery) ;
Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn2d 42, 246 P.2d 1099 (1952) (for breach
by the manufacturer, of a contract to sell suits to a retailer, the latter recovered the
profits it would have made on resale); Kelly v. Valley Constr. Co., 43 Wn2d 679, 262
P.2d 970 (1953) (subcontractor recovered his "profits," on breach by the contractor) ;
Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co., 45 Wra2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954) (for
breach by the manufacturer of an exclusive distributorship contract by wrongfully
permitting sales by others, the distributor recovered the gross commissions it would
have earned on such sales; no deduction for expenses was made, because the contract
impliedy obligated the manufacturer to pay the full commission) ; Lidral v. Sixth &
Battery Corp., 47 Wn.2d 831, 290 P.2d 459 (1955) (for a builder's delay in completing
construction, the owner can recover lost rentals) ; Carstens Packing Co. v. Cox, 47
Wn.2d 346, 287 P.2d 486 (1955) (a contract between a packer and a cattle feeder
obligated the packer to pay at a stated rate per pound for the weight added to the
animals while in the feeder's care, and to remove the animals when they would grade
out "choice"; the packer breached both duties; the feeder recovered at the contract rate
for the added weight, and the reasonable worth of all its services rendered after the
date on which the animals should have been taken by the packer) ; Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn.2d 123, 298 P.2d 497 (1956) (for breach by the seller of a con-
tract to deliver sprinkler-system pipe, the buyer recovered the value of the crop he
would have raised had he been able to provide the necessary water). See also the
discussion of profits as damages, in Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v. Heidner & Co., 45 Wn.2d
806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954), and the damages section of the UNIFORM SALES ACT, RCW
63.04.680.
550 199 Wash. 167, 90 P.2d 713 (1929) ; followed in Hansen v. Walker, 46 Wn.2d
499, 282 P.2d 829 (1955) ; difference in market values was the measure used.
55 43 Wn.2d 503, 261 P.2d 968 (1953) ; cost of completion was the measure used.
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condition."'2 Just what determines whether a performance is "sub-
stantial" in this situation is obscure. The apparent stress on the quan-
tum of performance may be misleading. In other jurisdictions the
difference in market values is usually said to govern damages only
where the work done is defective, and reconstruction would be eco-
nomically wasteful."5 ' There is reason to believe that the results
reached by the Washington court may not differ materially from those
reached by courts which state their rule in terms of "economic
waste."
554
Nominal damages. The traditional view deems a token award of a
nominal sum to be a proper vindication of the obligee's right. As ex-
plained by Professor Williston, "an unexcused failure to perform a
contract is a legal wrong. Action will lie for the breach although it
causes no injury. Nominal damages are then awarded."55 The Wash-
ington court long ago took a different position, holding that proof of
breach without proof of some injury will not sustain a judgment for
the obligee, even for nominal damages. " Such an award is appropriate
only where there is injury and failure to prove compensatory damages.
This proposition was inferentially reaffirmed in Gilmartin v. Stevens
Inv. Co.5 7 It will be observed that the rule as stated dictates whether
the obligee's cause shall be dismissed, or a judgment for nominal dam-
ages entered. The issue in the Gilmartin case was an unusual and
difficult one. What constitutes the failure of proof which will justify
an award of nominal rather than compensatory damages? The obligee
presented evidence which if credible would support a judgment for a
substantial sum. The trial court concluded injury was established but
disbelieved the testimony which would establish the amount of dam-
ages. The trial court awarded nominal damages and was reversed in
a five-four decision. The majority said:
552 From the owner's recovery under either formula the unpaid contract balance
must of course be deducted.
553 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 546 (1) (1932); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1089,
1090 (1950); 5 WiisTox, CONTRACTS § 1363 (rev. ed. 1936).
554 See the discussion in Mahan v. Springer, 155 Wash. 98, 283 Pac. 667 (1930)
and in the Bernbaum case, cited note 551 above.
555 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1339A (1950) (rev. ed. 1936). See also RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 328 (1932); 5 CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 1001 (1950).
556 See Ketchum v. Albertson Bulb Gardens, Inc., 142 Wash. 134, 252 Pac. 523(1927) and the decisions cited therein. For a discussion approving the Washington
rule see McCoaIcK, DAMAGES § 524 n.56 (1935).
55743 Wn.2d 289, 261 P.2d 73 (1953). The court quoted from an earlier opinion:
"Nominal damages never purport to be real damages. They are awarded where, from
the nature of the case, some injury has been done, the amount of which the proofs fail
entirely to show." (Emphasis added.)
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[S]ince competent and undisputed opinion evidence was submitted as
to the values comprising the agreed measure of damages, and the court
did find that substantial damage had been sustained, the court had
the duty either to make an award of substantial damages or to give
appellants an opportunity to submit additional proof as to damages.
Had the latter course been followed, the court was entitled, but not
required, to appoint an appraiser or other expert to present additional
testimony as to value.
The two dissenting opinions are perhaps more persuasive. The Gil-
martin decision may not represent the final word on this problem.
Foreseeability.
In awarding damages, compensation is given for only those injuries
that the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable result of his
breach when the contract was made. If the injury is one that follows
the breach in the usual course of events, there is sufficient reason for
the defendant to foresee it; otherwise, it must be shown specifically that
the defendant had reason to know the facts and to foresee the injury.5 8
The Washington court has long adhered to this formula.5 9 It was
invoked in three 1937-1957 cases. Lewis v. Jensen80 illustrates a loss
found to be a normal result of the breach. Dally v. Isaacson.. illus-
trates the effect of an obligor's knowledge of the special circumstances
which produced the disputed loss. In Pettaway v. Commercial Auto-
motive Serv., Inc., 82 the foreseeability rule was used to bar damages
for mental anguish, a technic which must be questioned. For the
highly complex problem raised by a claim for mental or physical
suffering caused by a breach of contract a more definitive and particu-
larized principle is needed."'
15 8 RESTATEMENT, Co NTRACs § 330 (1932). See also 5 CORBiN, CoNTRACTs §§ 1006
et seq. (1950) ; 5 WmHisToN, CoNTRA s §§ 1356, 1357 (rev. ed 1936).
5 5 9 
See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 330.
58039 Wn.2d 301, 235 P.2d 312 (1951) (bailee of an airplane, under a contract
to service it, held liable for its value; the bailee failed to adequately safeguard the
plane, which was stolen and wrecked by the thief).5640 Wn.2d 575, 245 P.2d 200 (1952) (manufacturer who delivered defective
miliwork late was held for the buyer's expenses in correcting the defects and for
extra labor costs incurred because of the delay). Followed in Lidral v. Sixth &
Battery Corp., 47 Wn.2d 831, 290 P.2d 459 (1955) (for delay by a builder in complet-
ing the structure, lost rentals can be recovered where the builder knew this loss would
follow his breach).
50249 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957). The Pettaway case involved breach by
the seller, of a contract for a car, and a claim for mental anguish suffered by the
buyer on being deprived of an article desired for "conspicuous consumption."
563The foreseeability rule must of course be met. But there are also serious
questions of basic policy, which are obscured and distorted if the emphasis is put on
foreseeability, the presence or absence of which is, in final analysis, very much in the
"eye of the beholder." It would be perfectly sensible for a court to hold that worry
or rage and physical manifestations of these emotional disturbances are such normal
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Certainty. The most confusing of the damages principles with which
a contract obligee must contend is the "rule of certainty." Just what
is it that he must establish with certainty-the fact of his injury, the
monetary evaluation of his injury, or both? Does the rule apply only
to "special" or "consequential" damages, or to general damages too?
How much proof does the rule demand? Is the degree of certainty
demanded in his proof of damages affected by the degree of persuasive-
ness in his evidence of foreseeability? Although seemingly contradic-
tory answers to these questions can be found, the variant language of
judges and text writers is probably a reflection of flexibility in the rule
rather than of doctrinal differences.
It is believed that the following statement is a fair summary of the
results expectable in American courts: An obligee may fail in his
endeavor to obtain compensatory damages, either because he does not
establish with "certainty" the injury for which he seeks compensation,
or because he does not establish with "certainty" the data by which a
monetary award can be determined.' 4 Courts tend to stress the fact
of injury, or the evaluation of it, depending on the problem before
them. These differences in emphasis can be misleading if the over-all
pattern is not kept in mind."' Several of the later Washington cases
are illustrative. In Dunseath v. Hallaue... the court said: "The un-
certainty here is not as to the fact of damage, which would be fatal to
a recovery by a plaintiff, but as to the amount of the total damage that
occurred after January 15th." In Gaasland Co. v. Hyak Lumber &
results of a breach of contract as to be always foreseeable. The certainty requirement
is not an insuperable barrier, as there are exceptions to it which are flexible enough to
encompass damages for mental or physical suffering. The real problem is a funda-
mental one-should a non-monetary damage element be permitted where the wrong
is in an essentially commercial relationship? In a number of American jurisdictions
the answer to this question is "maybe," rather than "no," although there are others
in which the prime concern seems to be the classification of the cause of action
as tort or contract. As is to be expected, the break-through is coming in cases
involving "wanton" breach of contracts in which the personal element predominates.
See the discussion in the dissent, Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wn.2d 795, 322 P.2d 125
(1958). The Carpenter case is discussed in Note, 34 WASH. L. Rv. 186 (1959). See
also Note, 5 WASH. L. REv. 36 (1930); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 341 (1932);(and the WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS to that section) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1076
(1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1340A (rev. ed. 1936).
5 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1020, 1021, 1022 (1950) ; McCoRmiCK, DAMAGES §§ 26,
27 (1935) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1345, 1346 (rev. ed. 1936).
585 These differences in emphasis are carried into some text statements. See 15
Am. JuR, Contracts § 23 at 414 (1938): "It is now generally held that the uncertain-
ty which prevents a recovery is uncertainty as to the fact of the damage and not
as to its amount . . . " (the remainder of the section indicates however that this
statement was not intended to be taken literally and out of context) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 331 (1932) (which stresses evaluation; notice however comment a,
which indicates that the required certainty as to the amount will vary with the
positiveness with which the fact of injury is established).
566 41 Wn2d 895, 902, 253 P2d 408 (1953).
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Millwork, Inc., 6' it was said: "Furthermore, the doctrine respecting
the matter of certainty, properly applied, is concerned more with the
fact of damage than with the extent or amount of damage." These
statements suggest that the fact of injury is the sole or governing
element. Yet in National School Studios v. Superior School Photo
Serv., Inc.,68 the obligee lost, even though the fact of injury was mani-
fest, because its proof did not provide a satisfactory basis for evalu-
ating its loss. The fact of injury and the amount are evidently both
important. "
Despite opinions suggesting that the rule of certainty applies only
where operating profits from a commercial enterprise are sought to be
recovered,""0 there is no serious doubt but what all manner of contract
damages are affected."'
Concerning the kind and amount of proof needed to satisfy the rule,
the typical judicial statement calls for "reasonable" certainty. Few
guides can be derived from decisions discussing the application of so
flexible a standard. It does appear that of an obligee whose evidence
of injury is strong, less will be demanded as to evaluation.572 Pre-
567 42 Wn.2d 705, 712, 257 P.2d 784 (1953). A similar statement appeared in
Gilmartin v. Stevens Inv. Co., cited note 570 below.
568840 Wn.2d 263, 242 P.2d 756 (1952). See also Pettaway v. Commercial Auto-
motive Serv., Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 654, 306 P.2d 219, (1957) (as to damages for
deprivation of the Chrysler).
589 Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wn.2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941) is a good example. So is the
court's handling of the renewal option and fuel oil aspects in Hole v. Unity
Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942).
57 0 Gaasland Co. v. Hyak Lumber & Millwork, Inc., cited note 567 above ("In the
main, the doctrine usually applies to bar recovery for loss of profits in a business
which has not been established") ; Gilmartin v. Stevens Inv. Co., 43 Wn.2d 289, 261
P.2d 73 (1953) (involved breach of a contract to furnish water for domestic use, and
a successful effort to get damages measured by the diminished market value of the
land; to the argument that the obligee's evidence failed to meet the certainty rule,
the court replied: "But there is also a -serious question as to whether the standard
of reasonable certainty has any application to a case of this kind. This standard is
usually applied only in cases where the measure of damages is the amount of profits or
losses.") The term "profits" is a treacherous one, being variously used by courts and
writers to mean net profits of a commercial enterprise, and the gain of which any
obligee has been deprived. It is used in the RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 331 (1932),
in the latter sense; comment a and the illustrations so indicate. It is quite true that
the certainty rule most often strikes at commercial operating profits, but this is
because such profits are typically speculative and vulnerable to the rule.
571 See, e.g., H. W. Whitaker v. G. B. & S. Mill, Inc., 21 Wn.2d 625, 152 P.2d 719
(1944); Dunseath v. Hallauer, 41 Wn.2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953); Pettaway v.
Commercial Automotive Serv., Inc., 49 Wn.2d 650, 306 P.2d 219 (1957) (as to
damages for deprivation of use of the Chrysler) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1022 (1952) ;
5 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1346A at n. 2 (rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS§ 331(1) (1932).
572 Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn.2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940). See
also Gaasland Co. v. Hyak Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 705, 257 P2d 784
(1953); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 331, comment a (1932); 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 1020 (1950).
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sumably the converse is also true, if only because persuasive evidence
on evaluation tends to establish the fact of injury. Operating profits
of a new business enterprise will be difficult indeed to prove with
certainty, although it would seem incorrect to say flatly that the burden
can never be met.57 The obligee would be well advised to muster the
best proof available to him; failure to do so may induce an adverse
holding on the certainty issue."4 Correlatively, an obligee who has
done the best he can in light of difficulties created by the nature of the
transaction and the fact of breach, may prevail on evidence a good
deal less concrete than would be required in other circumstances. 7'
One of the more mysterious aspects of the certainty rule is its inter-
relation with foreseeability. Logically, the latter concept is exhausted
with the technical principle discussed in the preceding subsection and
many opinions concerned with certainty contain no comment on fore-
seeability. There occasionally appears, however, a passage which sug-
gests that less certainty will be required where the obligor willfully
defaulted knowing what injury would result, or knew his breach would
cause a loss difficult to evaluate.""6
573 The, Washington court has said many times: "[L]oss of prospective profits of an
established business may be recovered if they can be ascertained with reasonable
certainty.. .' Hole v. Unity Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942);
Holden v. Schaefer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160 P.2d 537 (1945),
and the older cases therein cited. The obvious inference is that for a new venture
such damages cannot be had. A by-product of this notion is observable in the Hole
and Holden cases; the main contest seems to have been over the question: Did the
obligee have an "established business?" The inference is unsound. Duration of the
enterprise is hardly controlling. The earnings experience of an established business
may make the requisite proof of profits impossible; a new enterprise may under
exceptional circumstances provide proof enough. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1023 (1950) ;
McCoRxMicK, DAMAGES § 29 (1935). If the business has enjoyed a period of profitable
operation, the problems are much less acute; past sales and operating results may well
meet the certainty rule. Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wn.2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941). See also
the Hole and Holden cases, supra, and Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn.2d
742, 153 P.2d 286 (1944). These cases and those cited below in note 574 demonstrate
that the books of account and not opinion testimony provide the best evidence. A
salesman whose compensation is on a commission basis faces similar problems. His
past sales and earnings may enable him to meet the certainty requirement. Frazier v.
Bowman, 42 Wn.2d 383, 255 P2d 906 (1953); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1025 (1950).
ST4 California E. Airways, Inc., v. Alaska Airlines, 38 Wn.2d 378, 229 P.2d 540
(1951) ; National School Studios v. Superior School Photo Serv., Inc., 40 Wn.2d 263,
242 P.2d 756 (1952). See McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 29 (1935). Cf., McFerran v.
Heroux, cited note 579 below and discussed in note 581 (depreciation of a building
wat a critical part of the plaintiff's damages evidence; the court took judicial notice
of a depreciation table and indicated that it had previous cases taken such notice of
standard mortality tables).
5 Ball v. Stokely Food, Inc., 37 Wn.2d 79, 211 P.2d 832 (1950) ; Dunseath v.
Hallauer, 41 Wn.2d 895, 253 P.2d 408 (1953) ; Gilmartin v. Stevens Inv. Co., 43 Wn.2d
289, 261 P.2d 73 (1953) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn.2d 123, 298 P.2d 497
(1956). See also McCoRaiicK, DAMAGES, § 27 (1935).576 Holden v. Schafer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 209, 160 P.2d 537(1945) ("Appellant's officers and agents knew the facts when the contract was made
and then deliberately, with an evident intent to enrich appellant corporation at the
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Repudiation of life insurance policy. Franklin v. Northern Life
Ins. Co. 7" brought to the court, apparently for the first time, the ques-
tion of damages for repudiation of a life insurance contract. The
policyholder had become uninsurable. Said the court:
The just and logical rule governing the measure of damages recover-
able.., is the present value of his insurance policy, as of the date of
death, less the estimated cost of carrying the insurance from the date
of cancellation at appellant's then age. His life expectancy from the
time of the breach of the contract of insurance is a question of fact to
be determined from competent life expectancy tables and from his
physical condition at the time the contract was breached. In the
determination of this question, there must be taken into consideration
his bodily affliction, which may prove fatal or shorten his life ex-
pectancy.
Three judges dissented, arguing that the insured's physical condition
made any estimate of his life expectancy speculative, and proposing
return of the premiums paid plus interest5 78
Repudiation of option contract. McFerran v. Heroux,79 also a
expese of respondent, refused to comply with the terms of the agreement. Respondent,
under the circumstances, was entitled to recover prospective profits." Respondent's
evidence was probably adequate, without regard to the conduct of appellant referred
to in the quoted passage; that conduct would evidently have had weight, were the
respondent's evidence doubtful) ; Dally v. Isaacson, 40 Wn.2d 574, 579, 245 P2d 200(1952) (in discussing consequential damages resulting from delay in performance, the
court said: "Damage to Dally from a tardy delivery schedule of defective material
was not a mere possibility. It was a certainty. This foreseeable damage was not
speculative or remote." The passage suggests that foreseeability will counter, to adegree, the element of speculativeness at which the certainty rule is directed.) Notice
too Professor Corbin's comment: "There are many cases in which, by reason of the
ordinary experience and belief of mankind, the trial court is convinced that sub-
stantial pecuniary harm has been inflicted, even though its amount in dollars isincapable of proof. If the defendant had reason to foresee this kind of harm and thedifficulty of proving its amount, the injured party will not be denied a remedy in
damages because of the lack of certainty. It seems probable also that a lesser degree
of certainty will be required as against one whose breach is described as 'wilful' or is
motivated by malice or avarice than against one whose breach was due to misfortune
and whose efforts to perform were honest and in good faith. In such cases the trial
court and jury have a greater degree of discretion and doubts will more readily be
resolved against the party committing the breach." 5 CoRBzIN, CoiraxcTs § 1020 at
110, 111 (1950).
577 4 Wn.2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940). The court did not discuss the fact that the
plaintiff's wife was the named policy-beneficiary. As to this cf., REsTATEMENT, CoN-
TnAcTs § 345 (1932) ; 5 CoRBiN, CoNTRACTs § 1088 (1950).578 There is authority for the measure suggested by the dissent, although thepropriety of an award which makes no allowances for the protection afforded by the
policy prior to its breach has been questioned. See 5 CoRBIN, CoNTRAcTs § 968, (1950) ;
6 CORIN, op cit. supra, § 1088; 5 W wiSToN, CONTRACTs § 1330 (rev. ed. 1936). The
majority appears clearly right, in its refusal to deny the damages sought because of
uncertainty in the proof of the insured's life expectancy. The many personal injury
cases in which the probable duration of a person's life is left for the jury to decide
on the basis of his physical condition, with or without the aid of a mortality table,
indicate that the uncertainty is not excessive. See McCoRmicx, DAXAGES § 86 (1935).
57044 Wn.2d 631, 269 P.2d 815 (1954).
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case of first impression, was concerned with an unusually interesting
damage issue. A lease gave the lessor an option to buy improvements
at the end of the lease term. It also obligated the lessee to rebuild if
improvements were destroyed,"'0 and this obligation he repudiated after
a destructive fire. The lessor recovered the cost of rebuilding less the
depreciation... which would have accrued and less the option price.
The resulting figure was also reduced by discounting it at 6 per cent
to the end of the term. The court stated the measure of damages to be
the worth of the option, and went on to say:
In the case of options to purchase land, the surest measure of this
value may be, as stated by James, "the excess of the market value of
the land over the option price." In the instant case, however, such a
measure would be wholly inadequate.... [the] market value of the
grandstand would be substantially less than its worth to the plaintiff,
as owner of the land....
This well-reasoned decision should help materially in resolving dam-
ages problems created by an optionor's repudiation. 82
Mitigation. "Damages are not recoverable for harm that the plain-
tiff should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort
without undue risk, expense, or humiliation.""58 This seemingly simple
proposition, accepted generally by the Washington'8" and other Ameri-
can courts, 8 ' produces some knotty problems. The difficulties are
however primarily factual, produced by the indefiniteness of the term
"reasonable" and by the necessity for establishing a causal relation
between a questioned injury or valuation, and whatever it was the
580 The lessee had an election, to rebuild or terminate the lease; when the improve-
ments were destroyed by fire he elected to rebuild.
581 The plaintiff's evidence on depreciation might have been subject to question
under the certainty rule; the court was however willing to take judicial notice of a
treasury department (Bureau of Internal Revenue) bulletin dealing with depreciation,
and to apply to the tables therein contained the reasoning on which mortality tables
are relevant evidence even though the case involves a specific person.
. 582 Although the court characterized the breach as a present one, since the lease
obligated the lessee to rebuild, it must be recognized that the breach was anticipatory
so far as the option contract was concerned. The recovery approved was appropriate
to an anticipatory breach action. "The rules for determining the damages recoverable
for an anticipatory -breach are the same as in the case of a breach at the time fixed for
performance." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 338 (1932) ; 5 CoRanN, CONTRACTS § 1053
(1950) ; 5 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf., Cron & Dehn v. Chelan
Packing Co., 158 Wash. 167, 290 Pac. 999 (1930) (for anticipatory breach of a contract
to sell dehydrated apple rings, the buyer recovered the difference between the contract
price and the price at which a forward contract could have been made at the time of
the repudiation; this view, for which there is some case support, is critically discussed
in 5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1397 p. 3902 (rev. ed. 1936).
583 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336(1) (1932).
584 WASHINGTON ANNoTATIoNs, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 336.
585 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1039 (1950) ; 5 WmLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1353 (rev. ed.
1936).
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obligee failed to do. The 1937-1957 Washington cases dealing with
mitigation are illustrative."'
Interest. "In cases where it is promised, interest is an agreed com-
pensation for consideration received; and it is payable because it is
promised and not as reparation for a previous breach of duty. 587 The
promise may call for interest from the date of the promise or only from
the date on which the principal amount falls due. In either situation
promised interest is not usually considered "damages." The promised
1s6 Hansen v. Columbia Breweries, Inc., 12 Wn2d 554, 122 P.2d 489 (1942) (em-
ployer breached an employment contract; the court found suflicient evidence to indicate
e employee had tried without success to obtain other employment); Hole v. Unity
Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn.2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942) (buyer recovered prospective
re-sale profits; although like goods were procurable elsewhere, the contract called for
credit and the seller failed to show that the buyer could have made the purchases
which would have reduced his loss); Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn2d 742,
153 P.2d 286 (1944) (reasonableness of what the obligee did, and did not do, was for
the jury); 0 Brien v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 23 Wn.2d 917, 165 P.2d 86(1945) (employee sued for breach of employment contract; his pay during the unper-
formed contract period would have been $7,856.17; he earned during that period$533.57; the jury returned a verdict for $1,800; the award was sustained, because there
was evidence on which the jury could have found that the plaintiff failed to mitigate
his damage; moreover, the court held that the plaintiff undertook the burden of proof
as to mitigation, a burden ordinarily on the defendant, because he "tried his case on
the theory that the burden on the issue was upon him"; four judges dissented, appar-
ently deeming the burden of proof to be on the employer, and not sustained) ; Rdthke
v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 858, 207 P.2d 716 (1949) (contractor who undertook to install a
refrigeration system in a warehouse is entitled to his profit, contract price less cost of
performance, on breach by the owner; the owner sought to invoke the mitigation rule,
because the contractor had the machinery which he would have installed but for the
breach; this issue the court disposed of by demonstrating that the evidence did not
show he could not have made a similar installation contract with another person; the
court failed to see that such evidence would not have come within the mitigation rule;
the contractor's profit, had he found another buyer, would not have been a gain
properly deductible from his recovery against this defendant) ; Hill's, Inc. v. William
B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn.2d 42, 246 P.2d 1099 (1952) (failure of a buyer to procure
goods elsewhere does not diminish his recovery of profits under a contract to buy
goods for resale, it appearing that the added cost of doing so would have exceeded his
profits) ; Lidral v. Sixth & Battery Corp., 47 Wn.2d 831, 290 P.2d 459 (1955) (on
finding that the owner mitigated his damages, when the contractor breached, by moving
into the uncompleted building, the court sustained recovery for the costs of completing
the work at overtime pay rates, as the work had to be done during off hours) ; Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Grant, 49 Wn2d 123, 298 P.2d 497 (1956) (failure of a buyer to
procure pipe elsewhere, on the seller's breach of a contract to sell pipe for irrigation
purposes, was held not to invoke the mitigation rule, where the seller repeatedly
assured him that the pipe was on the way). See also Norm Advertising, Inc. v. Mon-
roe St. Lumber Co., 25 Wn.2d 391, 171 P.2d 177 (1946), in which the court applied
to a contract to buy advertising materials the principle which appertains in employ-
ment contracts, holding the contract price to be prima facie the measure of recovery;
the burden of showing that the seller could have reduced his loss was placed on the
buyer.
687 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 337, comment a (1932). See also 4 CoRBNz, CoN-
TRAcTS § 1045 (1950); Mayflower Realty Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Soc'y, 192
Wash. 129, 72 P.2d 1038, 75 P2d 579 (1937) (on the seller's anticipatory breach of aninstllment payment real estate contract, the buyer was permitted to maintain a specific
performance action but was required to pay all of the interest which would have
accrued, as the contract contained no pre-payment clause).
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rate, if lawful, governs the amount."' Correlatively, an agreement that
interest shall not be paid will be effective." 9
A statutory duty to pay interest seems also to be outside a proper
definition of "damages." RCW 19.52.010, "0 which should arguably
provide the answer for many interest problems, has been more ignored
than cited, probably because it is so ambiguous. Interest issues which
might have been analyzed as requiring only construction of the statute
have been and no doubt will continue to be resolved by the application
of common law principles."'
The 193 7-1957 period produced in Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip.
Co."' a case of particular significance. The reasons for its importance
lie in the court's earlier decisions. In some it was indicated with rea-
sonable precision that interest is recoverable as damages where the
defaulted promise was to pay money for work or goods received, in an
amount fixed by or readily computable from data contained in the
agreement, even though a dispute exists about the liability of the
promisor to pay such amount." 3 In others the court took a liberal
position, approving interest on damages measured by lost profits under
a buy-sell contract where the market value of the defaulted perform-
ances was readily established, " and on damages for breach of war-
588 The usury statute, discussed later in the section on illegality, appears to have
produced the only 1937-1957 appellate cases on promised interest.
5 89 Tingstad v. National Bank of Commerce, 36 Wn2d 1, 216 P.2d 236 (1950).590 This statute reads in part: "Every loan or forbearance of money, goods, or
thing in action shall bear interest at the rate of six per cent per annum where no
different rate is agreed to in writing between the parties."591 E.g., Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equip. Co., 45 Wn.2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1952).
Cf., Gheen v. Construction Equip. Co., 49 Wn.2d 140, 298 P.2d 852 (1956), in which
the court cited both the statute and the Mall case. The statute was also cited in
Herman v. Golden Arrow Dairy, Inc., 191 Wash. 582, 71 P.2d 581 (1937) ; the case
involved an agreement extending the maturity of an existing money obligation;
interest was allowed during the extension period. The statute was not cited in State
ex rel. Pac. Bridge Co. v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 8 Wn2d 337, 112 P.2d 135
(1941) (contractor recovered interest from the date on which the final payment under
a construction contract was due), nor in a number of earlier cases involving analogous
facts. See the cases cited, WASHINGToN ANNOTATIONs, RESTAT mENT, CONTRACTS §
337.
59245 Wn.2d 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954); Noted, 30 WAsH. L. REv. 128 (1955).
Professor Corbin was moved to write of this decision: "The court's discussion of
interest is unusually good and such as is seldom found in the reports." 5 ColnIN,
CONTRAcTS § 1051 (1950, Supp. 1959).5 93 Arnott v. City of Spokane, 6 Wash. 442, 33 Pac. 1063 (1893) ; Parks v. Elmore,
59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910); Empire State Sur. Co. v. Moran Bros. Co.,
71 Wash. 171, 127 Pac. 1104 (1912) ; McHugh v. City of Tacoma, 76 Wash. 127, 135
Pac. 1011 (1913); Modern Irr. & Land Co. v. Neely, 81 Wash. 38, 142 Pac. 458(1914); Dornberg v. Black Carbon Coal Co., 93 Wash. 682, 161 Pac. 845 (1916);
Dixon & Oliver v. Parker, Moran & Parker, 102 Wash. 101, 172 Pac. 856 (1918) ; A.
W. Hartman Shoe Co. v. Hanson, 135 Wash. 512, 238 Pac. 17 (1925); Hudnall v.
Pennington & Co., 136 Wash. 155, 239 Pac. 2 (1925) ; Svarz v. Dunlap, 168 Wash. 74,
10 P.2d 975 (1932) ; Woodbridge v. Johnson, 187 Wash. 191, 59 P.2d 1135 (1936).
594 National Steel Car Corp. v. Schwager & Nettleton, Inc., 124 Wash. 557, 214
Pac. 1049 (1923).
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ranty" ' Incompatible with these holdings, and disturbing, was a
passage in Wright v. City of Tacoma.. purporting to deny interest
where "the demand is for something which requires evidence to estab-
lish the quantity or amount of the thing furnished, or the value of the
services rendered... ." The broad implications of this language indi-
cate an unusual and restrictive formula. A test of the court's actual
adherence to it was inevitable, and came in the Mall Tool Co. case. Of
the quoted passage from the Wright case the court said: "This lan-
guage, taken out of context, is too broad if applied to quantity or
amount where there has been a sale at a fixed price per unit." Although
this is a carefully limited disapproval of the earlier decision, it seems
unlikely that the court will in any situation disapprove interest as
damages merely because the plaintiff was obliged to establish his loss
by evidence going beyond the contract language. It is on the -other
hand clear enough that interest is not always recoverable. Just where
the dividing line falls is still not certain, but from the court's discussion
in the Mall Tool Co. case 17 and from Hopkins v. Ulvestad5 ' it would
appear that the critical point is passed when computation of the amount
of the loss becomes excessively imprecise. 19
The Mall Tool Co. case also much clarified the effect on interest as
damages, of a counterclaim which is sustained and which will not itself
carry interest. Counterclaims based on defects in the performance for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery were distinguished from those based
on other defaults. The latter were held not to diminish interest dam-
ages. As to the former, earlier cases permitting interest only on the
net balance were favorably discussed.""0
595 Dickdnson Fire & Pressed Brick Co. v. F. T. Crowe & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115
Pac. 1087 (1911).
59687 Wash. 334, 151 Pac. 837 (1915) (extras under a building contract; interest
denied) ; followed in Lloyd v. American Can Co., 128 Wash. 298, 222 Pac. 876 (1924) ;
see also Woodbridge v. Johnson, 187 Wash. 191, 59 P.2d 1135 (1936), in which the
quoted passage from the Wright case was repeated.
597 See particularly the courtis discussion of Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d 818, 226
P.2d 218 (1951) and of Lloyd v. American Can Co., cited above at note 596. See also
Gheen v. Construction Equip. Co., 49 Wn2d 140, 298 P.2d 852 (1956), in which
the Mall Tool Company case was followed.
898 46 Wn.2d 514, 282 P2d 806 (1955) (interest is not recoverable where the plain-
tiff's loss is measured by the reasonable worth of his performance). There is some
contrary authority in other states. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1048 (1950).
590 This is apparently the position to which a number of other courts have come.
See 5 CORBN, CONTRACTS §§ 1048, 1050 (1950); 5 WILTs oN, CONTRACTS § 1413
(rev. ed. 1936). For the purposes of the stated formula, imprecision may be the
product of conflicting evidence about the extent of the plaintiff's performance or
about values. The formula cannot work with the certainty of an algebraic equation.
It does however establish a theoretic base from which counsel and court can work.
800 This is a view for which there is considerable authority in other states. See 5
CORBIN, CONTRACrS § 1051 (1950).
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Limitation of Liability. A contract term restricting an obligor's
liability for breach, to a type of injury, or type of remedy, or an amount
of loss less than would otherwise be recoverable, has been generally and
in Washington sustained."' This proposition was reaffirmed in Ketet
v. Hovick. °2 The court went on however to distinguish a clause dis-
claiming liability for "any loss or damage resulting from the use, or
loss of use, of any machine .. ," which was enforced, from a clause
limiting the seller's liability for breach of warranty to replacement of
the machine or (at his option) refund of the purchase price. The latter
clause was not enforced,. (i.e., damages were held to be recoverable)
because the dealer refused to furnish a new machine or make the re-
fund,0  and his doing so was found to be a condition to the limitation
of liability.' This is a decision which may occasion further contro-
versy. The buyer received more than he bargained for, a result not
readily justified. Serious problems will be raised by an obligor who
disputes the fact of his default. Must he surrender his contest, on pain
of. invalidating- the limitation provision? The holding seems incon-
sistent with the liquidated damages cases, in which failure of the de-
faulter to pay the sum specified in the contract to be paid as liquidated
damages does not make him liable for the injured party's actual and
greater loss." 5
A contract provision which prescribes a course of conduct to be
followed by a defaulting party but does not expressly limit his liability
can produce a difficult interpretation issue. That it is apt to be resolved
against the obligor is demonstrated by Byrne v. Bellingham Consol.
601 5 CoRniN, CONTRACTS § 1068 (1950) ; 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 781A (rev. ed.
1936). Crandall Engr. Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 188 Wash. 1,
61 P.2d 136 (1936).
603 47 Wn.2d 368, 287 P.2d 739 (1955). Although this case and the Crandall case
(cited in the previous note) involved chattel sales and relied on § 71 of the Uniform
Sales Act (RCW 63.04.720), there is no reason to expect a different result in other
types of transaction. See also McDonald Credit Serv. v. Church, 49 Wn.2d 400, 301
P2d 1082 (1956) and the decisions therein cited, which sustain the validity of clauses
disclaiming all warranty liability. An analogous result can be achieved in a real
property transaction by use of a "special warranty" of title. See Central Life Assur.
Soe'y v. Impelmans, 13 Wn.2d 632, 126 P.2d 757 (1942).
603 Return of the machine by the purchaser was a condition to the dealer's under-
taking to replace or refund; the purchaser offered to return the machine and the
dealer refused to receive it. This conduct, the court quite properly held, excused the
condition.
604 The condition was purportedly found by construction; the contract document
contained (so far as the opinion indicates) no language supporting such an interp-
retation.
605 Insofar as the seller promised to replace the property, a type of relief not
otherwise available to the buyer was created. Such a provision goes well beyond the
simple limitation of liability clause; the analogy to liquidated damages seems to be a
close one.
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School Dist."'6 The court will probably not find a limitation of liability
to have been agreed on save where the parties' purpose in that particu-
lar is dearly stated.
Liquidated damages. Contract provisions purporting to fix the
amount of damages recoverable upon breach were frequently litigated
in Washington prior to 1937. The appellate decisions accorded gen-
erally with the results reached by other courtS607 and with the Restate-
ment of Contracts, section 339.1°8 If the liquidated amount is a bona
fide and reasonable pre-estimate of the expectable loss which breach
will cause, and the transaction is of a type which makes proof of dam-
ages difficult, such a clause will be sustained. The later cases illustrate
the application of this formula but add nothing of substantive signifi-
cance.
09
In Russell v. Stephens610 the court recognized that an action for
damages presupposes the existence of a contract which has been
breached, and went on to say: "The vendor in a contract of sale and
purchase may, upon default in payment by the vendee, declare the
contract forfeited and, if the contract so provides, retain all sums paid
thereon, as liquidated damages, or he may elect to sue either for
606 7 Wn2d 20, 108 P.2d 791 (1941). A building contract provided for an extension
of time to the builder should he be delayed "by any act or neglect of the Owner or the
Architect.. ." It did not say that such an extension was the limit of the owner's
liability. The interpretation issue was resolved by resort to routine principles
(against the owner because he prepared the document; all provisions must if possible
be harmonized and given force), and by this statement: "Another reason for
resolving the ambiguity, if any, in appellant's [builder's] favor is that, while con-
tracting parties may provide for a limitation on the right to recover damages, the
harshness of that result, in an instance such as this, calls for strict construction of the
language relied upon to bar recovery." The builder, although he had received the
extension, recovered damages for delay caused by the owner. Cf., Erickson v. Edmonds
School Dist, discussed in note 812 below.
607 See CoRi, CoNTRACTs §§ 1054 et seq. (1950) ; 3 WLLIsToN, CoNTAC s §§ 783
et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).608 See WASHiNGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 339.
e09 Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945) (buyer
under contract for the sale of apples promised to pay an indicated sum for each box
not taken; sustained) ; Mead v. Anton, 33 Wn.2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949) (seller
of restaurant covenanted not to compete with the buyer and to pay $500 for each
month of breach; sustained) ; Management Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wn.2d 321, 235
P.2d 293 (1951) (seller of a laundry and dry-cleaning business covenanted not to
compete, as "an owner or part-owner" and to pay $10,000 in the event of breach;
held a penalty and unenforceable; the decision demonstrates that lump-sum liquidated
damages provisions must be used with great caution) ; Wai v. Parks, 43 Wn.2d 562,
262 P.2d 196 (1953) (lease provided for lessee's payment of part of the cost of
erecting improvements, and that "all moneys paid by Lessees to Lessors shall be
forfeited as liquidated damages to Lessors" in the event of breach; the lessee made
the promised capital payment and paid rent for several years, then defaulted; the quoted
clause was sustained as a liquidated damages provision and the lessor was unable
to recover defaulted rent payments).
610 191 Wash. 314, 71 P2d 30 (1937). In addition to the cases cited by the court,
see Eilers Music House v. Oriental Co., 69 Wash. 618, 125 Pac. 1023 (1912).
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specific performance or for the damages actually suffered." The liqui-
dated damages clause here referred to is evidently a limited and special
variety, having no effect on an action by vendor who has not "forfeited"
(i.e., repossessed the property). Despite the contrary implications of
the court's statement, it must be doubted whether this type of liqui-
dated damages provision can have any real effect even if the vendor
does choose to forfeit, since he must elect between this course and
damages."1' The clause seems actually aimed at the vendee and some
claim by him to return of his payments. Its usefulness in that connec-
tion is unclear." 2 Apparently the same result will follow in the absence
of such a clause, 8' and properly so. A vendee in total default can
neither resist repossession of the property, 14 nor recover in contract
for payments made by him before his default."1 ' The RusselZ case
involved a land transaction; like problems arise under chattel condi-
tional sale contracts and with like results, save that specific enforce-
ment is not often an alternative remedy.
Penalty or alternative performance. It is often difficult to determine
whether a particular contract clause gives a party a choice between
rendering one or another of indicated performances, or obligates him
to one and specifies another as a remedy for its default. The former
arrangement is not a limitation of liability agreement nor need it con-
form to the criteria by which liquidated damages agreements are
tested. "' Chandler v. Doran Co.61 indicates that the problem is to be
solved by interpretation of the contract.1
6 1 See Washington Co-op Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, discussed at note 628 below.
Notice that the vendor's choice between "contract" and "no contract," discussed in
this case, is not easily reconciled with the court's evident assumption, in the Russell
case, that damages, specific enforcement, and forfeiture plus retention of payments are
all remedial techniques which assume the existence of the contract.
612 See the discussion in note 676 below.
618 See Liliopoulos v. Ayerst, 125 Wash. 134, 215 Pac. 339 (1923); Peterson v.
Chess, 92 Wash. 682, 159 Pac. 894 (1916) (over-ruled on another point in Hef v.
Hansen & Keller Truck Co., 167 Wash. 206, 9 P.2d 110 (1932)).
614 This was clearly stated in Rider v. Cottle, 32 Wn.2d 538, 202 P.2d 741 (1949).
615 Such recourse as he may have is quasi-contractual or equitable. See RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932) ; 5 WnI.ssToN, CONTRACTS § 1454 (rev. ed. 1936).
616 See 5 CoREIN, CONRACTS §§ 1070, 1079, 1081, 1082 (1950) ; 3 WILLISTON, CON-
TRACTS § 781 (rev. ed. 1936) ; RESTATE ENT, CoNTRACTS § 339 comment on subsection
(1), f (1932).
817 44 Wn.2d 396, 267 P.2d 907 (1954). The decision is apparently one of first im-
pression in Washington. An employer hired a plant manager, gave him an option on
the plant, promised to pay him $600 per month "base salary," and promised to pay him
$900 more per month if the employer decided not to convey the optioned property. The
agreement was oral and the main problem was the operation of the Statute of Frauds.
In the process of determining that the statute did not bar recovery for the additionalpay, the court found the contract was an alternative one. The case will also be signifi-
cant, where an obligor is resisting recovery on the argument that the promise to pay
the additional sum is a penalty 
rather than quidat d damages.
6T1 key inquiry is indicated in a passage quoted by the court from 5 CoRBIN,
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A party who has himself wholly or partly performed will on occasion
prefer to recover his performance or its worth, upon the other's total
breach. This he may be able to do. The remedy by which his objective
is achieved is restitution, an alternative to damages. There are many
1937-1957 Washington cases in this important area. They will be dis-
cussed by Donald P. Lehne in a Comment scheduled for publication
in the Summer, 1960, issue of the Washington Law Review.
Specific performance. Thanks to some thirty cases 19 concerned
with promises to execute a will, the 1937-1957 period produced an
impressive amount of specific performance litigation. For the most
CoNT.AcTs § 1079 (1950), defining an alternative contract as "one in which a party
promises to render some one of two or more alternative performances either one of
which is mutually agreed upon as the bargained-for equivalent given in exchange for
the return performance by the other party." Correlatively, if the parties intend but one
of the performances to be the exchange, the other being compensation for failure to
render the exchange-performance, the transaction is not an alternative contract; if the
ostensible "alternative" performance is the payment of money the parties have attempted
to provide for liquidated damages, and the provision will be valid only if it meets the
test discussed in the preceding subsection.
119 Most of the cases concerned with an agreement to make a will were resolved on
mutual assent or Statute of Frauds issues. Their principal significance is in the
court's increasing concern with assurance in the proof of the agreement Specific
performance was decreed in: Resor v. Schaefer, 193 Wash. 91, 74 P.2d 917 (1937) ;
In re Fischer's Estate, 196 Wash. 41, 81 P.2d 836 (1938) ; Luther v. National Bank
of Commerce, 2 Wn.2d 470, 98 P.2d 667 (1940) ; In re Hilbert's Estate, 14 Wn.2d 475,
128 P.2d 647 (1942); Cummings v. Sherman, 16 Wn.2d 88, 132 P.2d 998 (1943);
Auger v. Shideler, 23 Wn.2d 505, 161 P.2d 200 (1945) (appears to be a specific en-
forcement action, although not so denominated); Ellis v. Wadleigh, 27 Wn.2d 941,
182 P.2d 49 (1947) (this, and the Luther case, supra, indicate that "reasonable" cer-
tainty as to the terms of the promised performance is sufficient) ; Forsberg v. Everett
Trust & Say. Bank, 31 Wn.2d 932, 200 P.2d 499 (1948); Sonthwick v. Southwick,
34 Wn.2d 464, 208 P2d 1187 (1949) ; Jansen v. Campbell, 37 Wn.2d 879, 227 P.2d 175(1951); Raab v. Wallerich, 46 Wn.2d 375, 282 P.2d 271 (1955). See also I re
Young's Estate, 40 Wn.2d 582, 244 P.2d 1165 (1952) (complaint held sufficient to set
out a cause of action for specific performance) ; Dahlgren v. Blomeen, 49 Wn.2d 47,
298 P.2d 479 (1956) (contract held established; relief given was imposition of a trust
on the property). Relief was denied in Wayman v. Miller, 195 Wash. 457, 81 P.2d 501(1938) ; Osterhout v. Peterson, 198 Wash. 166, 87 P.2d 987 (1939) ; Thompson v.
Weimer, 1 Wn.2d 145, 95 P.2d 772 (1939) ; Aho v. Ahola, 4 Wn2d 598, 104 P.2d 487(1940) ; Allen v. Dillard, 15 Wn.2d 35, 129 P.2d 813 (1942) ; Dau v. Pence, 16 Wn.2d
368, 133 P.2d 523 (1943); Widman v. Maurer, 19 Wn2d 28, 141 P.2d 135 (1943);
Payn v. Hoge, 21 Wn.2d 32, 149 P.2d 939 (1944) ; Whiting v. Armstrong, 23 Wn.2d
290, 160 P.2d 1014 (1945) ; Blodgett v. Lowe, 24 Wn.2d 931, 167 P.2d 997 (1946) ;
McGregor v. McGregor, 25 Wn.2d 511, 171 P.2d 694 (1946) ; Jennings v. D'Hooghe,
25 Wn.2d 702, 172 P.2d 189 (1946) ; Thomas v. Hensel, 38 Wn.2d 457, 230 P.2d 290(1951); In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wn.2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952) ; Boettcher v.
Busse, 45 Wn.2d 579, 277 P.2d 368 (1954); Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48 Wn.2d 395, 293
P.2d 935 (1956) (plaintiffs succeeded in establishing the contract but lost because they
were themselves in default of it; the court repeated the passage in Bayley v. Lewis
which is discussed in note 620 below, saying "one in default cannot enforce specific
performance of a contract!') ; Estes v. Estes, 48 Wn.2d 729, 296 P.2d 705 (1956) (in
form the action was for a declaratory judgment; the court's discussion is relevant
here).
The operation of the Statute of Frauds on promises to convey land, and the part
performance doctrine, were discussed at note 347 et seq., above.
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part, however, the decisions... added nothing to the body of doctrine
620 An equitable mortgage was decreed in Fleishbein v. Thorne, 193 Wash. 65, 74
P2d 880 (1937). Equitable security was found to have existed, insulating subsequent
transfers by the debtor from attack as preferences, in Whiting v. Rubenstein, 7 Wn.2d
204, 109 P.2d 312 (1941). The operation of the Statute of Frauds on verbal promises
to create security was discussed at note 356 et seq., above.
Negative covenants, i.e., not to compete, were enforced by injunction, in Merager
v. Turnbull, 2 Wn.2d 711, 99 P.2d 434 (1940), and Lyle v. Haskins, 24 Wn.2d 883,
168 P,2d 797 (1946). These cases involved unusually interesting problems of proof;
the competition was affected indirectly. In the Merager case, damages were also
awarded for the period during which the defendant wrongfully competed.
Injunctive relief was granted in aid of other types of obligation, in Mayflower
Realty Co. v. Security Say. & Loan Soc'y, 192 Wash. 129, 72 P.2d 1038, 75 P.2d 579(1937) (vendor was enjoined from wrongfully forfeiting a real estate contract) and
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Barrow, 3 Wn.2d 89, 99 P.2d 949 (1940) (at the
instance of a surety on a construction bond, the builder's administratrix was enjoined
from collecting payments accrued under a defaulted building contract).
Contracts for the transfer of an interest in land were specifically enforced in Dopps
v. Alderman, 12 Wn.2d 268, 121 P.2d 388 (1942) ; Mobley v. Harkins, 14 Wn.2d 276,
128 P.2d 289 (1942); Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn.2d 516, 188 P.2d 130 (1947);
Stephens v. Nelson, 37 Wn.2d 28, 221 P.2d 520 (1950) ; Griffin v. Hart, 26 Wn2d 304,
173 P.2d 780 (1946) ; Blume v. Bohanna, 38 Wn2d 199, 228 P.2d 146 (1951) ; Adams
Marine Serv. v. Fishel, 42 Wn.2d 555, 257 P.2d 203 (1953); Nielsen v. Northern
Equity Corp., 47 Wn.2d 171, 286 P.2d 1031 (1955) ; Baird v. Knutzen, 49 Wn.2d 308,
301 P.2d 375 (1956). The inadequacy of damages and the availability of specific per-
formance in transactions of this type are beyond question. The Baird case also
indicates that the relief can extend to a promisor's successor, who took title with
notice (here constructive) of the prior contract. This conforms to the usual analysis.
5 WMLISsToN, CONTRACTS § 1453 (rev. ed. 1936).
Specific enforcement was on occasion denied. Some proponents of the relief failed
to establish a contract; as in KVI, Inc. v. Doernbecher, 24 Wn.2d 943, 167 P.2d 1002(1946); Richardson v. Taylor Land & Livestock Co., 25 Wn.2d 518, 171 P.2d 703(1946) ; St Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946) ;
Golden v. Mount, 32 Wn.2d 653, 203 P.2d 667 (1949). In Herb v. Severson, 32 Wn.2d
159, 201 P.2d 156 (1948), the plaintiff, seller under a real estate contract, lost because
he could not convey a marketable title. In Cascade Timber Co. v. North. Pac. Ry., 28
Wn.2d 684, 184 P.2d 90 (1947) the plaintiff, buyer under a real estate contract, lost
because it refused to accept a deed in conformity with the contract In McLean v.
Archer, 32 Wn.2d 234, 201 P.2d 184 (1948), the action was dismissed for failure tojoin a necessary party plaintiff.
The effect on recovery, of a breach by the party seeking specific enforcement, was
to a degree confused by Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951). Relief
was decreed despite a partial breach, a result in conformity with the usual view. See
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 375 (2) (1932). The court also said: "A party cannot
enforce specific performance of a contract while in default on its terms." The word
"default' as used here must mean "material breach". RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
375(1) (1932). See also Ferris v. Blumhardt, cited in the preceding note.
The certainty element was discussed in several decisions. Uncertainty was held
to preclude relief, in Keys v. Kitten, 21 Wn.2d 504, 151 P.2d 989 (1944) ; KVI, Inc.
v. Doernbecher, supra; St Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, supra; Hubbell v.
Ward, 40 Wn.2d 779, 246 P.2d 468 (1952). See also Ellis v. Wadleigh, note 619. In
Adams Marine Serv., Inc. v. Fishel, supra, sufficient certainty was found to support
relief. It is not always clear, in these decisions, whether the court is considering
certainty as a contract formation requirement (see the discussion above at note 46
et seq.) or as a separate specific performance factor. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS§ 370 (1932). In Blume v. Bohanna, supra, a certainty issue was resolved by interp-
retation, i.e., finding the agreement, which in terms called for a rental to be agreed-on,
meant a "reasonable" rental.
The power of the court to decree whatever relief is appropriate under the pleadings
and evidence was demonstrated in Richardson v. Taylor Land & Livestock Co., 25 Wn.2d
518, 171 P.2d 703 (1946) (dictum; plaintiff sued on an oral real estate contract and
lost on the Statute of Frauds issue; the court said that the trial court could have
decreed restitution for benefits conferred on the defendant, but that it was not
error to remit the plaintiff to a separate restitution action) ; Hubbell v. Ward, supra
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earlier developed. 2'
An exception is State ex rel. Schoblom v. Anacortes Veneer, Inc., 2'
apparently a case of first impression. The court followed Restatement
of Contracts, section 377 in denying specific enforcement of a contract
under which the defendant's termination powers were such as to vitiate
any decree. 23 As an additional ground, the court denied relief because
the contract was for employment."'
Election of remedies. McKown v. Davis... appears to be the only
1937-1957 case squarely raising an election of contract remedies
issue."' 8 The court held that an action by a land buyer to rescind for
fraud, lost because he failed to prove the fraud, did not bar his later
specific performance suit.8"'
Washington Co-op Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs" is also of interest at this
point. In an excellent opinion written by Judge Olson, the court con-
siderably clarified the theoretic basis for the election which a condi-
tional sales vendor must make when the vendee defaults. The vendor
(plaintiff tried without success to get specific enforcement of an earnest money
agreement calling for the execution of a real estate contract; the trial court did
however decree specific performance conditioned on full payment by the plaintiff;
this was approved an appeal); McKown v. Davis, 47 Wn.2d 10, 285 P.2d 1048 (1955)
(buyer under a real estate contract sued after the seller had conveyed the property
to another person; the trial court decreed specific performance, with an alternative
proviso requiring payment of a sum measured by plaintiff's restitution interest, if the
defendant failed to convey within ninety days; this was approved on appeal).
821 See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIoNS, REsTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 358 et seq.
82 42 Wn.2d 338, 255 P2d 379 (1953).
623 This is the usual result. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1442 (rev. ed. 1936).
624 The employee sued; the court said: "It is impossible for a court to conduct
and supervise the operations incident to and requisite for the execution of a decree
for the specific performance of a contract which involves rendering personal services.
To attempt to do so would be futile. Equity will not decree an act which will not
serve a useful purpose." This is the usual result. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 379(1932); 5 WILLIsTON, CoNTRACTS § 1423A (rev. ed. 1936).
625 47 Wn.2d 10, 285 P.2d 1048 (1955).
828 See also: Willis T. Batcheller, Inc. v. Welden Constr. Co., 9 Wn2d 392, 115
P.2d 696 (1941) (election of remedies discussed; the issue was whether filing a claim
for a payment due, in obligor's receivership, barred subsequent forfeiture for default
on that payment); Labor Hall Ass'n, Inc. v. Danielson, 24 Wn.2d 75, 163 P.2d 167
(1945) (the court's discussion of election is of interest here, although the transaction
involved a lease); Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951) (right of
injured party to rescind for total breach was acknowledged by the court, but found
to have been lost through delay and assertion of the contract as a defense in subse-
quent litigation).
627 This is in accord with the usual view. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 383
(1932); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1528 (rev. ed. 1936). See also Watkdns v.
Siler Logging Co., 9 Wn.2d 703, 116 P2d 315 (1941). The court expressed doubt
"that, under our liberal practice, the filing of a complaint stating one theory of a
controversy, in the absence of any element of estoppel, constitutes such an election
as to prevent a later filing of an amended complaint on another theory." The court
went on to hold that an attempt to assert a remedy not available is not an election.
Willis T. Batcheller, Inc. v. Welden Constr. Co., 9 Wn.2d 392, 115 P.2d 696 (1941) is
a similar holding.
028 42 Wn2d 460, 256 P.2d 294 (1953).
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sued for the price and thereafter dismissed his action without prejudice.
He subsequently brought this conversion action and sought to escape
the election effect of his earlier conduct by resort to the proposition set
forth in Restatement of Contracts, section 381, under which an election
becomes final only when the other party has materially changed his
position. In denying this analysis, the court said:
The election in question is not a choice between inconsistent remedies
of a procedural nature, to which plaintiff's theory might apply. It is a
choice between inconsistent substantive rights which plaintiff had as a
conditional sale vendor, and over which its vendee had no control. It
is an election between inconsistent substantive legal relations, that is,
between a contract and no contract. Plaintiff chose the former. This
it could do, and create the chosen relation with its vendee, by merely
making its desire to do so manifest.- 9
DISCHARGE OF CONTRACTS
Basic principles. It will be recalled that contract duties are of two
varieties, the basic duty which is created by contract formation, and
the duty to perform immediately which exists when the time has arrived
for performance and all conditions have been met or excused. If the
latter duty is not at once performed it becomes a duty to make com-
pensation or otherwise answer for breach and the obligee has at once
a cause of action. At either stage of the transaction the duty then
extant can be extinguished. The term "discharge" is variously used,
to indicate a process by which a duty is extinguished, and to indicate
the end result of its extinguishment.
There are two quite different types of discharge. One is the product
of the obligee's intent. The common instances are release, rescission,
accord and satisfaction, novation and account stated. The other is the
product of legal principles which operate without regard to the obligee's
purpose. Typical are the propositions which regulate the operation of
express or constructive conditions, the statute of limitations, alteration,
merger, res judicata, impossibility, fraud, duress and mistake.
The most obvious of discharge methods is of course performance. It
is so pervasive a factor that no attempt has been made to isolate the
629The court went on to hold that commencement of the earlier action indicated
the vendor's intent and established the election, without regard to any reliance by the
vendee. See also Geranios v. Annex Investments, 45 Wn.2d 233, 273 P.2d 793 (1954),
in which the court said: "When a vendor has given a purchaser under an executory
real-estate contract notice of forfeiture and the entire purchase price is not due, the
purchaser has a right to acquiesce therein and treat the notice as a waiver of the
vendor's right to hold the purchaser for the unpaid balance of the contract."
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later cases in which performance was a defense,"' save for the applica-
tion-of-payment cases.
Application of payments. If an obligor owes multiple money obliga-
tions and neglects to specify the one to which a particular payment
shall appertain, litigation over application of the payment will be
resolved by resort to legal principles. These give effect to the creditor's
application if seasonably made, and require application by the court
in all other situations. The court will usually direct application to the
obligation which was the longest past due when the payment was
made. 3' Adherence to these propositions was reaffirmed in Whiting v.
Rubenstein32 and Bellingham Sec. Syndicate, Inc. v. Bellingham Coal
Mines. 33
Release. A release is a writing expressing an obligee's purpose to
discharge the obligor at once or on a condition stated, executed by the
obligee and backed by value. 3" There appears to be no significant
1937-1957 Washington release case. 3'
Rescission. A new bilateral contract by which the parties surrender
their rights under an existing bilateral contract still wholly or partially
executory on both sides is a mutual rescission. The old duties are
immediately discharged." 8 Letres v. Washington Co-op Chick Ass'n 37
31) The issues are typically factual, e.g., what did the obligor do? Morse v.
McGrady, 49 Wn.2d 505, 304 P.2d 691 (1956) is an example. The obligor was held to
have "the right under their general denial to produce evidence showing that the
work was done in a satisfactory manner." In other instances conformity of what was
done, to the demands of the contract, is disputed; the answer lies in interpretation of
the contract.
831 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 387 et seq. (1932) ; 5 Co IN, CONTRACTS § 1231
(1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1795 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).
832 10 Wn.2d 5, 116 P2d 305 (1941).
833 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942). For the earlier cases see WASHINGTON
ANNOTATIONS, RESTATMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 387, 394.
634 RESTATEmENr, CONTRACTS §§ 402 et seq. (1932) ; 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1238
(1950) ; 6 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1820 (rev. ed. 1936). Where the seal continues
to have its common law force, a release will be operative if sealed. The "value"
requirement is often said to be regulated by consideration principles, including the
antecedent-duty rule. See the discussion at note 135 above.
Morse v. McGrady, 49 Wn.2d 505, 304 P.2d 691 (1956) held, without discus-
sion, that an FHA Title 1 Completion Certificate, executed by the owner to his
bank, was not a release of any duty of the builder to the owner. Bakamus v. Albert,
I Wn.2d 241, 95 P.2d 767 (1939) held a release to be protected by the parol evidence
rule and to encompass all demands which fell within its language. (The case did not
involve a release of contract duties.)
036 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 406 et seq. (1932) ; 4 CoaBN, CONTRACTS § 1236
(1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1828 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936). Some confusion in
terminology will be observed; the stated definition appears to conform to the better
usage of "rescission" as a discharge technique for contract obligations. Great care
must be exercised in differentiating between this type of agreement, and the unilateral
"rescission" which is a remedy for total breach of contract, for breach of warranty in
a sale, or for fraud. See the discussion, notes 639, 640 below.
837 8 Wn.2d 64, 111 P.2d 594 (1941).
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is of interest, both for a good statement of the mutual assent require-
ments for the formation of the new contract, 3 s and for the court's
failure to recognize that a new agreement by which the parties undo
a fully-performed contract is not mutual rescission.639 The crucial
issue in other cases was interpretation of words or conduct which
might or might not express an offer to rescind and acceptance of it.640
Consideration presents no serious problem, being sufficiently estab-
lished in the reciprocal surrender of old rights."' The rescinding con-
tract can be oral save where a statute of frauds requires a writing."4
638 The court recognized that a rescission agreement can be express or implied and
requires offer and acceptance. This proposition was repeated in Morango v. Phillips,
33 Wn.2d 351, 205 P.2d 892 (1949). The court also said: "Silence, when an offer of
rescission is made, does not, as a general rule, operate as an acceptance, unless the
attendant circumstances are such as require the one to whom the offer is made to
speak. An agreement inferred from silence rests upon the principle of estoppel."
639 Chicks were sold, delivered, and paid for; the parties knew that the chicks might
be infected and the seller promised to be responsible for all losses. The chicks did
come down with bronchitis and at the buyer's request the seller took back such as
still survived. The issue was whether the seller was liable for the buyer's other
losses, in addition to refund of the price paid. Insofar as a sales was involved, the
new transaction was simply a re-sale, not a rescission. Whether return of the chicks
had any legal effect on the seller's promise to make good all losses presented an
interpretation question. Cf., Dahl v. Stromberg, 31 Wn.2d 884, 200 P.2d 495 (1948),
where the court referred to a transaction by which the parties rescinded a conditional
sale contract as an "abandonment." The term "abandonment!' recurs in Washington
decisions; just what the court means by it is not always clear. See Jacks v. Blazer, 39
Wn.2d 277, 235 P.2d 187 (1951) ; Ferris v. Blumhardt, 48 Wn.2d 395, 293 P.2d 935(1956).
6 Wiegardt v. Becken, 21 Wn.2d 59, 149 P.2d 929 (1944) ; Holton v. Hart Mill
Co., 24 Wr.2d 493, 166 P.2d 186 (1946) ; Rider v. Cotte, 32 Wn.2d 538, 202 P.2d 741
(1949) ; Morango v. Phillips, 33 Wn.2d 351, 205 P2d 892 (1949); Litel v. Marsh, 33
Wn.2d 441, 206 P.2d 300 (1949) ; Bayley v. Lewis, 39 Wn.2d 464, 236 P.2d 350 (1951).
One type of conduct which can evidence an agreement to rescind the original contract
wholly or in part is the formation of a new one which is inconsistent with it, or with
part of it. Ethredge v. Diamond Drill Contracting Co., 196 Wash. 483, 83 P.2d 364
(1938) ; Haley v. Brady, 17 Wn.2d 775, 137 P.2d 505 (1943) ; Reid Co. v. M-B Con-
tracting Co., 46 Wn.2d 784, 285 P2d 121 (1955). Particularly treacherous is a wrong-
ful repudiation by one party apparently acquiesced in by the other; mutual recission is
not ordinarily a sound interpretation of such evidence. See 4 CoaiN, CONMTRACTS §
1236, at 961 (1950). Here, as in other instances of total breach by one party, a
declared purpose by the injured party to "rescind" is but a declaration by him of his
purpose about his remedy. This was recognized in the Holton and Rider cases, supra.
It is, however, a distinction which the court has not always observed. Cf., Jones v.
Grove, 76 Wash. 19, 135 Pac. 488 (1913). The asserted rescission agreement should
also fail for lack of consideration. See the following note.
04, This was recognized and stated in Exeter Co. v. Martin, Ltd., 5 Wn.2d 244,
105 P.2d 83 (1940), a case involving surrender of a lease. See also the discussion at
notes 146, 162 above. Notice that a purported "mutual rescission" of a unilateral
contract or of a bilateral contract performed on one side must fail for lack of
consideration; only one party has a right to surrender. If the other provides consider-
ation in some new promise or performance, discharge may result; it is however
properly classified as accord rather than "mutual rescission." See 6 WLLISToN,
CONTRAcTS § 1828 (rev. ed. 1936). Cf., 5 ConiN, CoNTRAcTS § 1236 at 959, 960
(1950). Where one party has committed a total breach, the other is discharged
thereby and the defaulter cannot provide consideration for a mutual rescission. This
the court has on occasion failed to recognize. Jones v. Grove, 76 Wash. 19, 135 Pac.
488 (1913) is an example. With the Jones case, compare Harris v. Morgensen, 31
Wn.2d 228, 196 P.2d 317 (1948).
642 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 407(1932) ; 5 CoRDiN, CONTRACTS § 1236, n. 58(1950);
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On occasion, mutual rescission occurs after one party has partly
performed. The new agreement may or may not wipe out his right to
be paid for what he did, or create a right to return of his performance.
The answer is usually said to turn on interpretation of the new con-
tract."3 The older Washington cases were not harmonious in their
disposition of the problem; in several the court apparently required
restoration of the status quo ante, (where the rescission agreement was
silent on the point) as a matter of law.644 This approach was again
taken in Morango v. Phillips;6" it may be the product of failure to
observe the difference between rescission as a remedy and rescission
by mutual agreement."' In any event this is a detail which will require
clarification in future decisions.
Accord and satisfaction. Accord and satisfaction is a routine method
for the discharge of unilateral contracts, bilateral contracts fully per-
formed on one side, and claims for breaches of contract. Traditionally,
the accord is bilateral in form, the obligor undertaking to render an
indicated performance and the obligee undertaking to receive it in
satisfaction of his right or claim."" The discharge occurs when the
new performance is rendered." ' There is however much modern use
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1828 (rev. ed. 1936), Haley v. Brady, 17 Wn.2d 775, 137
P.2d 505 (1943) supports the rule, although the case involved a modification which
probably came after a breach by one party so that the new agreement was an accord;
a change in part of an executory contract of necessity rescinds the affected part of the
old one. Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Faulkner, 191 Wash. 549, 71 P.2d 382 (1937)
was cited; there the court said: "Although the guaranty provided ... that it could not
be modified or abrogated except in writing ... it is well settled that such a contract
may be modified or abrogated by the parties thereto in any manner they choose ... "
The issue, however, was discharge of a unilateral contract by accord and satisfaction.643 RESTATEM-ENT, CONTRACTS § 409 (1932); 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1236 n. 53
(1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1827 (rev. ed. 1936).
044 See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTS § 409, and McMillen
v. Bancroft, 162 Wash. 175, 298 Pac. 460 (1931).
645 33 Wn.2d 351, 205 P.2d 892 (1949).
646 Indeed, it is difficult to read otherwise the following passage in the Morango v.
Phillips opinion: "We have decided many times that, before a party to a contract is
entitled to a rescission, he must be willing to do equity and restore that which he
has received from the other party; and, if a rescission is had, either as the result of a
decree of court or by mutual agreement, each party to the contract must place the
other in status quo in so far as it is practicable or possible so to do." The court cited
for this statement one mutual rescission case (McMillen v. Bancroft, cited note 644
above) and two cases concerned with rescission as a remedy.042' RESTATAmENT, CONTRACTS § 417 (1932); 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1268, 1276
(1950) ; 6 WIILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1838 (rev. ed. 1936). An agreement for a sub-
stitute performance is a rescission where it replaces reciprocal rights and duties under
an executory bilateral contract; see the preceding subsection. The parties to an accord
may agree (but seldom do) that the original claim is at once discharged. See RESTATE-
AIENT, CONTRACTS, § 418 (1932); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1847 (rev. ed. 1936).
This principle was apparently applied in Kandoll v. Penttila, 18 Wn.2d 434, 139 P.2d
616 (1943) ; the affected obligation was a judgment.
64s Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Faulkner, 191 Wash. 549, 71 P.2d 382 (1937) is
illustrative.
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of the term "accord and satisfaction" in discussions of unilateral dis-
charge contracts, i.e., transactions in which the obligor proffers a per-
formance as an offer for a discharge, or the obligee proffers a discharge
as an offer for a performance. In these transactions there is no inter-
mediate executory contract stage, as the discharge occurs simulta-
neously with formation of the contract. This usage appertains in
Washington.
The accord, whether bilateral or unilateral, must satisfy the mutual
assent and consideration requirements for contract formation. Several
of the 1937-1957 accord cases were concerned with the application of
offer and acceptance principles.649 Their main interest is in emphasis
of an obvious point-an obligee who would have his remittance operate
as an accord must accompany the check or other payment with lan-
guage indicating that he is making an offer for a total discharge.50
Accords also produced a number of consideration problems. In
disposing of them the court further complicated an already confused
area. In Watkins v. Seattle65 and Bellingkam Sec. Syndicate, Inc. v.
Bellingkam Coal Mines"2 payment of less than the sum due was held
not to be a consideration for discharge of a liquidated obligation, with-
out discussion of earlier contrary cases. The latter were, in turn,
649 Berliner v. Greenberg, 37 Wn.2d 308, 223 P2d 598 (1950) (the parties' dis-
charge transaction was found not to have progressed beyond the preliminary negotia-
tion stage); Sprague Ave. Inv. Co. v. Pacific Fin. Corp., 5 Wn.2d 301, 105 P.2d 28(1940) (from an earlier case the court quoted: "The general rule is that, where a
debtor sends to his creditor a check for the amount he is willing to pay, and at that
time informs the creditor that he intends the check to be considered as full payment,
then, by the acceptance and cashing of the check,'the creditor agrees to the settle-
ment and cannot thereafter seek additional compensation."); Gould v. Witter, 10
Wn.2d 553, 117 P.2d 210 (1941) (found, on the facts that there was no accord for
lack of mutual assent) ; Bellingham Sec. Syndicate v. Bellingham Coal Mines, Inc.,
13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) (found, on the facts, that there was no accord for
lack of mutual assent) ; Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951) (stressed
the absence of any indication by the creditor, when he remitted, of a condition that the
payment be accepted in discharge of a larger amount; there was no mutual assent) ;
Boyd-Conlee Co. v. Gillingham, 44 Wn.2d 152, 266 P.2d 339 (1954) ("The mere
receipt by respondent of an amount less than is claimed, with the knowledge that
appellants admit an indebtedness only to the extent of the payment made, does not of
itself establish an accord and satisfaction. When a remittance is made, which is less
than the amount in dispute, it must be made plain to the creditor that the remittance
is tendered as full payment of the disputed amount"; the alleged accord failed for lack
of mutual assent).
The earlier cases were discussed in Shepherd and Shattuck, Accord and Satifaction
in Washington, 8 WASH. L. Rgv. 112, 165 (1934).
650 If the creditor receives the payment, cashes the check or (probably) if he
retains the check for an undue time, he will be deemed to have accepted the offer, quite
without regard to his actual purpose in that particular. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
420 (1932) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1856 (rev. ed. 1936).
6512 Wn.2d 695, 99 P.2d 427 (1940).
65213 Wn2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942).
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followed in Douglas County Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Newby,"'3 with
equal inattention to opposed decisions. In Meyer v. Strom"5 4 it was
held that payment "of an amount admitted to be due can furnish no
consideration for an accord and satisfaction of the entire claim." This
is a minority view, 5' adhered to in some of the pre-1937 cases. " ' In
Sprague Ave. Inv. Co. v. Pacific Fin. Corp.,57 on the other hand, an
obligor's remittance of the sum he contended was due was held without
discussion to be consideration. Tonseth v. Serwold 5 s followed a 1935
decision,85 in holding to be liquidated, and hence within the antecedent-
duty rule, an obligation the amount of which was certain but the exist-
ence of which was disputed. This is an analysis difficult to understand.
It is generally conceded in other jurisdictions that the antecedent-duty
rule does not apply where either the existence of an obligation or its
extent is disputed."'
Welsh v. Loomis,"8 ' is also of interest, for its recognition that a pay-
ment in any amount by a person who does not owe the obligation can
support discharge of a liquidated obligation.8 2
In 1937 the court had occasion, apparently for the first time, to
853 45 Wn.2d 784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954). See Shepherd and Shattuck, Accord and
Satisfaction in Washington, 8 WASH. L. Rxv. 112, 165 at 119 (1934), and the discus-
sion at note 135 above.
854 37 Wn.2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951).
855 5 CoRBIN, CONTRAcTS § 1289 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 129 (rev. ed.
1936).650 Shepherd and Shattuck, Accord and Satifaction in Washington, 8 WASH. L.
Rnv. 112, 165 at 120 et seq. (1934). Paulsen Estate v. Naches-Selah Irrigation Dist.,
190 Wash. 205, 67 P.2d 856 (1937) reached a contrary result.
0575 Wn.2d 301, 105 P2d 28 (1940). The court said: "Where a dispute arises
over the construction of the terms of a contract by which liability is to be measured,
that in itself renders the amount owing unliquidated."
85 22 Wn2d 629, 157 P.2d 333 (1945).
8r, Graham v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182 Wash. 612, 47 P.2d 1029. (The action
involved a life insurance policy with a double indemnity clause from which suicide
was excluded. The insured died, whether from suicide or otherwise being disputed.
Payment of the regular death benefit was held not to be consideration, both because
it was payment of a sum the obligor did not dispute (as to which see notes 175, 178
above) and because the controversy concerned the cause of death, the amount of the
obligation being otherwise undisputed. The fallacy in this reasoning seems obvious.
The "amount" is certainly disputed if an alleged obligor denies all liability. Moreover,
for purposes of the consideration rule which defeats a discharge based on part per-
formance of a duty, the parties should be free to compromise the fact of liability as
well as the scope of it James v. Riverside Lumber Co., 121 Wash. 130, 208 Pac.
260 (1922), seems inconsistent with the Graham case.
'
8
'1RESTATKMANT, CONTRACTS §§ 76, 417 (1932); 6 CoRINt, CONTRACTS §§ 1288,
1290 (1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 128 (rev. ed. 1936). Whether the dispute
must be bona fide or reasonable or both was discussed above, under the subheading
"Compromise."
001 5 Wn.2d 377, 105 P.2d 500 (1940). The case is apparently one of first impres-
sion in Washington.
C2 This is the usual view. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 76, 421 (1932) ; 4 Coaanr,
CONTRACTS § 1285 (1950) ; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 125 (rev. ed. 1936).
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consider the legal situation after breach of an accord by the obligor.
Recovery on the original claim was permitted.6 3
Novation. The essence of novation is substitution. A third person
can be substituted for the original obligor, or for the original obligee.
In either event the original duty is discharged." In MacPherson v.
Franco"'5 and Hines v. Chesire.6" the existence of a novation was denied
because the proof failed to establish an agreement to which obligor,
obligee and third person were parties.66 '
Account stated.
Matured debts are discharged by a manifestation of assent in good
faith by debtor and creditor to a stated sum as an accurate computation
of the amount of the matured debt or debts due the creditor, or if there
are cross demands as the amount of the difference between the total
indebtedness due one party and the total indebtedness due the other
party. A new duty arises to pay a sum so fixed.668
In Goodwin v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co.6 " the court without
discussion held that an insurer's periodic statements to the insured
concerning a policy loan and indicating compound interest did not
ground an account stated.
663 Buob v. Feenaughty Mach. Co., 191 Wash. 477, 71 P.2d 559 (1937). RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 417 (1932) was cited with approval; under its system the
obligee has a choice of remedies, i.e., suit on the original claim or suit on the accord.
Most modern courts would probably concur. 4 CoRnIN, CONTRACTS § 1275 (1950);
6 WImmsToN, CONTRACTS § 1848 (rev. ed. 1936). The Washington court quoted from
comment a, and subsection d. The latter covers breach by the obligee and would
seem not to be in point in the Buob case. The reference does however suggest that the
court would be favorably inclined to the provisions of subsection d in an appropriate
case. This subsection provides not only for damages, but also for specific enforcement,
which would enable the debtor for all practical purposes to use the accord defensively.
This use of the accord would be a departure from some of the early Washington
decisions. See Shepherd and Shattuck, Accord and Satisaction in Washington, 8
WASH. L. REv. 112, 165 at 169 et seq. (1934).
66
8
4 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 424 et seq. (1932) ; 6 CoaniN, CONTRACTS § 1297
(1950); 6 WiLLISToN, CONTRACTS § 1865 (rev. ed. 1936). That the novation is a
recognized discharge method in Washington was indicated in the earlier cases. See
WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, to the cited sections.
66534 Wn.2d 179, 208 P.2d 641 (1949).
666 36 Wn2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950).
887Two-party discharge transactions of the substituted-party variety can of
course be effective, as where the obligor and obligee agree that the obligor will
perform only to a third person, or a third person and the obligee agree that the third
person will perform in lieu of the obligor. Whether the term "novation" should
encompass agreements like these is debatable. For a discussion favoring the affirma-
tive view, see 6 CoRDIN, CONTRACTS § 1299 (1950).
8838 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 422(l) (1932). See also 6 CommI, CONTRACTS§1303 et seq. (1950) ; 6 Wn.uisroN, CONTRACTS § 1862 (rev. ed 1936). It seems clear
from the earlier cases that the account stated as defined in the Restatement operates
in Washington. See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, to the
cited section. See also National Assn of Creditors v. Ultican, 190 Wash. 109, 66 P.2d
824 (1937).36 196 Wash. 391, 83 P.2d 231 (1938).
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Conditions, express and constructive. "A contractual duty is dis-
charged by the unexcused failure of a condition to occur within the
time necessary to create a right to the immediate performance of the
duty." 70 Since the discharge takes place when the time has passed
within which the condition can be satisfied, determining whether such
time has passed is often the key step. In instances of express conditions
the answer lies in interpretation to ascertain the time fixed by the con-
tract. The obligee has no leeway, as express conditions operate literally
and time is always of the essence.67' Constructive conditions are made
much more difficult by the concept of "substantial performance," under
which an obligee can on occasion satisfy the condition by a tender made
after the date set by the contract for his performance."2 The same
criteria are significant where an obligee's attempt to meet a condition
is timely but deviates in terms of quantity or quality; he has no leeway
where the condition is express; he may have some, where the condition
is constructive. Discussions of constructive conditions are complicated
by shifts in terminology; failure to satisfy such a condition always
entails failure to render a promised performance, and the injured
party's discharge is often said to be the product of "material" or "total"
breach by the defaulter,"7 3 or of "failure of consideration." 7 ,
The operation of these propositions was illustrated in many of the
1937-1957 cases. This period also produced several cases 7' dem-
onstrating that a conditional sale contract whether for land or a chattel,
is governed by special rules.676
670 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 395 (1932). See also 6 CoREiN, CONTRACTS §§ 1252
et seq. (1950). The range of constructive conditions which fall within this principle
is very broad. Included will be conditions grounded on an obligee's duty not to
interfere with the obligor's performance, and on an obligor's duty not to repudiate. See
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 295, 317, 318 (1932), and the discussion at note 522
et seq., above, under the subheading Prevention and Repudiation.
371 See the discussion above at note 473 et seq. Notice that an express condition can
be excused, and that one basis for excuse is extreme hardship and forfeiture.
172 See the discussion at note 484 et seq. above.673 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 397 (1932).
674 See RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs § 274 (1932). An illustrative case is Mell v.
Winslow, 49 Wn.2d 738, 306 P.2d 751 (1957). Prospective failure of consideration
was discussed above under that subheading, at note 492 et seq.
075 The discharge is not often directly in issue. The contested question is typically
the existence of the condition or whether it was satisfied or excused. A holding for the
promisor is however indicative of his discharge. See, as to express conditions, In re
Lewis' Estate, 2 Wn.2d 458, 98 P.2d 654 (1940) and the cases cited in note 473 above.
As to constructive conditions, see notes 488-491 above. Prevention and repudiation
were discussed at notes 522 et seq. above.
676 The vendee who defaults will subject himself to repossession and forfeiture; no
contract clause so stating is necessary to the result. Rider v. Cottle, 32 Wn.2d 538,
202 P.2d 741 (1949). That "default" will encompass any breach was indicated in
earlier cases. Liliopoulos v. Ayerest, 125 Wash. 134, 215 Pac. 339 (1923) (failure to
pay one installment) ; Gaffney v. O'Leary, 155 Wash. 171, 283 Pac. 1091 (1929) (re-
fusal to sign a written contract). No inclination to apply the usual total-breach
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Statute of Limitations. "Actions can only be commenced within
the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action shall have
accrued . . ."I" Once the limitation period has run, the duty of a
contract obligor is discharged. The discharge is in a sense contingent,
because of the tolling principle 7 The statute operates on a cause of
action, which in a contract situation exists only when a duty of im-
mediate performance has been defaulted. Interpretation of the con-
tract to determine when the obligor was to perform or whether his
undertaking was conditional, and the operation of express or construc-
tive conditions, are accordingly common issues in statute of limitations
litigation. Several of the later cases are illustrative.67 The statute also
criteria is evidenced in these cases. The vendor must however elect between repos-
session and forfeiture, or recovery of the price. His choice of the first course dis-
charges the vendee's duty to pay. Standard Finance Co. v. Townsend, 1 Wn.2d 274,
95 P.2d 786 (1939) ; Washington Co-op. Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wn2d 460, 256
P.2d 294 (1953). (These cases state the rule; the effect on title, of election to
recover the price, was the point in issue). It is evident that the vendor is ordinarily
discharged of all duties by his election of either course; if however he elects forfeiture
and sues in replevin, a conditional decree may be entered, under which the vendee can
defeat the action by payment of the entire contract balance within a time set by the
court. Gilbert Co. v. Husted, 50 Wash. 61, 96 Pac. 835 (1908); Standard Furniture
Co. House v. Burrows, 59 Wash. 455, 110 Pac. 13 (1910); Kohler & Chase v. Turner,
84 Wash. 192, 146 Pac. 393 (1915). A similar technique has been followed in real
estate contract cases. Crook v. Tudor, 28 Wn2d 289, 182 P.2d 740 (1947) ; Bruckart
v. Cook, 30 Wn.2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948). In the Crook case the sum to be paid, set
by the trial court, covered only defaulted installments and the vendor's costs; this
detail was not however in issue on the appeal. On the other hand it may be doubted
that default by the vendee, however gross, serves to extinguish his interest until the
vendor makes his selection. This idea was expressed in In re Horse Heaven Irrigation
Dist., 19 Wn.2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943), a land contract case. Cf., Harris v. Morgen-
sen, 31 Wn2d 228, 196 P.2d 317 (1948) (vendee in default does not provide consider-
ation for a promise by the vendor to refund part of the price paid, by surrendering
the property). That the election does not necessarily involve a notice of forfeiture,
where this is the vendor's choice, was indicated in Crook v. Tudor, supra, (vendee
abandoned the property). Geranios v. Annex Investments, 45 Wn.2d 233, 273 P.2d 793(1954), also a land contract case, indicates that forfeiture will discharge not only
accrued installments but unaccrued ones as well. Forfeiture will discharge a down-
payment note found by the court to represent a part of the vendee's executory promise
to pay. Jones-Short Motor Co. v. Bolin, 153 Wash. 198, 279 Pac. 395 (1929), noted
30 YALE L. J. 124 (1920). A note found to be "payment" of the down-payment will
not be discharged. Norman v. Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78 (1916). The
vendee's discharge has been held not to encompass his undertaking, in the contract, to
pay an attorney fee, or insurance premiums. Motor Contract Co. v. Van Der Volgen,
162 Wash. 449, 298 Pac. 705 (1931) ; Union Mach. & Supply Co. v. McCush, 104 Wash.
62, 175 Pac. 559 (1918).677 RCW 4.16.010. The prescribed period is six years, for "an action upon a con-
tract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement."
RCW 4.16.040 (2). The period is three years, on "an action upon a contract or liability,
express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written
instrument" RCW 4.16.080(3). Statutes regulating administrative procedures may
affect contract obligees; see for example RCW 28.88.010, et seq., which create a
system of appeals in the public school system; the statute was applied in Blunt v.
School Dist. No. 35, 12 Wn.2d 336, 121 P.2d 367 (1942) to bar an action by a dis-
charged school teacher.
678 The tolling cases were discussed at p. 65 et seq. above.
679 Gensman v. West Coast Power Co., 3 Wn.2d 404, 101 P.2d 316 (1940), noted
15 WAsH. L. REv. 267 (1940) (the action was to recover over-time pay; the court
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generates a continuing grist of construction problems. In Campbell
Co. v. Holsum Baking Co."" the court declined to treat as defensive
and unaffected by the limitations statute a cross claim based on an
alleged over-payment of plaintiff by defendant. In DeBritz v. Sylvia s1
an optionee who accepted a written option offer, by words and conduct
only, was held to the six-year statute; the action was found to arise
"out of a written agreement." ' 2 In Rushlight v. McLain688 the statute
was held not to run during the obligor's absence from the state, even
though the obligor was an employee of the obligee.08 4
Merger and Res judicata. An adjudication, in litigation between
an actual or alleged obligor and obligee concerning either the existence
or scope of a contract duty, precludes a second action. A holding for
the obligee merges the obligor's duty in the judgment."' A holding for
the obligor brings the doctrine of res judicata into operation." 6 These
principles were significant in several of the later cases."'7
found that payment was due monthly and held that the statute started to run as each
monthly payment was defaulted; earlier cases holding that the statute does not begin to
run on wage claims for services rendered under a continuous and indeterminate
employment, until the employment ends, were distinguished; presumably a finding that
wage payments were due periodically is fatal to the continuous-employment rule);
Keyes v. Tacoma, 12 Wn.2d 54, 120 P.2d 533 (1941) (holder of local improvement
district bonds occupied as to the city and funds held by it for the payment of bonds the
position of trust beneficiary; recovery was permitted long after the limitations period
had run on the bonds; the cut-off point was held to be the date on which the bond-
holder learned that the city had repudiated its trust) ; Bellingham Sec. Syndicate v.
Bellingham Coal Mines, 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) (obligor's duty was sub-ject to an express condition; obligor was held to have the burden of proof because the
statute creates an affirmative defense; obligor failed to sustain the burden of showing
that the condition was met more than six years before the action was commenced) ;
Chatos v. Levas, 14 Wn.2d 317, 128 P.2d 284 (1942) (in the absence of credible
evidence concerning the due date of a note, the court "must hold that there was no
date of payment mentioned in the note and that it, therefore, became a note payable
on demand."); Trethewey v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 17 Wn.2d 697, 136 P.2d 999
(1934) (where salary under an employment for an indeterminate term was to be
paid only if sufficient funds were available and unpaid amounts were to be carried
as a running account, the statute was held to begin to run when the employment was
terminated); Rushlight v. McLain, 28 Wn.2d 189, 182 P.2d 62 (1947) (demand note
is due when issued and statute starts to run then). In connection with running accounts,
see RCW 4.16.150.
080 15 Wn.2d 239, 130 P.2d 333 (1942).
138121 Wn.2d 317, 150 P.2d 978 (1944), noted, 20 WASHr. L. Ray. 69 (1945).652 The earlier cases dealing with the very troublesome problem, when does a cause
"arise" from a writing, were discussed by the court; the statutory language is so
vague as to insure continuing necessity for its construction.
08328 Wn.2d 189, 182 P.2d 62 (1947).
084 The statute directly in issue was RCW 4.16.180.
0 R6 ESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 444 (1932) ; 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1318 (1950) ; 6
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1875A (rev. ed. 1936).
6s RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 449 (1932) ; 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1318 (1950)
6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1875E (rev. ed 1936).
63 Woodruff v. Coate, 195 Wash. 201 80 P.2d 555 (1938) (husband and wife,
owners of all of the stock in a corporation, held bound by the judgment in a prior
action to which the corporation was a party and in which relief on an alleged contract
executed by the husband was denied; the husband managed the corporation's case) ;
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Impossibility and frustration. An obligor whose performance re-
quires the existence of a specific person or thing and who has not
assumed the risk of non-existence will be discharged by death or
incapacity of the person or unavailability of the thing.688 Within limits
as yet imperfectly indicated by the cases, other events which destroy its
purpose may discharge a contract.689 In Bryne v. Bellingham Consol.
School Dist., "I the court held that weather and labor difficulties did
not excuse an owner's failure to "keep the construction work in a
sufficient state of progress to allow timely completion of the electrical
work." In Tube-Art Display, Inc. v. Berg,"9' destruction of the build-
ing on which an electric sign was displayed was held not to discharge
the owner's duty to pay rent on the sign.
Estoppel, waiver, renunciation. Save where the renunciation sec-
tion of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law governs, "2 it is
difficult to determine the legal effect of an obligee's gratuitous expres-
sion of a purpose not to require a performance to which he has a
right, or not to require compensation for a prior breach. Although
value or consideration is often said to be needed for a consensual dis-
charge, gift and reliance principles have on occasion been drawn on to
sustain a gratuitous discharge. 93 The later Washington cases demon-
Clubb v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 197 Wash. 308, 85 P.2d 258 (1938) (prior adjudication
of the amount due under an accident insurance contract) ; Dolby v. Fisher, 1 Wn.2d
181, 95 P.2d 369 (1939) (a prior action is not adjudication of an issue raised by a
cross-complaint and reply, where no evidence on it was submitted by either party and
the judgment ignored it) ; Golden v. McGill, 3 Wn.2d 708, 102 P.2d (1940) (a decree
of distribution, entered after hearing and service, was held to bar this later action by
one of the parties for specific enforcement of an alleged contract which the will
breached; the issue now sought to be litigated could have been raised in the earlier
proceeding) ; Gable v. Allen, 25 Wn.2d 186, 169 P.2d 699 (1946) (in a prior action for
breach of an alleged contract to marry, the defendant both denied the contract and
alleged an unsatisfied condition to his promise, i.e., the settling of his former's wife's
estate; judgment went for the plaintiff in superior court; the supreme court reversed;
its judgment was held to bar the present action seeking recovery on the same contract
upon an allegation that the condition had now been met; to the plaintiff's argument
that the prior judgment must be limited to the condition issue, under which the
earlier action would only be dismissed as premature, the court's answer was that its
prior decision was on alternative grounds-no contract, and non-satisfaction of a
condition; the prior judgment was accordingly res judicata on both issues).
688 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 454 et seq. (1932) ; 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§1320
et seq. (1950); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1931 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936). For the
earlier cases see WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, to the cited
Restatement sections.
689 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 288 (1932) ; 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1353 et seq.
(1950); 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1951, 1954 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936). For the
earlier cases see WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, to the cited
Restatement sections.
690 7 Wn.2d 20, 108 P.2d 791 (1941).
69137 Wn.2d 1, 221 P.2d 510 (1950).
692 RCW 62.01.122.
893 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 410, 411 (1932); 5 CoRmN, CONTRACTS §§
1240 et seq. (1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1829 (rev. ed. 1936).
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strate the impossibility of arriving at any firm conclusions about this
area. °' The most which can safely be said is that an obligee can in
Washington so conduct himself as to lose his right, without receiving
any compensation for it. Just what conduct will have this effect cannot
be specified.
FrAuD AND MISREPRESENTATION
Terminology and basic principles. A promisor may be induced to
make his promise, by a misstatement of the promisee about some aspect
of the transaction, or by a misimpression which the promisee could have
dispelled. Whether such conduct or inaction by a promisee is legally
wrongful is a question which can be answered only after the applica-
tion of a complicated set of interlocking principles. Those which
concern relief of a promisor from his undertaking are discussed in the
following subsections.
Development of a terminology appropriate to the substantive
refinements has been slow. Prior to 1958 the word "fraud" was used
without discrimination in Washington tort and disaffirmance cases.
It appeared where the misstatement was knowingly false and where
the misstatement was made without awareness of its falsity. A defini-
tion of it in which both scienter and materiality were stressed was
614 Herman v. Golden Arrow Dairy, Inc., 191 Wash. 582, 71 P.2d 581 (1937) (em-
ployee who for a long period received without objection pay which to his knowledge
did not include compensation for overtime, was held estopped to later claim overtime
pay); Byrne v. Bellingham Consol. School Dist, 7 Wn.2d 20, 108 P.2d 791 (1941)
(subcontractor who went ahead with the job after delays caused by the owner was
held not to have waived his right to damages for the delays) ; Bellingham Sec. Syndi-
cate v. Bellingham Coal Mines, 13 Wn.2d 370, 125 P.2d 668 (1942) lessor who for a
long time received royalty payments without objection and without knowledge that the
payments should be larger was held not estopped to recover the balance due it; said
the court: "Estoppel by silence does not arise without full knowledge of the facts, and
a duty to speak on the part of the person against whom it is claimed.") ; Kessinger v.
Anderson, 31 Wn.2d 157, 196 P.2d 289 (1948) (buyer of land who paid the price,
received a warranty deed, and remained silent while the escrow holder disbursed to the
seller, all with knowledge that there existed an encumbrance on the property which
violated the covenants of the deed and the seller's contract obligation, was held to be
precluded from recovering damages for the breach; the court discussed both "waiver"
and "estoppel") ; Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn.2d 667, 269 P.2d 960 (1954) (vendee
who paid and received a deed, knowing that it did not cover all of the area encom-
passed by the seller's original representation concerning the boundaries, was held to
have "waived" any right he might have to a conveyance of the additional land);
Douglas County Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Newby, 45 Wn.2d 784, 278 P.2d 330 (1954)
(obligee who gave an extension of time based on part payment of a liquidated obliga-
tion was held "estopped" to deny consideration for the extension; reliance by the
obligor in paying what he did was stressed). The use of the term "waiver" in this
context is difficult to understand; conditions can be waived, but to hold that property
rights can be lost by a mere expression of purpose does manifest violence to basic
transfer concepts. "Estoppel' is no less difficult to work into the facts of these cases;
the reliance is typically but the doing of something the obligor was legally bound to
do. Reconsideration of the entire problem would seem to be in order.
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often repeated, despite abundant evidence that a promisor does not
have to show scienter in order to disaffirm.
In Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 6 a 1958 case which was not
concerned with disaffirmance, the court recognized that "fraud" is a
word which should be used only to designate a misstatement accom-
panied by scienter 9 Whether the word as so defined has any proper
place in disaffirmance litigation is discussed below, in the subsection
entitled "Materiality."
A wrongful misstatement by the promisee may lead the promisor
to promise, believing he is doing something else or that he is making a
different kind of promise. This variety of mistake is fatal to mutual
assent. There is no contract.69 No 1937-1957 Washington case
involving this kind of mistake was found.
More commonly, a wrongful misstatement affects the promisor's
decision to make a promise which he knows full well he is making.
His mistake does not defeat mutual assent and there is a contract if
the usual contract-formation criteria are met. The promisor is pro-
tected by an election which is a significant addition to the discharge
methods discussed in the preceding section. He may elect to disaffirm
(a word with which "avoid" and "rescind" seem to be interchangeable)
and if he does he is discharged. If he fails to disaffirm he remains
bound. If he has already performed, he can by disaffirmance mature
a right to the return of his performance. This he can also do where the
transaction was a sale. It is often impossible to determine from an
opinion whether a property transfer was made in performance of a
contract, and no attempt has been made to segregate sale and contract
cases for the purposes of this section.
Proof. A misstatement may be asserted by a promisor as a defense,
or as an integral part of an action to recover a performance he has
rendered. In either situation he carries the burden of persuasion. The
Washington court has said many times that "fraud" must be shown by
"clear and convincing evidence,""69 but it is not possible to ascertain
695 153 Wash. Dec. 126, 332 P2d 228 (1958).
696 Although the case did not involve recission the court's analysis and terminology
should carry over into rescission cases.
097 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 475 (1932) ; 5 Ww.LISTON, CONTRACTS § 1488 (rev.
ed. 1936).
69s Russell v. Stephens, 191 Wash. 314, 71 P.2d 30 (1937); Hopper v. Williams,
27 Wn2d 579, 179 P.2d 283 (1947) ; Paulson v. Cuddy, 31 Wn.2d 924, 199 P2d 920(1948) ; Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wn.2d 303, 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) ; Elliott v. Fischer,36 Wn.2d 774, 220 P2d 338 (1950); Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn.2d 131, 234 P.2d 884(1951) ; Jenness v. Moses Lake Dev. Co., 39 Wn.2d 151, 234 P.2d 865 (1951) ; Dragos
v. Plese, 39 Wn.2d 521, 236 P.2d 1037 (1951) ; Shay v. Archambo, 40 Wn.2d 277,
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from the opinions just what the promisor must show in addition to the
usual preponderance. There are a few decisions in which no reference
is made to a special burden of proof;.. the omission is probably not
meaningful. In Westerbeck v. Cannon 700 the rule requiring clear and
convincing proof was said not to apply because the misstatement was
by a person occupying a fiduciary relationship to the promisor. The
significance and scope of the stated exception is obscure.
In Gronlund v. Andersson7 " and Nyquist v. Foster"2 the court
reaffirmed its refusal to enforce a contract-document clause disclaiming
all representations not stated in the document. This type of clause
will not bar proof of misstatements, nor will it bar disaffirmance.
That conduct can express a misstatement was recognized in Wester-
beck v. Cannon"0 3 and in Downing v. State.04
The Downing case is of interest for another reason. The plaintiff had
received for property a sum less than its fair value and the legal
significance of this fact was one of the issues. The court said that
although inadequacy of price will not alone support rescission 715 (unless
so gross as to "shock the conscience of an equity court"), relief can be
had if there is in addition an inequitable incident such as "fraud." The
court went on: "Even though no directly false statements are made,
if there appears to be a studied effort to produce a false impression
upon the mind of the party from whom land is being purchased, this,
together with inadequacy of price, will be sufficient to authorize relief."
The utility of this approach is not readily seen. If "fraud" is proved,
242 P.2d 511 (1952) ; Nyquist v. Foster. 44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; Simms
v. Erwin, 46 Wn.2d 417, 282 P.2d 291 (1955). In result, these cases go both ways.
See also Schulz v. Spokane United Rys., 16 Wn.2d 43, 132 P.2d 366 (1942), in which
an attempt to upset a release on the ground of fraud was unsuccessful.
695 Gose v. Harris, 196 Wash. 167, 82 P.2d 160 (1938) (but compare the dissent);
Downing v. State, 9 Wn.2d 685, 115 P.2d 972 (1941); Page v. Prudential Life Ins.
Co., 12 Wn2d 101, 120 P.2d 527 (1942); Weaver v. Blochberger, 31 Wn.2d 877, 199
P.2d 589 (1948) ; Gronlund v Andersson, 38 Wn.2d 60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951).
700 5 Wn.2d 106, 104 P.2d 918 (1940).
70138 Wn.2d 60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951).
702 44 Wn2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954).
703 5 Wn.2d 106, 104 Pf2d 918 (1940). The court said: "Appellant contends that
the record does not show a single false statement made to respondents .... However
that may be, we think actions may speak louder than words, and we are clearly of
the opinion that the acts of appellant indicate a course of conduct, carried out with
the intent of deceiving respondents, which was just as reprehensible as though appel-
lant had verbally made misrepresentations, and we are also satisfied that appellant
cannot escape liability for the wrong caused such acts, and that such acts constitute
fraud in law." See also 5 WULmsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 1497 at 4181 n.4 (rev. ed. 1936).
704 9 Wn.2d 685, 115 P.2d 972 (1941).
705 In Meyer v. Eschbach, 192 Wash. 310, 73 P.2d 803 (1937) earlier cases were
discussed, and followed which hold that inadequacy of price is not alone a basis for
relief.
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inadequacy of price is certainly not a necessary additional requirement
for disaffirmance.
Even more confusing is a passage in Hood v. CIine,7" quoted from
an earlier case: "Mere inadequacy of consideration will not afford cause
for rescission of a contract on the ground of fraud, where the parties
have dealt at arm's length . . ." The inference in this passage, that
inadequacy of price can per se be "fraud" under some circumstances,
seems obviously unsupportable. On the other hand, evidence indicat-
ing a considerable discrepancy between price and value can hardly be
dismissed as irrelevant. It can properly be weighed with conflicting
testimony about the making of false statements, since gross discrepancy
is abnormal and logically supports other evidence of wrongdoing by the
person who got the long end of the bargain. The Washington court has
gone even further in this direction. An earlier case,7 7 cited with
approval in Ramsey v. Mading,"I suggests that inadequacy of price
may be so gross as to create a presumption of "fraud". How the pre-
sumption will work if the promisor has no credible evidence of mis-
statements cannot be determined.
Concealment. In general, a promisee's non-disclosure of the true
facts is not legally wrongful even though he knows the promisor is
laboring under a misapprehension."' A quite different problem is
present if the parties are in a relationship which makes this kind of
advantage-taking improper. Both the basic rule and some of the
exceptions were discussed in Hood v. Cline.71 Disclosure was said to
be required by an agent-principal or an attorney-client relationship.
This is the usual view."'
What is a "fact." A promisee's misstatement of his opinion about
some aspect of the transaction is not ordinarily regarded as "fraud";
706 35 Wn.2d 192, 212 P.2d 110 (1949).
70 7 Tausick v. Tausick, 52 Wash. 301, 100 Pac. 757 (1909). The stated rule was not
however applied, as the evidence of inadequacy was unsatisfactory.
708 36 Wn.2d 303, 217 P.2d 1041 (1950). The rule was not applied because the court
did not regard the consideration as "so far out of line as to be unconscionable." See
also Soya v. First Nat'l Bank, 18 Wn2d 88, 138 P.2d 181 (1943); Vossen v.
Wilson, 39 Wn. 2d. 906, 239 P.2d 558 (1952).
709 5 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1497 (rev. ed. 1936).
710 35 Wn.2d 192, 212 P.2d 110 (1949).
711 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 472 (1932) ; 5 WILLISTONr, CoNTRACTs § 1499 (rev.
ed. 1936). The court went on to find that neither of these relationships existed, and
to hold that "confidence alone is not enough to establish a fiduciary relationship...."
See also Westerbeck v. Cannon, 5 Wn.2d 106, 104 P.2d 918 (1940) (which appears to
involve agency), and the dissent in Kalk-varf v. Geschke, 194 Wash. 135, 77 P.2d 612(1938).
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neither is non-performance of a promise made by him.7 12 The insistence
by courts on proof of a misstatement of "fact" has led to contests over
the classification of a promisee's remarks as "fact," "opinion," or
"promise," and to opinions drawing distinctions which approach the
esoteric. The later Washington cases dealing with these matters are
not entirely harmonious.
In Algee v. Hillman Inv. Co."" and Darnell v. Noel "' the court
followed earlier cases in holding statements about the boundaries of
land to be statements of fact. This proposition has apparently, in the
court's estimation, become a "rule." Statements about the value of
property have not received consistent treatment. In Hood v. Cline15
such a statement was held to be of opinion. Cunningham v. Studio
Theatre," on the other hand, suggests that the court will examine the
circumstances in each transaction and will be inclined to view value-
representations as statements of fact."'
The most complex "promise" vs. "fact" controversies have revolved
around a promisee's statement about future events. At first encounter
such a statement seems dearly not one of fact.71s Moreover, in many
transactions the context readily supports classification of the state-
ment as a warranty, a type of undertaking affected by the parol
evidence rule and by a warranty-disclaimer clause. Despite these
difficulties a promisor has in some instances been able to establish his
case.
In Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth71' and in Nyquist v. Foster72 a
712 Opinions: RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 474 (1932) (a false statement of opinion
is misrepresentation or fraud, if made by one who is or purports to be an expert, or if
it is intentional and "varies so far from the truth that no reasonable man in his position
could have such an opinion") ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTs §§ 1491 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).
Promises: RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 473 (1932) (promise made with intent not
to perform can be fraud) ; 5 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra § 1496. See note 723 below.
713 12 Wn2d 672, 123 P2d 332 (1942).
714 34 Wn2d 428, 208 P.2d 1194 (1949).
71r 35 Wn.2d 192, 212 P.2d 110 (1949).
716 38 Wn.2d 417, 229 P.2d 890 (1951).
717 The court said: "Appellants rely upon what they call the general rule that an
expression of value is but opinion.... However, this rule is not absolute, and it is
not the law that an expression of value is always an opinion and never a material
fact.... Indeed, the so-called general rule has been whittled down until it can be said
that it 'applies only where the parties stand on an equal footing .....'" The court
went on to indicate that in its view many value-statement cases in which fraud was
denied actually turned on the absence of reliance, and that it was not necessary in the
immediate case to decide whether the questioned statement was fact or opinion.
71S This proposition was stated in Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn2d 131, 234 P.2d 884
(1951), in a quotation from an earlier case: "The representation must relate to an
existing fact." The court held a statement by a seller, that he intended to move to
another city, was not material because it failed to meet the stated test.
719 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953). The seller of a furnace said it was adequate
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buyer succeeded in rescinding although the seller's remarks concerned
the future performance of what he was selling. In the former case the
court said:
Where it is not shown that the buyer relied upon the salesman's assert-
ed special and peculiar knowledge of the article or of the conditions
under which it was to be used, a statement that such article will satis-
factorily meet the buyer's requirements will be regarded as an expres-
sion of opinion about something to take place in the future... But
where the salesman does assert such special and peculiar knowledge,
and the buyer relies thereon, a statement that the article is appropriate
for, and will satisfactorily meet, the buyer's requirements will be
regarded as a representation of fact.
A rather different approach was taken in the Nyquist case. The seller
said the walls of a house-trailer would not warp. This was held to be
a statement of fact because it concerned existing qualities in the
trailer walls."' But, said the court, "where the fulfillment or satisfac-
tion of the thing represented depends upon a promised performance
of a future act, or upon the occurrence of a future event, or upon
particular future use, or future requirements of the representee, then
the representation is not of an existing fact." Although the court did
not in Nyquist v. Foster purport to over-rule Holland Furnace Co. v.
Korth, the tests stated in the two cases are evidently inconsistent.
That the earlier case will be followed seems doubtful, if only because
the approach taken in it is hard to justify. How can reliance on the
seller as an expert change what is otherwise a prediction about the
future into a statement about the present?
In Murdoch v. Leonard22 "fraud" was found in the making of a
promise "with no intent, at the time it was made, to abide by it." 23
in design to heat the entire house comfortably in the coldest weather. Fraud was
found.
720 44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; See also Gronlund v. Andersson, 38 WVn.2d
60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951), in which no issue was made of the point here under discus-
sion although the wrongful language as alleged in the complaint related to the future
performance of a well; it would appear desirable to proceed with caution when fram-
ing pleadings in this marginal area; the Nyquist case provides a guide-the proper
cast of the allegation in the Gronlund case would be the existing capacity and past
performance of the well, not what it would do in the future.
721. The court said: "On the other hand, a statement is one of existing fact, if a
quality is asserted which inheres in the article so that, at the time the representation
is made, the quality may be said to exist independently of future acts or performance
of the one making the representation, independently of other particular occurrences
in the future, and independently of particular future uses or future requirements of
the buyer." (Emphasis by the court.)
722 1 Wn.2d 37, 95 P.2d 37 (1939).
723 This is the usual result. See note 712 above. An attempt to establish fraud in
this way failed in Investment & Securities Co. v. Adams, 192 Wash. 41, 72 P.2d 288
(1937), because the crucial element, intent when the promise was made, not to per-
form, was not proved
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Scienter.
It is not necessary, in order that a contract may be rescinded for fraud
or misrepresentation, that the party making the misrepresentation
should have known that it was false. Innocent misrepresentation is
sufficient, for though the representation may have been made innocent-
ly, it would be unjust to allow one who has made false representations,
even innocently, to retain the fruits of a bargain induced by such
representations.12 '
American courts have in general come to this view. 25 Although the
Washington court has too,72 it continues to publish opinions in which
"fraud" is identified with scienter. Illustrative are Haugen v. Neis-
wonger,"' Gronlund v. Andersson,7 2' and Graff v. Geisel, 729 from which
a definition of "fraud" which requires an "intentional" misstatement
can be derived. Also dangerous are Dragos v. Plese,2 ° Nyquist v.
Foster,7 3 and Peterson v. Boyd,72  which refer to deceit cases contain-
ing a similar definition. Of course an intentional misstatement can
support disaffirmance, but care in explaining the result is needed if an
appearance of conflict between cases involving intentional misstate-
ments and cases involving innocent ones is to be avoided.
724 5 WILLIsToN, CONTRAcTS § 1500 (rev. ed. 1936). See also RESTATEMENT, CON-
macTs, §§ 470, 476 (1932).
725 See Judge Foster's discussion in Brown v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 153 Wash.
Dec. 126, 332 P.2d 228 (1958).
726 Algee v. HilIman Inv. Co., 12 Wn.2d 672, 123 P.2d 332 (1942) ("This court
has many times held that one who indicates to a purchaser that the land sold has a
certain area when, as a matter of fact, the deed or contract of purchase contained a
less amount, is responsible to the purchaser even though he acted under an honest
mistake without any intent to deceive."); Thompson v. Huston, 17 Wn.2d 457, 135
P.2d 834 (1943) ("Untrue statements amount to constructive fraud, even though
made in entire good faith.") ; Anthony v. Warren, 28 Wn.2d 773, 184 P.2d 105 (1947)(from an earlier case a passage was quoted, indicating that the court has aligned
itself in recission cases with the courts which deem intent not to be a controlling
factor and which permit recission "notwithstanding the misrepresentations were not
fraudulently made..."); Hunt v. Marsh, 40 Wn2d 531, 244 P.2d 869 (1952)("Marsh may not have had actual knowledge that the triangle was not a part of the
motel property, but when she chose to represent to respondent by words and the
exhibition of a map that such was the fact, she became bound thereby.") ; Holland
Furn. Co. v. Korth, 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953) ("[I]f a person represents as
true material facts susceptible of knowledge, to one who relies and acts thereon to
his injury, he cannot defeat recovery by showing that he did not know his representa-
tions were false, or that he believed them to be true.")
72734 Wn.2d 422, 209 P.2d 267 (1949). Rescission was denied, for lack of justified
reliance.
728 38 Wn.2d 60, 227 P.2d 741 (1951). An intentional misrepresentation was found
and rescission was granted.
72939 Wn.2d 131, 234 P2d 884 (1951). Rescission was denied for lack of justified
reliance.
730 39 Wn2d 521, 236 P.2d 1037 (1951) (deceit case cited which did not spell out
the criteria for fraud but cited earlier deceit cases which did).
73144 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954).
73246 Wn2d 97, 278 P.2d 400 (1955).
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Materiality. The traditional definition of "fraud" excludes an
immaterial misstatement, i.e., one which would not "be likely to affect
the conduct of a reasonable man with reference to a transaction with
another person...,3 Professor Williston took issue with this
limitation:
It is laid down in the cases that a misrepresentation must be material
in order that the law may take notice of it as a fraud. If, however, a
party to a bargain has made misrepresentations for the purpose of
inducing action by the other, and the other party has acted, relying
upon the misrepresentations, it seems that the former should not be
allowed to deny that misrepresentations which have effectively served a
fraudulent purpose were material. This in effect is saying that any
misrepresentations which were intended to bring about a particular
result and which do bring about that result are sufficiently material.73 4
The Restatement of Contracts conforms to this analysis, providing
for rescission both where a material fact is innocently misrepresented
and where a misstatement is intentionally made.3 5 Nothing was
observed in the later Washington opinions, however, which suggests
any inclination by the court to dispense with materiality where the
misstatement was made with knowledge of its falsity. There is, on the
contrary, considerable evidence the other way.738 Whether Brown v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's7 17 portends not only a tightening of the termin-
ology in the fraud area, but also a willingness to review substantive
elements such as materiality, is entirely conjectural.
It will be observed that the terminology problem mentioned at the
beginning of this section is inter-related with scienter and with
materiality. Under the Williston and Restatement system there are
two combinations of evidence on which a promisor can disaffirm. One,
denominated "material misrepresentation," stresses materiality and the
other, denominated "fraud," stresses scienterY.7 8 A misstatement, and
73 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 470(2) (1932).
734 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 1490 (rev. ed. 1936).
7 3 5 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTS §§ 470, 471, 476 (1932).
7,36 In Dragos v. Plese, 39 Wn.2d 521, 236 P.2d 1037 (1951); Nyquist v. Foster,
44 Wn.2d 465, 268 P.2d 442 (1954) ; and Petersen v. Boyd, 46 Wn.2d 97, 278 P.2d
400 (1955), the court cited deceit cases, which routinely state materiality to be a
requisite for "fraud." In Ramsey v. Mading, 36 Wn.2d 303, 217 P.2d 1041 (1950);
Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, 43 Wn.2d 618, 262 P.2d 772 (1953) and Peterson v.
Boyd, supra, materiality of the misstated fact was said to be a requisite for rescission.
In Cunningham v. Studio Theatre, 38 Wn.2d 417, 229 P.2d 890 (1951) ; Hunt v. Marsh,
40 Wn.2d 531, 244 P.2d 869 (1952) ; and Holland Furnace Co. v. Korth, supra, materi-
ality was found and rescission granted, but without any helpful discussion. See also
Hood v. Cline, 35 Wn.2d 192, 212 P.2d 110 (1949) (rescission denied, apparently be-
cause the fact concealed was not material).
7 See the discussion at note 695 above.
73 See the discussion at note 724 et seq. above.
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reliance, are requisites to both. Scienter remains an important concept
because it determines the necessity for a showing of materiality. In the
final analysis, the Washington cases stress "material misrepresenta-
tion." Scienter certainly does the promisor's cause no harm, but the
cases cited at note 726 demonstrate the court's willingness to permit
disaffirmance even though the misstatement was made without knowl-
edge of its falsity. If scienter is not a requisite, opinions inferring the
contrary are none the less misleading and confusing because the
statement in issue was made with knowledge of its falsity.789 The term
"fraud" as defined in the Brown case, discussed at note 695, does not
accurately delineate the minimum evidence on which a promisor can
disaffirm. It would accordingly seem that the use of this term in
rescission litigation is undesirable. The term is useful only if scienter
plays a significant part in determining whether a promisor can dis-
affirm. Scienter does not now play such a part. It will if the court ad-
heres to the position proposed by Professor Williston and discussed
above.
Reliance. Reliance by the promisor is a vital element of "fraud"; °
a misstatement which does not mislead will not give a promisor cause
for disaffirmance. In several of the later Washington cases reliance
was in issue and was handled like any contested fact. 41
Whether a promisor should in addition be required to establish
justification for his reliance is a question not easily answered. Ought
he be held to a standard of care in protecting himself, even though
this operates to insulate a defrauder from any penalty for the wrong-
doing? The cases in other American jurisdictions are far from har-
monious in their disposition of this problem." 2 Nor can the 1937-1957
Washington cases on the point be reconciled. The court has stated
730 As in the cases cited at notes 727-732 above.
740 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1515 (rev. ed. 1936). The Restatement of Contracts
uses the term "induced" rather than the term "reliance," and states a presumption of
inducement where the misstated fact is material. See §§ 476, 479. There is no indica-
tion in the later Washington cases of adherence to such a presumption.
741 Sutton v. Peterson, 193 Wash. 175, 74 P.2d 884 (1938) (reliance not found);
Buckley v. Hatupin, 198 Wash. 543, 89 P.2d 212 (1939) (reliance not found) ; 31
Wn.2d 877, 199 P.2d 589 (1948) (reliance evidently found); Ramsey v Mading, 36
Wn.2d 303, 217 P.2d 1041 (1950) (reliance not found); Michaelson v Hopkins,
38 Wn.2d 256, 228 P.2d 759 (1951) (reliance not found); Dragos v. Plese, 39
Wn.2d 521, 236 P.2d 1037 (1951) (reliance not found); Shay v. Archambo, 40 Wn.2d
277, 242 P.2d 511 (1952) (reliance not found) ; Nyquist v. Foster, 44 Wn.2d 465, 268
P.2d 442 (1954) (reliance found).
72 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1516 (rev. ed. 1936). Professor Williston appears
to question the propriety of a justification requirement, and says: "The modern tend-
ency is certainly toward the doctrine that negligence in trusting in a misrepresentation
will not e-cuse positive wilful fraud or deprive the defrauded person of his remedy."
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broadly a requirement that the promisor demonstrate his "right to
rely" and has in some cases denied relief because justification for
reliance was lacking.743 Other decisions go very far in expressions of
impatience with a promisee's argument that investigation by the
promisor would have disclosed the true facts, and with the idea that a
promisor should be held to his bargain because he was gullible in
relying.4 ' The latter group of cases appear to better forecast the
future course of the court than does the group in which relief was
denied. Justification has offensively cynical overtones, when projected
against findings for the promisor on all the other elements of his case.
On the other hand, close materiality issues may properly go against
a promisor who neglects an obvious and easily pursued verification
precaution, and in comparable situations reliance as a fact need not be
decided for the promisor even though he testified that he did rely. The
court has ample control over the outcome, without resort to a justifica-
tion requirement.
Disafirmance. A promisor who can meet the substantive demands
previously discussed has a power the exercise of which (variously
labelled "disaffirmance," "avoidance," or "rescission") gives him a
defense should he be sued for failure to perform," 5 and a right to the
return of any performance he has rendered.4" It is a limited power,
regulated by the propositions considered in this subsection.
743 Weir v. School Dist. No. 201, 200 Wash. 172, 93 P.2d 308 (1939) (school direc-
tors were held not justified in relying on the statement, by an applicant for a position
as principal, that the district's budget would cover the salary proposed for him; the
court's discussion is very good) ; Haugen v. Neiswonger, 34 Wn.2d 422, 209 P.2d 267
(1949) (buyer of a half-interest in a saw-mill held not justified in relying on the
seller's concealment of a chattel mortgage on the property; the mortgage was a matter
of public record; the court stressed the buyer's experience in the saw-mll business
and his failure to examine the books of the business or the public records, or investi-
gate the seller's financial standing); Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn.2d 131, 234 P.2d 884(1951) (justification not found; with a little investigation the buyer could have pro-
tected himself).
T44 Cunningham v. Studio Theatre, 38 Wn.2d 417, 229 P2d 890 (1951) ; Rummer
v. Throop, 38 Wn2d 624, 231 P.2d 313 (1951); Jenness v. Moses Lake Dev. Co., 39
Wn.2d 151, 234 P.2d 865 (1951) ; Hunt v. Marsh, 40 Wn.2d 531, 244 P.2d 869 (1952) ;
Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954). In these cases rescission was
granted. See also the Weir case, cited in the preceding note.
745 RESTATEmENT, CoNRACTs §§ 476, 490 (1932). In Brown v. VanTuyl, 40 Wn.2d
364, 242 P.2d 1021 (1952), fraud was attempted to be used defensively; the defense
failed on the merits. The defendant also sought recovery of his performance, relief he
would have obtained had he succeeded in establishing fraud. Thompson v. Huston, 17
Wn.2d 457, 135 P.2d 834 (1943) illustrates another common procedural combination;
the vendor under a real estate contract sued for possession alleging total breach; the
vendee successfully countered with fraud. Where forfeiture rather than damages is
sought by the vendor, the defrauded vendee of course does not defeat repossession; he
does obtain restitution. In the Thompson case the court recognized that the rule which
bars restitution for a vendee himself in total default does not apply where the vendee
was defrauded and has disaffirmed.
746 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 488, 489 (1932) ; 5 WILiSToN, CONTRACTS § 1525
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The promisor can of course elect to affirm the transaction. If he
does he cannot thereafter disaffirm. 74 Several of the later Washington
cases demonstrate that his purpose in this particular. can be evidenced
by conduct, such as rendering his own performance or using- things
received from the wrongdoer."
Excessive delay in making the election is fatal to the power to
disaffirm. Time starts to run when knowledge of the promisee's wrong-
doing is acquired. The permissible delay varies with the circum-
stances." 9 The later Washington cases concerned with these details
are illustrative.75
(rev. ed. 1936). Thompson v. Huston, cited in the preceding note, is illustrative. So
are a number of the cases cited in the following notes.
747 RESTATEmENT, CoNTRaAcTs § 484 (1932) ; 5 WILLISTON, CoNmcTs § 1527 (rev.
ed. 1936).7 8 Weir v. School Dist No. 201, 200 Wash. 172, 93 P.2d 308 (1939) (although
delay in disaffirming was the stated reason for refusing rescission, there was evidence
also of affirmance) ; Beaulaurier v. Washington State Hop Producers, 8 Wn.2d 79,
111 P.2d 559 (1941); Hood v. Cline, 35 Wn.2d 192, 212 P.2d 110 (1949); Power v.
Esarey, 37 Wn.2d 407, 224 P.2d 323 (1950) ; Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn.2d 131, 234 P.2d
884 (1951) ; Brown v. VanTuyl, 40 Wn.2d 365, 242 P2d 1021 (1952). Cf.j Algee v.
Hillman Inv. Co., 12 Wn.2d 672, 123 P.2d 332 (1942), in which a vendee -succeeded
in persuading the court that the payments he made after knowledge of the fraud were
"not made... with any idea of retaining the property...." Cf., also Bariel v. Tuin-
stra, 45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) (the defrauded buyer of a dairy herd did not
affirm, by retaining the cows and making payments; he attempted to disaffirm, but
the seller refused to take back the cows, whereupon the buyer "became an involuntary
bailee of the milk cows and had no alternative but to continue operating the dairy farm
and selling the milk" ; the buyer had given the seller an assignment of his milk checks
and the creamery insisted on honoring the assignment after the attempted disaffirm-
ance; the "payments" to the seller were accordingly involuntary). If the buyer's use of
the property, after his notice of disaffirmance, had been as "owner," he would have
been held to the contract; see RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTs § 482 (1932). It will be
observed that in the cited cases the court employed a curiously diverse terminology,
talking variously of the promisor's conduct in terms of "intent," "waiver," "estoppel,"
or "ratification." It would appear that the real factor is "intent," as was recognized
in the Algee case.
749 RE-STATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 480, 483 (1932) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1526(rev. ed. 1936). The traditional theory is laches, although delay also tends in many
transactions to express affirmance and it is often difficult to tell just what theory the
court is pursuing. See the cases cited in the following note. The Restatement requires
"prompt" return of property received from the defrauder, and notice of disaffirmance
within a "reasonable time" in other situations. This is a refinement not clearly evi-
denced in the 1937-1957 Washington decisions.7 5 0 Weir v. School Dist. No. 201, 200 Wash. 172, 93 P.2d 308 (1939) ("One who
seeks to avoid a contract, which he has been induced to enter into by fraudulent repre-
sentations . . . must act with reasonable promptness on discovering the fraud, or the
right to rescission will be waived."); Algee v. Hillman Inv. Co;, 12 Wn.2d 672, 123
P.2d 332 (1942) (extended delay in discovering the fraud is not relevant) ; Thompson
v. Huston, 17 Wn.2d 457, 135 P.2d 834 (1943) (where notice of disaffirmance was
promptly given, retention of the property up to the date of trial was not a bar to
relief) ; Darnell v. Noel, 34 Wn.2d 428, 208 P.2d 1194 (1949) (delay during the time
the seller, having been advised of his misrepresentation concerning land boundaries,
endeavored to perfect the buyer's title, is not relevant; the court in stating the delay
principle said: "It is a well-settled rule that actions for rescission must be promptly
commenced"; that any such "rule" actually exists must be questioned; if notice of
di-affirmance is seasonably given, surely the action need not be started at once; the
word "promptly" must also be compared with the phrase "reasonable promptness,"
1959]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW3
Return of any performance received from the wrongdoer is an
integral part of disaffirmance, but this is a requirement of some flexi-
bility. Where rescission by action is sought, the requisite proffer can
be made in the pleadings. If return is physically impossible (e.g., user
of property) the relative equities of the parties can be worked out by
the court in money terms.75' These too are details on which the 1937-
1957 cases are only illustrative.752
used in the Weir case, supra) ; Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wn.2d 131, 234 P.2d 884 (1951)
(the passage from the Weir case, set out above, was quoted; the promisor continued
to perform after learning of the fraud; affirmance would appear the real reason for
the refusal of relief) ; Brown v. VanTuyl, 40 Wn.2d 364, 242 P.2d 1021 (1952) (court
quoted a text statement: "Where a party desires to rescind upon the ground of nis-
take or fraud, he must, upon the discovery of the facts, at once announce his purpose
and adhere to it."; whether the phrase "at once" is to be taken literally must be
questioned; it was certainly not necessary to the decision; the proponent of fraud
received as buyer a boat, and never did proffer it back to the seller) ; Bariel v. Tuinstra,
45 Wn.2d 513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) (several weeks delay was held not to bar disaffirm-
ance; the defrauder was not prejudiced by the delay).
751RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 480, 481 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§
1529, 1530 (rev. ed. 1936).
752 Thompson v. Huston, 17 Wn.2d 457, 135 P.2d 834 (1943) (a rescinding buyer is
entitled to a judgment for payments made plus interest on them, less a sum measured
by the reasonable rental value of the property for the period of occupancy) ; Hopper v.
Williams, 27 Wn.2d 579, 179 P.2d 283 (1947) ("This court has laid down a rule which
we now are satisfied to follow, namely, that restoration or tender of restoration of
property is not a condition precedent to the commencement or maintenance of an action
for the rescission of a contract for the purchase of land, but that it is sufficient to show
a willingness to do equity"; the court went on to indicate the theory of an action to
rescind to be the existence of a right to this relief, not that rescission has already
occurred; the buyer lost because he never, in his pleadings or otherwise, made any
proffer of restoration) ; Weaver v. Blochberger, 31 Wn.2d 877, 199 P.2d 589 (1948)
(upon rescission, a buyer who gave the seller's broker a negotiable note as part of the
down-payment is entitled to a judgment for the amount of the note, there being no
proof by the seller that the note is not binding on the buyer; having refused a proffer
of the property, whereupon the buyer vacated the property, the seller is not entitled to
rental value even though he did not then re-enter) ; Darnell v. Noel, 34 Wn.2d 428,208
P.2d 1194 (1949) (upon rescission by a buyer, the seller is entitled to rents received
by the buyer from the property less operating expenses including a charge for remodel-
ing part of the building, and less an additional amount for reasons not specified in the
opinion; the buyer tore down several small buildings; for them the seller received
nothing, on a finding they did not add to the value of the property); Rummer v.
Throop, 38 Wn.2d 624, 231 P.2d 313 (1951) (upon rescission by a buyer, the seller is
entitled to reasonable rental value as an offset against the purchase price) ; Brown v.
VanTuyl, 40 Wn.2d 364, 242 P2d 1021 (1952) (buyer who neither returned the
property nor offered to return it cannot have rescission) ; Bariel v. Tuinstra, 45 Wn.2d
513, 276 P.2d 569 (1954) (a buyer who initiates a rescission action within a reasonable
time, in his complaint lists the property, and prays both for restoration of the parties
to their condition prior to the sale and for general equitable relief, has sufficiently met
the restoration burden; from an earlier case the court quoted: "In order to rescind a
contract for fraud, the party defrauded must as a general rule restore, or offer to
restore, the consideration which he has received under the contract The trend of the
later cases seems to be toward a reasonable and equitable application of the rule, and
to hold that it requires a plaintiff to do merely what equitably he ought to do." (Em-
phasis by the court)). Thompson v. Huston, supra, is also of interest in that the trial
court made its judgment for the buyer's purchase money a lien on the property. This
the appellate court held was wrong, saying: "We find no legal basis for the portion of
the decree above quoted. The property in question had not been attached ... nor did
they ever acquire any right which would authorize the granting to them of the specific
lien provided for in the judgment."
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Duress and undue influence. A promisor may be induced to promise
by fear of action the promisee has threatened to take should the
promise not be made. If the threatened action is wrongful, the threats
are wrongful and are duress; the promisor can disaffirm as in the case
of fraud.753
No 1937-1957 Washington case was found involving the traditional
duress pattern, i.e., a threat of physical injury to the promisor, a mem-
ber of his family or his property. Business compulsion, a more recently
developed type of duress grounded on threatened indirect injury to a
property interest," 4 was unsuccessfully asserted in two cases."" Also
unsuccessful were attempts to establish duress in threats to pursue civil
remedies."' Such threats can be wrongful and duress; the test is bona
fides, that is, a belief by the promisee that he had a cause of action.'11
Although persuasion by a promisee is not usually a legal wrong and
is certainly not duress, the relations between promisor and promisee
can be such as to set a limit past which persuasion creates in the
promisor a power to disaffirm.58 In Kalkwarf v. Geschke755 the court
recognized both the parent-child and principal-agent relationships as
coming within the limiting principle, but found no improper persuasion.
Mistake. "In the Restatement of this Subject, mistake means a state
of mind that is not in accord with the facts." 6' The extent to which
7 53 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 492(2), 493, 495, 499 (1932) ; 5 WLmLiSTON, CON-
TRACTS §§ 1603, 1627B (rev. ed. 1936).
76 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1618 (rev. ed. 1936) ; Ferguson v. Associated OilCo., 173 Wash. 672, 24 P.2d 82 (1933), noted, 8 WASH. L. REV. 140 (1934) ; McDonald
v. Pend Oreille Mines & Metal Co., 189 Wash. 389, 65 P.2d 1250 (1937).
755 Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P.2d 513 (1939); Marrazzo v. Orino, 194
Wash. 364, 78 P.2d 181 (1938).
76 Investment & Securities Co. v. Adams, 192 Wash. 41, 72 P.2d 288 (1937)(threat to file a petition for involuntary bankruptcy); Doernbecher v. Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 16 Wn.2d 64, 132 P.2d 751 (1943) (threat to bring an action for cancellation
of insurance policies).
757 5 WnmisTo, CONTRACTS § 1606 (rev. ed. 1936), a passage from which was
quoted in the Doembecher case, cited in the preceding note.
758RESTATEm!ENT, CONTRACTS §§ 497, 498, 499 (1932); 5 WLISTON, CONTRACTS§§ 1608, 1625, 1625A (rev. ed. 1936) ; Vossen v. Wilson, 39 Wn.2d 906, 239 P2d 558(1952) ("We have said that persuasion and solicitation do not constitute undue influ-
ence." The court went on to quote from an earlier case a definition of undue influence
which requires a showing that the promisor's will was overcome by the persuasion.)
759 194 Wash. 135, 77 P.2d 612 (1938). Domination of the promisor and undue in-
fluence can of course exist without any formal relationship such as agency or intra-family relations. The discussion in Tecklenburg v. Washington Gas & Elec. Co., 40
Vn.2d 141, 241 P.2d 1172 (1952) is indicative, although undue influence was not found.
This case, Parris v. Benedict, 28 Wn2d 817, 184 P.2d 63 (1947), and Thilman v.
Thilman, 30 Wn.2d 743, 193 P.2d 674 (1948) also demonstrate that the mental strength
or weakness of the obligor is an important factor in determining whether the persuasion
was improper. In Soa v. First Nat'l Bank, 18 Wn.2d 88, 138 P.2d 181 (1952), a
fraudulent conspiracy case, the same point was stressed.7
C-0 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 500 (1932).
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mistake by a person who makes what is otherwise an offer or an
acceptance can effect mutual assent and the formation of a contract
was discussed at page 46 above. At this point the concern is with
equitable relief from a contract through rescission and with reforma-
tion, a remedy by which a contract document is amended to conform to
the parties' purpose.
If -both parties are under a mistake concerning a material fact
relating to the transaction, rescission will probably be decreed at the
suit of either party."1 No 1937-1957 Washington case clearly raising
this problem was found.
If but one party labored under a mistake, rescission has in other
jurisdictions been as often refused as granted." 2 The Washington
court in earlier cases aligned itself with the courts in which relief can
be had;"' its position was reaffirmed in Puget Sound Painters Inc. v.
State, "' with a full statement of the requirements which the promisor
must meet in order to obtain relief."
-Reformation to correct a scrivener's failure to carry into his drafting
the purpose of the parties is a routine remedy. In the usual case the
issues. are factual and revolve around the court's insistence on ample
proof of the mistake.88 The later Washington cases are typical.87
761 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 502 (1932); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 608 (1950);
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1542, 1544 (rev. ed. 1936).
7623 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 608, 609 (1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1578,
1579 (rev. ed. 1936). It will be observed that there is a considerable divergence be-
tween the views of Professors Corbin and Williston as to what the law should be on
this point. RSTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 503 (1932), adheres to Williston's preference
for refusal of relief where the mistake is unilateral.
63 Donaldson v. Abraham, 68 Wash. 208, 122 Pac. 1003 (1912). See also WASH-
INGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 503; the earlier cases were not
entirely harmonious in their disposition of unilateral mistake issues.
764 45 Wn.2d 819, 278 P.2d 302 (1954). The action was to restrain forfeiture of a
bid bond. Although the court's discussion is carefully limited to the exact problem
before it, the principle stated should apply broadly to rescission actions in which the
promisor meets the indicated standards. See the following note.
165 "We are convinced that the opinion in the Donaldson case establishes the prin-
ciple or policy in this jurisdiction: that equity will relieve against forfeiture of a bid
bond, (a) if the bidder acted in good faith, and (b) without gross negligence, (c) if he
was reasonably prompt in giving notice of the error in the bid to the other party,(d) if the bidder will suffer substantial detriment by forfeiture, and (e) if the other
party's status has not greatly changed, and relief from forfeiture will work no sub-
stantial hardship on him" 45 Wn.2d 819, 823, 278 P.2d 302, 304 (1954). Whether
"negligence," gross or otherwise, should play any part in the solution of this problem
is arguable. See 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 609 at 438 (1950) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1596 (rev. ed. 1936). The key elements would appear to be a showing of substantial
injury to the promisor if relief is denied, and a showing of notification to the promisee,
of the mistake, before he has substantially changed his position in reliance on the
-contract
766 RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 504, 511 (1932); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 614(1950) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1547 (rev. ed. 1936). There were many Washing-
ton cases before 1937. See WASHINGTON ANNOTATIONS, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §
504, 511.
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The special problem raised by an attempt to reform a memorandum
so it will satisfy the Statute of Frauds was discussed above at page 360.
"There is no portion of the law of mistake more troublesome than
that relating to mistake of law, by which is meant either ignorance of a
rule or principle of law or an erroneous conclusion as to the operation
of the law upon a known set of facts.""0 8 The confused state of the
cases generally on the matter of, equitable relief for mistakes of law has
occasioned some difficulty where a scrivener uses the words the parties
expect (or supplies words to which they do not object) but fails to
accomplish the legal relation they expect, other words being requisite
to that end. The better view permits reformation for such a mistake. 9
To this view the Washington court adhered in Chebalgoity v.
Branum.77'
Reformation can also be had to correct a mistake not truly "mutual,"
as where one party knows the document does not express the agreed
terms and the other does not.7 7 ' This proposition was followed in
Meyer v. Young17  but with an unfortunate emphasis on "fraud." The
707 Shaw v. Briggle, 193 Wash. 595, 76 P.2d 1011 (1938) (relief granted) ; John
Hancock Mlut. Life Ins. Co. v. Agenew, 1 Wn.2d 165, 95 P2d 386 (1939) (relief
denied; the court indicated that the burden of proof will not be met where there is'a
direct conflict in the testimony of the parties concerning the existence of the- alleged
mistake; see however the explanation of this statement, in the Akers case, infra)
Marks v. Scaler's Inc., 2 Wn2d 277, 97 P.2d 1084 (1940) (relief granted; the burden
on the proponent of reformation was said to be "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
of mutual mistake in the drafting of the instrument, and of what was the true agree-
ment and intention of the makers") ; Moeller v. Schultz, 11 Wn.2d 416, 119 P2d 660
(1941) (relief granted); Keesling v. Pehling, 35 Wn.2d 624, 214 P.2d 506 (1950)
(relief denied; the action was to reform an option contract which stated a price above
the Civil Production Administration ceiling price; plaintiff's argument that the parties'
intended a lawful agreement hence must be taken to have intended the lower price, was
rejected by the court; the sum stated in the option was the one agreed on, not a sum
appearing there by mistake); Nadreau v. Meyerotto, 35 Wn.2d 740, 215 P.2d 681
(1950) (relief granted); Akers v. Sinclair, 37 Wn2d 693, 226 P.2d 225 (1950) (after
discussing its earlier and not-always consistent statements concerning the burden of
proof, the court reaffirmed "the long-established rule in this state that clear, cogent
and convincing evidence is necessary to sustain an action for reformation on the ground
of mutual mistake." The court went on to cite the John Hancock Mut. Life Ins: Co.
case, supra and others, and to say, "we have sometimes said that where any doubt exists
as to the intent of the parties, reformation will not be granted.... However, the mere
denial that a mistake was made will not defeat an action for reformation .... In de-
termining this question, the courts will look into the surrounding circumstances, and
will take into consideration all facts which throw light upon the intention of the
parties") ; Bergstrom v. Olson, 39 Wn.2d 536, 236 P.2d 1052 (1951) (relief granted);
fulhausen v. Nalley's, Inc., 42 Wn.2d 701, 258 P.2d 459 (1953) (relief denied);
Corbett v. Ticktin, 43 Wn.2d 248, 260 P.2d 895 (1953) (relief granted).
768 5 WU.LISTON, CoNTRAcrs § 1581 (rev. ed. 1936).
709 3 CoRiNn, CONTRAcTS §§ 616 et seq., particularly § 619 (1950) ; 5 WLISTON,
CONTRACTS §§ 1581 et seq., particularly § 1585 (rev. ed. 1936).
77 16 Wn.2d 251, 133 P.2d 288 (1943). Earlier Washington authority was followed.
See also Schwieger v. Robbins & Co., 48 Wn.2d 22, 290 P.2d 984 (1955) (discussing
unilateral mistake of law).
771 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 505 (1932); 3 CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 614 (1950);
5 WU.LISTON, CONRAcrs §§ 1523, 1525 (rev. ed. 1936).
772 23 Wn.2d 109, 159 P.2d 908 (1945).
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vital element is knowledge of the mistake. A direct misrepresentation
that the document accurately embodies their agreement is not signifi-
cantly more reprehensible than is failure to reveal a known divergence
between document and agreement.7"
The defendant in the Meyer case sought to defeat reformation by
pointing to the plaintiff's negligence in not discovering the mistake.
The court was not impressed and its opinion indicates that a good deal
more than failure to carefully scrutinize the document and related
papers before signing must be shown before this type of defense can
succeed. A similar position was taken by the court in Moeller v.
Schultz, 7 where the mistake was mutual.
775
If reformation will adversely affect a successor in interest of a
party to the contract, who acquired his interest for value and without
knowledge of the mistake, the remedy will be refused.70  General
creditors of a party were accorded the same protection in Malott v.
General Mach. Co."' The holding seems extreme. Peterson v.
Paulson779 involved the difficult problem posed by a successor who
bought from a party on an installment payment contract. Reformation
was decreed. The court stated a formula which requires a contract
purchaser to "have paid the purchase price and have acquired the
legal title without notice of such prior equity," before he is entitled to
protection.80
7
7 See also Kaufman v. Woodard, 24 Wn.2d 264, 163 P.2d 606 (1945), in which the
court said that reformation can be had for "a mistake on the part of one party and
fraud or inequitable conduct on the part of the other party." What the term "inequit-
able conduct" means in this context is obscure. The court so characterized the de-
fendants' failure to reveal their failure to include certain property in a document they
prepared, but there was no showing that the agreement actually encompassed such
property. The critical issue would seem to have been a contract formation issue, to
which insufficient attention was given.
774 11 Wn.2d 416, 119 P.2d 660 (1941).7 5 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 508 (1932); and 5 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1596
(rev. ed. 1936) were cited. See also 3 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 614 at 469 (1950), and
Geogehegan v. Dever, 30 Wn.2d 877, 194 P.2d 397 (1948) ; "The fact that, due to the
neglect of either or both of the parties to verify the description, a mistake was made,
or the fact that appellant wrote the erroneous description, would not, in our opinion,
affect the mutuality of the mistake."
776 R.STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 504 (1932); 3 CoaaIN, CONTRACTS § 614 (1950).
In Shaw v. Briggle, 193 Wash. 595, 76 P.2d 1011 (1938), reformation was decreed
against a successor who acquired his interest with knowledge of the mistake. See
also the court's discussion in the Malott case, cited in the following note.
777 19 Wn.2d 62, 141 P.2d 146 (1943).
778 The action was to reform a conditional sale contract to correct the delivery
dates specified in the contract document; were the relief granted the instrument
was timely filed; in its original form, the filing was late. Relief was denied. There
was no showing that any creditor relied on the document in its original form.
779 24 Wn.2d 166, 163 P.2d 830 (1945).
780 The case was a difficult one and few are apt to quarrel with the outcome, which
in effect sustained a buyer's right to reformation as against a successor from the
seller, who bought on real estate contract and learned of the mistake before he paid
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ILLEGALITY
The contract formation process is regulated not only by the mutual
assent and consideration propositions already discussed, but also by
standards created by legislatures and courts for the protection of the
public interest. An agreement which does not conform to these stand-
ards is "illegal." Whether an agreement which would be a contract but
for the illegality creates any legal relations between the parties depends
on factors which are considered in the final subsection below.
A great variety of standards have been stated."8' The 1937-1957
Washington cases were concerned with only a few of them.
Bargains in restraint of trade. It has long been settled that the
buyer of a business can exact of the seller a covenant not to start or
enter a competing business, provided the covenant does not encompass
too much territory or too long a period." 2 No issue about the legality
of the covenant was raised in the later cases concerned with transac-
tions of this type." 3
A seller of land can lawfully take from the buyer a covenant not to
use the property in competition with the seller, provided the restraint
is "reasonable." '' In Messett v. Cowell, 8 5 the court sustained a coven-
ant not to use any of the lime rock on the demised property for the
purpose of making or burning lime.
In Marvel Baking Co. v. Teamster's Union7F8 the legality of a union-
employer agreement requiring the employer to sell only to persons in
out and received his deed. Nevertheless, ramifications of the stated principle, particu-
larly its applicability to recording system controversies, are so serious as to suggest
that the point may not be settled by the Peterson case. An innocent buyer on contract,
who has paid part of the price, would appear to merit a more sympathetic reception
than was accorded Mr. Peterson in this case.
781. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, heading to Chap. 18, § 512 (1932) ; 6 CORBIN,
CONTRACTS §§ 1373 et seq. (1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1628 et seq. (rev. ed.
1936).
782 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 513-516 (1932); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1385-
1387 (1950); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1641 (rev. ed. 1936). A number of the
earlier cases involved legality problems. See WASEINGTON ANNOTATIONS to the cited
RESTATEMENT sections.
783 Merager v. Turnbull, 2 Wn.2d 711, 99 P.2d 434 (1940) (sale of undertaking
business; covenant not to compete in Spokane, no time limit) ; Lyle v. Hasldns, 24
Wn.2d 883, 168 P.2d 797 (1946) (sale of sawmill; covenant not to compete in Lewis
County for ten years) ; Mead v. Anton, 33 Wn.2d 741, 207 P.2d 227 (1949) (sale of
restaurant; covenant not to compete within a radius of five hundred yards, for ten
years) ; Management, Inc. v. Schassberger, 39 Wn.2d 321, 235 P.2d 293 (1951) (sale
of dry cleaning and laundry business; covenant not to compete in Yaldma for five
years). The controversies in these cases were about the fact of competition and about
remedies.
785 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1389 (1950) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1642 (rev. ed.
1936).
785 194 Wash. 646, 79 P.2d 337 (1938).
736 5 Wn.2d 346, 105 P.2d 46 (1940).
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good standing with the union was apparently assumed by the court. 8"
An agreement between prospective bidders at a public sale, whereby
one for a consideration provided by the other undertakes not to bid
against him, is illegal.788 This proposition was reaffirmed in Conran v.
White & Bollard, Inc."9
Wagers. "While it is true that wagering contracts are unenforceable,
yet the first requisite of a wagering contract is that it must be so
considered by both parties in such transactions as are here involved.
Where the intention of gambling is limited to one party, it is not a
wagering contract." With this passage the court in Ferris & Hardgrove
v. Buff, 9 met the defendant's argument that his margin transactions
on the wheat exchange were illegal because he "never intended actually
to buy or sell but only to gamble.. .,,'M The decision appears to be the
only one of the later cases which is concerned with this type of
illegality.
Usury. The basic Washington usury statute is RCW 19.52.020.
Three of the later cases were concerned with its operation. In Tacoma
Hotel, Inc. v. Morrison & Co., Inc."' a lender who had loaned $10,000
succeeded in persuading the court that the agreement was for repay-
ment of $10,000 plus seven per cent interest, although the borrower's
note was for an amount which violated the statute and the lender's first
complaint sought recovery of such amount. In Auve v. Fagnant,'98
the court refused to give effect to an agreement whereby the parties
purportedly compromised the usury issue; the transaction was
usurious at the outset and was held to remain usurious despite the
787 The union called its members out on strike, and picketed the employer's plant.
This action was to restrain the picketing. The court denied the injunction, finding a
labor dispute existed and that there was no secondary boycott; the court evidently
assumed the legality of the restraint See also Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No.
313, note 814 below.
7 88 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 517 (1932) ; 5 WImLSToN, CONTRACTS § 1663 (rev.
ed. 1936).
789 24 Wn2d 619, 167 P.2d 133 (1946). See also Wilder v. Nolte, 195 Wash. 1, 79
P.2d 682 (1938).920 Wn.2d 161, 163, 146 P2d 331, 332 (1944).
791 The stated test is the usual one. See RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS §§ 520, 522, 523
(1932); 6 CoRiN, CONTRACTS §§ 1484, 1485 (1950); 6 CoRBiN, CoNTRAcrs § 1468
(1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1668, 1669, 1670 (rev. ed. 1936).
792 193 Wash. 134, 74 P.2d 1003 (1938). The court recognized that the true
transaction must be ascertained by determining the intent of the parties. The evidence
of a usurious bargain, provided by the note and the first complaint, was sufficiently
rebutted by evidence of mistakes in the preparation of those instruments. Courts will
be equally astute in getting at the realities of the transaction where a lender attempts
to disguise usury. 6 CoRmNn, CONTRACTS § 1501 (1950); 6 WILLIsToN, CONTRACTS
§ 1687 (rev. ed. 1936); RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS § 529 (1932).
79316 Wn.2d 669, 134 P2d 454 (1943).
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"compromise." With Hafer v. Spaeth794 Washington joined the many
jurisdictions in which a conditional sale transaction will not be
usurious; I" the transaction is a sale and the financing charge is a part
of the price. The opinion contains an unusually full and helpful discus-
sion of the basic usury elements.
Bargains tending to obstruct the administration of justice. Yount
v. Zarbell'0 involved an agreement by which a person not a lawyer
employed a lawyer. The agreement was held to be illegal. The employ-
er was in the collection and discount business. He prepared pleadings
and related papers which the lawyer signed. The lawyer then con-
ducted the litigation. In one instance a judgment was taken with
knowledge that the defendant had partly paid the obligation sued on.
In re Arbitration Puget Sound Bridge Co. v. Lake Washington Ship-
yards0 7 followed earlier cases in holding that arbitration is in Wash-
ington solely a statutory proceeding. The court also construed the
statute as conferring on the parties "an absolute right to be heard and
to present their evidence, after reasonable notice of the time and
place of the hearing." An earlier case98 was disapproved insofar as it
conflicts with this construction. The court went on, however, to find
that the right to a hearing can be waived.
Bargains in violation of public or fiduciary duty. An agreement
which contemplates persuasion of a public official to a course of action
desired by one of the parties creates obvious hazards to the public
interest. In their endeavor to protect that interest without stultifying
legitimate activity, courts have stressed the method of persuasion con-
templated or used. If the method is corrupt the agreement is illegal.
A provision for payment only if the persuasion is successful is not
proof enough that corrupt methods are contemplated. 9 In Hall v.
Anderson"' the court adhered to these principles. York v. Gaasland
Co."'1 went against the legality of a contingent fee agreement, but only
because an executive order hostile to such agreements was found to
71,422 Wn.2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945).
705 6 ConIN, CONTRACTS § 1500 (1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1685 (rev. ed.
1936).
796 17 Wn2d 278, 135 P.2d 309 (1943).
707 1 "Wn.2d 401, 96 P.2d 257 (1939).
708 Hatch v. Cole, 128 Wash. 107, 222 Pac. 463 (1924).7 00 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 559, 563 (1932); 6 CoaIN, CONTRACTS § 1450
(1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1729 (rev. ed. 1936). The cited texts indicate some
contrary authority on contingent fee agreements.
:10 18 Wn.2d 625, 140 P.2d 266 (1943).$0 41 Wn.2d 540, 250 P.2d 967 (1952).
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declare a federal public policy which state courts should respect. The
opinion in the York case also pointed out a conflict between the Hall
case, supra, and Goodier v. Hamilton,s02 an earlier case:
In determining whether or not a contract is inherently corrupt, how-
ever, we seem to have applied a less stringent test in the Hall case than
in the earlier Goodier case. In the Hall case, we stated that a contract
is not inherently corrupt if it "could conceivably have been lawfully
performed," while in the Goodier case we held that a contract should
be condemned if it "contains the germ of possible corruption."
It was not thought necessary in the York case to resolve the conflict.
Sinnar v. LeRoy" 3 gave the court another opportunity to clarify its
position. The opportunity was not taken."0 '
Bargains tending to defraud or injure third persons."'° "A bargain
for exemption from liability for the consequences of negligence not
falling greatly below the standard established by law for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risk of harm, is legal except in the
cases stated in sec. 575 ..8.. The exceptions provided in section 575
cover willful breach of duty, and negligence in employer-employee and
public service relationships. Both the basic rule and the exceptions
represent views which most American courts would accept, 0 and
which the Washington court approved in a 1936 case.08 Operators of
parking lots have in several outside cases been held to come within the
"public service" exception."0 ' Ramsden v. Grimshawl ° involved the
familiar parking lot claim check disclaiming all liability for theft or
injury to the vehicle; in holding the disclaimer to be ineffective the
court stated a principle broader than was necessary for the result, and
802 172 Wash. 60, 19 P.2d 392 (1933).
SOS 44 Wn.2d 728, 270 P.2d 800 (1954) (contingent-fee agreement for procuring
a beer license was held illegal; the Hall case was purportedly distinguished; the court
said after referring to the Goodier case, "the record not only discloses that this
transaction 'contains the germ of possible corruption,' but the evidence and all
inferences which may be drawn lead us to conclude that the parties contemplated the
use of means other than legal to accomplish the end desired."
804 The Hall, York, Goodier and Sinnar cases are discussed in Note, 30 WAsH. L.
REv. 97 (1955).805 This subheading is taken from the RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS; it is concededly
inapt as to a bargain for exemption from liability, which is the subject matter of
Restatement sections 574 and 575 and the problem raised in some of the Washington
cases discussed in this subsection.806 RESTATEMFNT, CONTRACTS § 574 (1932).
5076 CORRIN, CONTRAcTS § 1472 (1950); 6 WiLLISTON, CoNRcs § 1751C (rev.
ed. 1936).
sos Broderson v. Rainier Nat'l Park Co., 187 Wash. 399, 60 P.2d 234 (the exemption
covered operation of the toboggan slide at Longmire Springs, and was sustained).800 4 W.LisTox, CONTRACTS § 1065A (rev. ed. 1936).
81023 Wn.2d 864, 162 P.2d 901 (1945).
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probably broader than was intended: "[T]he rule is that one cannot
contract away responsibility for one's own negligence or fraud." The
earlier case was not discussed or cited. 1' It seems unlikely that the
court will hold disclaimers of liability for simple negligence in non-
public-service relationships to be illegal.
Disclaimers of liability for breach of contract have come to litiga-
tion in a limitation-of-liability context and have been sustained in
Washington and elsewhere. 12 The fate of an outright disclaimer of
all liability for any and all breaches remains obscure.
If the making or performance of an agreement entails tortious injury
to a third person or the breach of a contract to which he is a party, the
agreement is illegal. 13 This proposition was invoked in several of the
later Washington cases. 1'
8 1 1 In the Broderson case, cited note 808 above, the court discussed the public
service exception and found the defendant did not come within it. The opinion in the
Ramsden case contains no helpful discussion.
812 See the subsection entitled "Limitation of liability," n. 601 et seq. above. Erick-
sen v. Edmonds School Dist, 13 Wn2d 398, 125 P.2d 275 (1942) is of particular
interest in this connection, because the court addressed itself directly to the validity of
a building-contract clause disclaiming liability for any delay. The clause was sus-
tained, with citation of earlier Washington cases and of many cases from otherjurisdictions: "Where, however, the contract expressly precludes the recovery of
damages by the contractor for delay caused by the default of the owner, that pro-
vision will be given full effect." Whether the court might take a different position if
the breach is "willful" cannot be determined. The disclaimer at issue in the Ericksen
case was of course partial, excluding damages for just one kind of breach; it was also
accompanied by a provision for an extension of the builder's time for performance if
delay was caused by the owner's fault.
813 RESTATEMMNT, CoNTRAcTs §§ 571, 576, 577 (1932) ; 6 CoRniN, CoNmTAcTs § 1470(1950) ; 6 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1738 (rev. ed. 1936).
s14 Findley v. Findley, 193 Wash. 41, 74 P2d 490 (1937) (An agreement between
three of four heirs to divide all of a decendent's estate among themselves was held to
be illegal) ; Wilder v. Nolte, 195 Wash. 1, 79 P.2d 682 (1938). The case involved an
agreement between contractors. One, who shortly thereafter submitted a bid on a
public road job, undertook to employ the other as superintendent, on a basis which
gave the "employee" the profits on the job in excess of five per cent and obligated him
to stand the losses. The court found no harm to the state in this arrangement. The
construction contract contained a non-assignment clause. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Tacoma,
199 Wash. 72, 90 P2d 226 (1939). A partnership obtained a construction subcon-
tract; one partner had charge of the work and secretly agreed with a person to
whom he sublet part of the work to share the profits and losses on that part; the
agreement was sustained; the court said: "We believe, however, that it is also the
rule that there is nothing which is inherently fraudulent or against public policy in
one member of a firm engaging in enterprises in his own behalf, provided he acts in
good faith towards his partner . . ." Edwards v. Teamsters Local Union No. 313, 8
Wn.2d 492, 113 P.2d 28 (1941). The agreement required Edwards to discontinue a
mode of operation then covered by contracts with third persons and was sustained
because those contracts contained termination clauses. McVicar v. Peters, 12 Wn.2d
92, 120 P.2d 485 (1945). A side-deal by which a purchaser who was being refinanced
by the Home Owners' Loan Corporation promised to pay the vendor $325 was
sustained because known to the Corporation; cases from other states, holding side-
arrangements illegal as a fraud on the Corporation, were discussed and distinguished.
Jones v. Curtiss, 20 Wn.2d 470, 147 P.2d 912 (1944) reached the opposite result,
because the Corporation was not shown to have been aware of the side-deal. Four
judges dissented, finding insufficient proof of the public policy which was assumed in
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Bargains prohibited by statute. An agreement prohibited by legis-
lation is of course illegal. Legislative purpose is expressed with varying
degrees of clarity and it is often hard to determine whether a particular
statute is prohibitory or only regulatory. 1 ' Both the basic principle
and the difficulties in applying it were demonstrated in the later cases. 1 '
the cases which invalidated secret deals collateral to HOLC refinancing. In Wash-
ington State Hop Producers v. Riel, 20 Wn.2d 624, 148 P.2d 847 (1944), a contract
for the sale of land by a father to his daughter was sustained, although the effect of
it was to relieve the father of an exclusive marketing agreement with the Hop
Producers; the court recognized that the transaction would be illegal unless shown to
have been undertaken in good faith, and found both an adequate price and good
faith to have been shown.
83. RESTATEmENT, CoNrAcTs § 580 (1932); 6 CoRSiN, CoNTRAcTs § 1374 (1950);
6 W i.LIsToN, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1763 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936). Usury, which was discussed
above, is a statutory wrong. Bargains in restraint of trade, also discussed above, may
come within the operation of a statute.
811 Smith v. Seattle, 192 Wash. 64, 72 P.2d 588 (1937) (a city's request for bids on
electric light globes may specify "Mazda lamps only"; a request so phrased does not
violate a city charter requirement of competitive bidding) ; Fisher v. Thumlert, 194
Wash. 70, 76 P.2d 1018 (1938) (credit sale of apples to an unlicensed commission
merchant is not void; the buyer acquired title and his later mortgage created a valid
lien; in a dictum the court said that a contract made by an unlicensed commission
merchant to buy goods would not be enforced) ; Ogilvy v. Peck, 200 Wash. 122, 93
P2d 289 (1939) (a licensed plumber can recover for work done despite his failure to
procure a building permit for the work) ; Callahan v. Jones, 200 Wash. 241, 93 P.2d
326 (1939) (prosecuting attorney's agreement with a person who had lodged a
criminal complaint concerning a theft, for representation of the complainant in civil
proceedings for recovery of the stolen property, was held to violate REm. REv. STAT.
§ 4138 and to be illegal) ; Washington Fruit & Produce Co. v. Yakima, 3 Wn.2d 152,
100 P.2d 8, 103 P.2d 1106 (1940) (agreement for the furnishing of power, made
between a city and a power company, was held not to violate an ordinance requiring
franchises for the use of city streets to be submitted to the voters, and not to violate
an ordinance requiring contracts to be let on an advertisement for bids) ; Whittaker
v. Weller, 8 Wn.2d 18, 111 P.2d 218 (1941) (transaction by which corporation issued
its stock, receiving the stockholder's note in payment, with the understanding that on
a stated contingency the stock would be cancelled and the note returned to the maker
thereof, was held to conflict with REI. REv. STAT. § 3823 and to be illegal) ; Smaby v.
Shrauger, 9 Wn.2d 691, 115 P.2d 967 (1941) (an agreement between stockholders of
a corporation and its employees, whereby the corporation was released and the stock-
holders promised to pay accrued wages, was held not to violate REm. REv. STAT. §
7594; four judges dissented) ; Pillatos v. Hyde, 11 Wn.2d 403, 119 P.2d 323 (1941)
(an agreement between a corporation and its employee whereby the latter was to
receive part of his pay in stock of the corporation was held to violate REm. REv. STAT.
§ 7594 and to be illegal; four judges dissented) (the statute with which the Smaby and
Pillatos cases were concerned is now RCW 49.48.010; it forbids the issuance by an
employer of orders for wages, payable in other than money) ; Oregon-W. Ry. & Nay.
Co. v. C. M. Kopp Co., 12 Wn.2d 146, 120 P.2d 845 (1942) (an agreement by which
a rail carrier undertakes to transport, and render a service not covered by its rate
schedule, violates 24 STAT. 380 (1887) ; 63 STAT. 486 (1949) ; 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1952),
and is illegal); Dalton v. Clarke, 18 Wn.2d 322, 139 P.2d 291 (1943) (agreement
between the Seattle transportation commission and a contractor, negotiated and not
let on a public call for bids, was held not to violate the applicable statutory regula-
tions for such transactions) ; Shorewood, Inc. v. Standring, 19 Wn.2d 627, 144 P.2d
243 (1943) (unlicensed real estate broker cannot enforce a commission agreement) ;
Malcolm v. Yakima County Consol. School Dist. No. 90, 23 Wn.2d 80, 159 P.2d 394(1945) (agreement between teacher and school district, by which the teacher leased
living quarters from the district, was held to violate REMs. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 4852-1,
setting a minimum pay for teachers) ; Rathke v. Yakima Valley Grape Growers Ass'n,
30 Wn.2d, 486, 192 P.2d 349 (1948) (agreement was held to violate the Robinson-
Patman Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914) ; 49 STAT. 1526 (1936) ; 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1958), and
to be illegal) ; State ex rel. Piper v. Pratt, 31 Wn.2d 725, 198 P.2d 814 (1948) (agree-
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Bargains concerning domestic relations. An agreement to marry
after one party (or both) is freed from an existing marriage by divorce
or death of the present spouse is illegal.""7 This proposition was applied
in several of the later cases.818
An agreement for illicit sex relations is illegal." 9 This principle was
invoked by the defendant in Anderson v. Petridge,20 without success.
The action was on an employment contract, which the court found was
not made in contemplation of the illegal relationship which subse-
quently developed.
Effect of illegality. Generally speaking, there is no remedy for
either party to an illegal agreement. Damages or specific enforcement
cannot be had. Neither can restitution for a performance rendered.82" '
ment between a county and an architect whereby the latter prepared plans for a
court house, was held unenforceable because the building project exceeded the county's
statutory debt limit and because the commissioners had no authority to engage an
architect save in conjunction with a building project); Johnson v. Rutherford, 32
Wn.2d 194, 200 P.2d 977 (1948) (agreement for sale of a leasehold on commission
does not violate the statute requiring a real estate broker to be licensed) ; Meyer v.
Simpson, 34 Wn.2d 486, 209 P.2d 294 (1949) (an unlicensed architect cannot enforce a
promise to pay for his services) ; Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner, 34 Wn.2d 269, 208 P.2d
906 (1949) (agreement between an oil company and a distributor, requiring the latter
to deal only in the oil company's products and to maintain indicated prices, was held
to violate no federal or state statute) ; Wachob v. Griner, 35 Wn.2d 309, 212 P.2d 781
(1949) (agreement for sale of a leasehold on commission does not violate the statute
requiring a real estate broker to be licensed) ; Hederman v. George, 35 Wn.2d 357, 212
P.2d 841 (1949) (option agreement covering mining stock was held to violate REM.
REv. STAT. § 5853-37 and to be illegal); Prichard v. Conway, 39 Wn.2d 117, 234 P.2d
872 (1951) (an agreement by which the widow of a deceased dentist undertook to
sell the decedent's dental practice for a price which included a percentage of the
profits, and which authorized her to supervise the business operation but not the
professional operation of the practice, was held not to violate REM. REv. STAT. (Supp.)
§ 10031-6) ; Yaeger v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 313, 39 Wn.2d 807, 239
P2d 318 (1951) (a closed-shop agreement between an employer and a union,
voluntarily entered into by the employer and exterting no compulsion on the then
employees of the employer, does not violate REM. REv. STAT. (Supp.) § 7612-2 and
is lawful); Isthmian S.S. Co. v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 41
Wn.2d 106, 247 P.2d 549 (1952) (followed the Yeager case, supra) ; York v. Gaasland
Co., 41 Wn.2d 540, 250 P,2d 967 (1952) (discussed at note 801 above); McDonald v.
Wockner, 44 Wn.2d 261, 267 P.2d 97 (1954) (agreements held to violate the policy
declared by the Anti-Kickback Statute, RCW 49.52.050 and 49.52.070, and to be
illegal) ; Anderson v. Petridge, 45 Wn.2d 299, 274 P.2d 352 (1954) (agreement found
not to violate 23 STAT. 332; 8 U.S.C. § 141, and to be lawful) ; Robertson v. Club
Ephrata, 48 Wn.2d 285, 293 P.2d 752 (1956) (agreement found not to violate regula-
tion 18 of the Washington State Liquor Control Board, and to be lawful).817 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 588 (1932) ; 6 CoRnrN, CONTRCrs § 1475 (1950) ; 6
WrLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1743 (rev. ed. 1936).
81g Davis v. Davis, 3 Wn.2d 448, 101 P.2d 313 (1940); Jones v. Allen, 14 Wn.2d
111, 127 P.2d 265 (1942) ; Armitage v. Hogan, 25 Wn.2d 672, 171 P.2d 830 (1946).
See also Chiles v. Kail, 34 Wn.2d 600, 208 P.2d 1198 (1949), a deceit action which
failed because the defendant's promise to marry plaintiff, although made without
intent to perform and hence fraudulent, was made while defendant was still married to
another; plaintiff knew of the existing marriage.
r10 RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 589 (1932) ; 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1476 (1950);
6 WTLLTSTON, CONTRACTS § 1745 (rev. ed. 1936).
820 45 Wn.2d 299, 274 P.2d 352 (1954).
S21 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 598 (1932).
1959]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
No attempt will be made to segregate and cite again the illustrative
cases already cited in this section.
There are exceptions to the basic proposition. In other words, there
are illegal agreements which courts will enforce, wholly or in part, or
upon which a remedy in restitution may be grounded. The factors
which support the exceptions are clear enough, although their operation
produces some difficult problems. 22 The public interest is injured with
varying degrees of seriousness by different types of illegality. Some
types of agreement are illegal only because it is in the public interest
to protect a particular class of persons. The parties may not be equally
culpable in making an illegal agreement. The illegality may be the
product of a statute which specifies a remedy for one party. Some of
these factors were significant in the later Washington cases. 23
CONCLUSION
This is not an article which permits of a conventional concluding
summary. The problems which have been considered are much too
heterogeneous. It does seem appropriate to mention some by-products
of the case reading, analysis and comparison reflected in the discussion
above. One is increased appreciation of just what "stare decisis"
means. Another is increased awareness of the effort required for the
preparation of a court's opinion. Still another is a firm conviction that
the work-load of the court is appallingly heavy. These three are inter-
8 22 RTATMNT, CONTRACTS §§ 599 et seq. (1932) ; 6 CoRBiN, CONTmACTS §§ 1518
et seq. (1950) ; 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1630 et seq. (rev. ed. 1936).823 Ryan v. KVI, Inc., 198 Wash. 459, 88 P.2d 836 (1939) (restitution was permitted
where the deviation from the legality-standard was minor; RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS§ 600 (1932) was cited); Goodwin Co. v National Discount Corp., 5 Wn2d 521, 105
P.2d 805 (1940) (usury was found; the penalty provisions of RE . RFv. STAT. § 7304
were invoked by the debtor but their application was refused because the action was
for an accounting and hence equitable; "we have held that the person seeking equitable
relief must offer to return what he actually received under the contract, along with
lawful interest thereon."); Pillatos v. Hyde, 11 Wn.2d 403, 119 P.2d 323 (1941)
(where an employment contract is illegal because in violation of REm. REv. STAT. §
7594, the employee can recover the cash value of unpaid wages) ; Auve v. Fagnant, 16
Wn.2d 669, 134 P.2d 454 (1943) (a debtor who has paid usury can recover the interest
paid in excess of twelve per cent) ; O'Neil v. Crampton, 18 Wn.2d 579, 140 P.2d 308(1943) REm. REv. STAT. § 2304, permitting the recovery of money lost at gambling,
was applied); Malcolm v. Yaldma County Consol. School Dist. No. 90, 23 Wn.2d 80,
159 P.2d 394 (1945) (school teacher whose employment agreement violated REm.
R7v. STAT. (Supp.) § 4852-1, the minimum pay statute, was permitted to recover thepay-deficiency) ; Melton v. United Retail Merchants, 24 Wn.2d 145, 163 P.2d 619
(1945) (the court recognized that "a plaintiff may recover a sum of money from a
defendant who has acknowledged that it belongs to plaintiff even if that sum be
plaintiff's share of the profits of some illegal business or transaction in which both
were engaged and equally culpable. This is so because the plaintiff, in such a situa-
tion, need prove nothing illegal, but has only to prove that the defendant has
acknowledged the sum sued for to belong to him... !').
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related. They have meaning for anyone pondering the probable future
development of contract law in Washington.
The reason given in an opinion for the result reached by the court
is especially important in an area where planning and drafting are
dominant factors. Naturally enough, judicial opinions are not uniform
in clarity either of writing or of reasoning. Yet every new contract
case, whatever the quality of the opinion, becomes a part of the mass
of precedent with which judges, as well as lawyers and law teachers,
must struggle in their endeavor to ascertain the legal principles which
govern the creation, operation and extinguishment of this legal relation.
The accumulated total of Washington cases on contracts is now
very large. As the number of the decided cases goes up, it becomes
more and more difficult to undertake the kind of research needed for
a thorough understanding of them. Without such an understanding,
differences in the language and emphasis of opinions can crystallize in
succeeding cases into applications or statements of principle which
are seemingly if not actually divergent. Several instances in which
this seems already to have occurred were observed in the case discus-
sion above. Where it occurs, consistency in results and in the stated
reasons for them becomes ever harder to achieve. Appeals are en-
couraged by the existence of precedents apparently favorable to both
sides. Good briefing becomes more difficult. The court must decide
an increasing number of cases by resort to an increasingly amorphous
body of basic doctrine. The practitioner is harassed in his drafting
and advisory functions, where he must be guided by his best judgment
concerning the court's position should the transaction come to litiga-
tion. On matters about which the court has already spoken, his judg-
ment must of necessity be predicated on the existing cases. If they
are inconclusive (as to which both the language of opinions and the
results reached are important), the percentage of uncertainty in his
advice and drafting may rise above the level which is tolerable in
commercial transactions.
The 1937-1957 contract opinions are a major research and writing
accomplishment, particularly notable when the peculiarities of records
and the deficiencies in briefs are considered, yet they comprise but a
fraction of the court's total output. It is difficult indeed to see how
the time needed for the thorough investigation of earlier cases and the
preparation of lucid opinions can be found by the court if the volume
of appellate litigation continues to increase.
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